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They did not recognize me in the shadows
That suck my color out of the passport.
My wound was exhibited for them,
For a tourist collecting pictures.
They did not recognize me. No... don't leave
My arm without sun, because the trees
knows me, the rain's song knows me
Do not leave me pale like the moon!
All the birds that followed 
my arm to the distant doors of the airport
All the wheat fields
All the prisons
All the white tombs
All the borders
All the waved handkerchiefs
All the eyes
Were with me, but they
have taken them away from my passport!
Stripped of my name and what I am?
On soil I worked with my own hands?
Today Job's cry filled the sky:
Don't make an example of me twice!
Dear gentlemen! Dear prophets,
Dont' ask the trees about their names
Dont' ask the rivers about their mother
The sword of light cleaves from my brow,
And the river gushes from my hand
All people's heart... is my citizenship
So take my passport now.
Passport - Mahmoud Darwish (1970)
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In 2000-2001 I wanted to go to Europe to dream of playing [football]... here [in Senegal] is 
hard to leave, I couldn't... I seek for that, but I had no possibilities of getting a visa to come 
to Italy. Then, my uncle wanted to go to Milan, but firstly to Mali, because there it was 
easier to come to Italy. I went with him, and we immediately found a person there, who 
had the possibility to bring people to Europe with him. But he had to go through France,  
then Italy, thus I did like that. (…) I don't really know how he could bring people there. 
But with a visa, yes. He knew the people, important people. How he sorted it out, I don't 
know. He arranged all the documents, presented them to the Embassy, who gave him the 
visas and then we left, passing through France.
There I thought that every trouble would be over, but actually any trouble had started yet  
(…) we paid three thousands euro, then I had 750 euro in my pockets, which means five 
thousand CFA as  argent de poche. But he stole from us, he stole money. Because then he 
change in dollars and I didn't know how much was the dollar in that moment, I was young 
(…) We arrived in France, in Paris I think (…) then I went to Milan, from there I had no  
more money. I paid from France to Milan and they were finished. I called one of my aunts,  
she came and gave me 150 euro more or less, but it was the lira, I don't remember well, but  
it was not that much (…) my uncle told me that it was difficult to stay in Milan without  
documents, “if they catch you they can bring you back to Senegal”, and he suggest me to go 
immediately to Tuscany, it was better and more quiet. So I came to Tuscany, and it was true 
it was more quiet. I found friends there who told me that there were two alternatives in 
terms of job: “harvest or selling”. Since I didn't understand Italian I had to choose [among 
these]. Harvest is not easy, you have to wait for a place, while selling you can even start  
tomorrow. Therefore I told myself: “I have no money, I only have around 150 euro. I can't  
wait, I need to go straight immediately to sell”.
Pape - Dakar, November 2011
These  few  glimpses  into  the  experience  of  a  young  Senegalese  travelling towards  Italy 
provide insight into the life of many Senegalese in Italy. The story of Pape brings to the fore the  
issue of Senegalese migrants working as street-sellers, an issue debated not only in academic 
work,  but  also  in  newspapers  and  tabloids.  In  recent  decades,  Senegalese  migration  has 
attracted the attention of political scientists, economists, sociologists, historians and migration 
experts. In the terms of mainstream research, the experience of Senegalese migrants speaks to 
us about the phenomenon of migration in connection with the role of community, remittances, 
social integration, migration and development, topics whose functioning has been approached 
by researchers working interdisciplinarily and intersectionally. 
I will not be discussing these issues. I will not write about Senegalese migration, or about 
“migration fuxes”. But I do believe that Pape's story demands more of us. It asks for specific 
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interrogations concerned with the narrative surrounding the travel experience which, I believe, 
is derived from something which is seldom mentioned in today’s debates on migration: the 
availability of mobility channels. 
The aspect of human mobility which makes the news is “illegal migration”, a term which is 
often associated with the rhetoric of invasion. It is easy for a general public to imagine people  
taking the trip from Africa to Europe on a damaged boat, seeking peace, food, and a job, as  
typical  of those to whom this term is applied. We have plenty of images, video, and stories of 
“boat people”, but it is not my intention to recall them here. What I was (and still am) interested  
in is what we do not see. What we are not used to having narratives of. What occurs before the 
boat, the fight, the arrival. Before the naming of that person as a migrant. 
When I applied for my internship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I was not sure how 
to choose between Senegal and Morocco. And I did not even know I was to go on to work on a 
PhD. I was looking for the possibility of experiencing my personal migration for a while, from 
the “north” to the “south”. To see the country of origin of my friends, as I have already done in  
Romania and I would later go on to do in Tunisia, this was my real, personal aim.
Finally, Senegal was settled as my destination. 14 January 2010, Milan-Dakar in a five-hour 
low-cost fight, with ticket purchased a few weeks before. And it was done. That was intended to 
be my voyage to become an expat. And, to put it simply, that was precisely the motivation of my 
trip. Right after completing my master degree course, travelling without fixed dates, going to 
take up an unpaid internship, buying a fight and shortly afterwards finding myself immediately 
there, and looking for an understanding of how different it is for others to move in the reverse 
direction.
By the time I started working  at the Italian Embassy in Dakar I knew I was  also a PhD 
student, but this did not really imply a different approach to the job. I was there because of my 
previous curiosity and my research project was not even a draft. Nevertheless, I thought it was 
useful  to  collect  direct  experience of  what I  was,  albeit  vaguely,  interested in studying:  the  
inequality of access to foreign spaces. How do state devices regulate movements? What is the  
operational functioning of the Schengen regime? 
Over the period of  the internship, my picture of  the operational  questions  I thought  it 
necessary to investigate became clearer, and the experiences I was gaining began to take on the  
form of a pilot survey for my research project. In the course of this process, the visa device and 
its deployment via Consulates became the focus of my research. 
In  this  work,  I  try  to  maintain  a  balance  between  theoretical  suggestions,  analysis  of  
institutions, and empirical descriptions. But the later topic is probably the one with the broadest 
scope,  since  I  want  to  give  a  precise  account  of  what  goes  on  in  Consulates,  how  law  is 
implemented, practices developed by the administration, how recipients and officials behave at 
the counter, and similar activities. It is that aspect of the institutions which is relevant to the 
people's experience, not the people themselves, that constitutes the object of inquiry. Hence, my 
impetus was to study Consulates and visa application/issuing procedures (there are no such 
studies available at the time of  writing),  providing insights from the very filter  of partition 
among mobilities, and looking beyond the specific case of the Italian Consulate in Senegal. 
In the following pages I will present the context in which my research was conducted, my 
research questions, and the scientific scope and social usefulness of such research, ending with 
an overview on the structure of the work.
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The Schengen Regime
Nowadays, the formation and upkeep of European Union (EU) policies of mobility and 
migration are two separate domains within the EU decision-making process. Internal mobility 
or  the  free  movement  of  persons  is  one of  the four  fundamental  freedoms of  the  Internal 
Market, while EU mobility and migration policies are matters of freedom, security and justice. 
The two regimes are ruled by different philosophies and different institutions. They are, 
however, two sides of the same coin: the EU’s mobility and migration regime for its members  
and non-members. Indeed, the principle of free movement of persons grants EU citizens the 
right to move and live freely within the Union’s borders, and this is the inclusive side of the 
coin, tending towards a “borderless Europe”. At the same time, for many people around the 
world, borders are not disappearing but are very much present. The external EU borders are 
being tightened, and mobility policies are becoming increasingly exclusive, all of which gives  
the EU its “Fortress Europe” reputation. 
However,  some  further  considerations  which  have  challenged  this  apparently 
straightforward distinction need to be mentioned in order to paint a more accurate picture of 
the situation. On one hand, the clash between France and the EU Commission on the expulsion 
of Roma people (August 2010) challenges the freedom of movement and stay of EU citizens, 
with the justification of a requirements for means of sustainment. On the other hand, the events  
of  spring  2011  concerning  Tunisian  migrants  in  Italy,  as  well  as  the  Danish  attempt  to 
reintroduce  controls  on  internal  borders  (May  2011),  together  with  the  resulting  EU 
Commission's communication on migration (COM (2011) 248),  have shown how Schengen 
internal borders can be immediately retrenched to stop unwanted movements.
Moreover,  it  is  worth  mentioning  the  EU  enlargement  of  2004  and  the  recent  visa 
liberalisation. As the date of accession drew closer, old member states became reluctant to grant 
full  citizenship rights  to the new member states of Eastern Europe. Hence  a  second tier  in 
European citizenship was created, with new member states being subjected to transition periods 
for the application of some of their rights, such as the free movement of workers (Lesińska et al. 
2012).  Regarding  the  visa  liberalisations  of  2009  (Fyrom,  Montenegro,  Serbia)  and  2010 
(Albania,  Bosnia)  it  is  worth  mentioning  the  recent  safeguard  clause (COM  (2011)  290) 
“allowing the rapid, temporary suspension of the visa waiver for a third country on the positive 
list in case of an emergency situation, where an urgent response is needed in order to resolve 
the difficulties faced by one or more Member States, and taking account of the overall impact of 
the  emergency  situation  on  the  European Union  as  a  whole”.  This  shows  us  that  the  line 
between the regimes governing internal and external movements can sometimes be thin.  
Nevertheless, the Schengen regime acts as the foremost partition among travellers. Citizens 
of certain countries outside of the EU are subjected to visa requirements for periods of up to 
three months, which constitutes the common Schengen policy on short-term visas. 
EU governments have refused to be satisfied by the information issued via passports by the 
authorities of countries that they deem “risky”, and they prefer to carry out the identification of  
foreigners in their home countries themselves, via their Consulates, and undertake the control 
of their documents before their departure, in order to prevent entry of anyone who is likely to  
become a “security risk” if allowed to enter the EU territory. 
Although maritime entries across the Mediterranean fit  the requirements of  migration-
related news-making perfectly, tourist visas are the largest channel used by people to enter the 
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EU (Morawska 2001; Monzini et al. 2006; Fasani 2009). By far the most effective way to access 
mobility from certain countries, as well as the most common way to migrate, is to enter on a 
valid visa, and to remain after the visa has expired (overstaying). Data collected from interviews 
with over 2,200 people who migrated from Morocco or Senegal to Spain, and from Egypt or 
Ghana to Italy,  show that 58% had used the overstaying method (Schoorl  et  al.  2000).  The  
Italian  Ministry  of  the  Interior  reports  that  migrants  by  sea  represent  about  13%  of  the 
undocumented  migrants  present  in  Italy,  while  the  undocumented  people  are  overstayers 
(64%).  The 23% is  made  up  of  persons  who entered  Italy  from  other  Schengen countries, 
crossing the border by fraudulent means (Ministry of the Interior 2007: 336). 
Migration vs. Mobility: towards a research question
It  is  worth  mentioning  one  main  assumption  which  lays  behind  the  research.  The 
management of mobilities operates through dis-located borders, a situation which filters out (or 
“differentially” in) categories of people on the move. A selection process guided by a utilitarian 
and  security-oriented  rationale,  favouring  the  interests  and  needs  of  the  State  over  the 
protection/desires  of  the  traveller takes  place  far  from  EU  borders.  While  highly 
skilled/business  travellers  are  granted  visas  for  entrance  and  stay  permits  with  facilitated 
administrative procedures which smooth their path, applicants coming from countries “at risk” 
of emigration are, even before starting the procedure, generally held to be “risky” because of 
their assumed intent of overstaying the period that could be granted to them, and they have to 
spend  a  lot  of  time  and  money  on  attempting  to  pass  through  non-transparent  and 
controversial procedures for obtaining a visa. To have a chance of successfully negotiating the 
route towards an entry visa, it is up to the individual applicant to prove (with the aid of several  
documents required by the Embassies) that s/he does not constitute a threat and that s/he can 
be regarded as bona fide. 
The locations appropriate for the operational case study are Schengen Consulates abroad, in 
countries subjected to the visa requirement, where these Consulates act as borders through the 
visa  device,  having  the  power  to  issue  it  or  not.  Thus,  the  different  borders  that  travellers  
activate and the inequality in access to spaces decided on the basis of an alleged “ migratory 
risk” are the main issues addressed by the research. 
How  are  the  categories  which  separate  people  on  the  move,  through  the  process  of 
selection-discrimination-exclusion, established? How do we make sense of them? Where does 
the process start? When? How?  
More  specifically,  the  central  questions  raised  in  this  study  concern,  on one  hand,  the 
application of Schengen visa policies by Embassies and Consulates,  focusing particularly on 
applicants for a tourism Schengen visa, for whom the migration risk is expected to be greatest,  
in  the  sense  that  is  the  most  diverse  category  of  travellers. On  the  other  hand,  the 
understanding of the concept of “risk” by EU institutions, and its implementation in Consular 
practices as well as its impact on the production of the “migration vs mobility” divide will be 
investigated. And in order to develop the main strands of my research I will draw upon the 
following operational questions:
· How is “regular migration” understood and managed at the EU level? What are the EU's  
policies and how are they implemented by the administration operating on a national and local 
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level? 
· How do Schengen visa application and issuing procedures take place? What are the steps 
the visa applicant has to face? 
· Who is in charge of making the decision and which criteria are taken into consideration? 
How  is  an  understanding  of  risk  translated  by  Consular  officials?  What  are  the  profiles 
considered as being at “risk”?
The aim of the study is not to account for the success or failures of the Schengen visa policy, 
but  rather  to  achieve  a  better  understanding  of  the  institutional  and  routine  bureaucratic  
mechanisms that  lie behind it.  I will look at the implementation of visa policies at the micro 
level  of  Consulates  in  the  attempt  to  unpack  discourses  and  policies  around  migration, 
exploring selective filters and the construction of the category of (potential) “migrant” itself.  
Virtually nothing is known about the practices that migrants have to face to travel with proper 
documents toward the countries of Europe which operate under the Schengen system, and all  
the bureaucracy of the EU member states which is deployed abroad passes largely unnoticed.  
Leaving the exploration of maps of migration fuxes to others, I have in my research looked 
beyond borders as points of departure, and explored the Consular level in its implementation of 
visa policies and development of working practices. Here, decisions which lead to both mobility 
and immobility are made.
Critical (Migration) Studies
Human migration has increasingly become the focus of international relations in a world of 
nation states and it has given rise to the academic discipline of Migration Studies. The focus on 
migration issues has led to its overexposure in the news media and the public discourse, and in 
response, the migration knowledge-producing machine is running at maximum speed. But why 
do we study migrants? Why do we need an understanding of migration? What is the scope of 
Migration Studies? 
Migration Studies emerged as a scholarly field from the analysis of migrants and of those 
state policies which have a bearing on the fows of people. Scholars have been prone to adopt 
the perspective of nation states (and to use the considerable quantity of data they generate) in 
studying topics such as “immigration”, “emigration” or “asylum”, and as they have sought to 
escape the tyranny of nationally bounded studies through explorations of transnational and 
diasporic migrant networks which span geographical borders, they have sometimes paid too 
little attention to the power that states have long exercised over migration  (Harzig, Hoerder 
2009). 
The question of how governmental policies classify, regulate and infuence mobile people, 
and  in  so  doing construct  the  individual  as  migrant attracts  less  attention.  Despite  all  this 
questioning  at  the  border,  the  field  of  Migration  Studies  is  not  ruled  by  cautious 
deconstructionists. On the contrary, embedded in the social sciences, with an eye to infuencing 
policy, migrationists (not all, of course) construct their own “order of things”: irregular migrant, 
economic  migrant,  cross-border  migrant,  second/third/fourth  generation  migrant,  host-
country, source-country, primary and secondary migration, transnational migration, internal 
migration, chain migration, and the list goes on.
The  literature  on  transnationalism  has  questioned  the  one-way  assumptions  of  these 
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migration definitions, stressing the interplay or interrelations of the two places involved and of  
the migrant networks between, but it  did not enlarge or even much question the notion of 
migration itself as a form of mobility (Levitt, Glick Schiller 2004). 
The Algerian sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad introduced an interesting standpoint in critical 
migration research. According to Sayad (1999), migration is no less than the state itself and the 
very fact of using the concept of migration is to think like a State (pénsée d'État). Sayad shows 
how migration acts as the boundary of the national state, revealing its intrinsic and basic truth: 
it is the very nature of the national state to categorise, and in order to do so, beforehand to 
ascribe to itself every necessary criterion of pertinence so as to carry out this partition - without  
which there is  no national  state  -  between “nationals” and the “others”.  Thus,  migrants  are 
produced as discourse by the state,  in contrast with other movers such as tourists, business 
people and international lorry drivers, which remain uninteresting and largely invisible forms 
of movement from the migration/immigration perspective. 
Elspeth Guild mentions the term “Critical Migration Studies”,  which she defines as “the 
process of deconstructing the state's claims in the face of resistance by individuals” (Guild 2009: 
11). The author investigates the migration-security nexus in the 21st century, underlining a logic 
of  otherness,  of  inside-ness/outside-ness,  inclusion/exclusion,  classification  and  porosity  of 
classification. “It is in the allocation of statutes that the first indications of the relationship of the 
foreigner with security appears”, the author (2009: 13) argues. Following Guild, I challenge the 
supposition on which Migration Studies is based: that we know what migration is and which 
actors are entitled to determine the political in respect of migration. 
Furthermore,  Migration Studies is not only a disciplinary field in which scholars move, 
write, and work, but it can also be an object of inquiry, which can tell us quite a lot about our 
deeply held assumptions on the relationship between mobility and migration. In a sense, the 
close cooperation between government and academia is what enabled the field of Migration 
Studies  to  grow so  prolifically  over  the  past  few decades  throughout,  at  least,  the  Western 
hemisphere. But this cooperation is exercising pressure on the political ambitions of Migration 
Studies,  especially  as  more  critical  voices  refuse  to  promote  a  science  of  the  state  or  to  
participate in Western securitisation projects. 
Following Favell's idea of re-describing our object of study by “rebooting migration theory” 
(Favell  in  Brettell,  Hollifield  2008),  this  research seeks  to  shift  the  focus  from the study of 
emigration/immigration dynamics to a broad spatial mobility study, where the focus is on the 
“construction” of  migrations,  not  on migrants.  In my understanding,  a  migrant is  someone 
experiencing troubles moving to or remaining in their desired place,  and a critical research 
approach  is  required  to  unpack  the  reasoning  and  functioning  of  those  troubles.  As  a 
consequence, my approach brings the experience of immobility and failed mobility attempts 
into the study of migration.
While the issue of migration as well  as manifold related nexuses (migration & security, 
migration & development, migration & integration, etc...) are among the most debated topics 
both in politics and academia, the high incidence of restrictions occurring in the reality and the 
inaccessibility of migration for the majority of people are often overlooked. The study of visa 
restrictions can give interesting insights on actual borders which exist effectively in places far 
from States’ ports of entry, and on how they are still used as key strategies to control access to  
spaces, representing an important manifestation of inequalities imposed on people. 
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Structure of the dissertation
The concepts which frame my understanding of the relationship between state control of 
movement,  borders,  the  implementation  of  visa  policies  and practices  of  discretion  will  be 
illustrated in the first Chapter of this dissertation. Subsequently, in Chapter Two, I will explain 
the reasons that induced me to collect direct observations and interviews. I will also illustrate 
some methodological issues and troubles related to my fieldwork. 
The rest of this dissertation is organised in two parts, where the first has a contextualisation 
function  relating  to  the  second.  In  the  first  I  describe  the  institutional  framework  (both 
European and Italian) of migration administrations and policies, while in the second part I will 
dig into the detail of implementation of visa policies in Consulates, which I consider to be the 
actual “substance” of my present study, and where the issues of discretion and filtering practices 
will come into sight. 
In Chapter Three I will trace the interrelated structure of Italian administrations in charge 
of  migration management,  from Ministries  to  other  state  and non-state  bureaucracies.  The 
following chapter (Chapter Four) explores, on the one hand, the regulations and tools of the 
Schengen visa policy, and on the other hand, Italian laws and the mechanisms for legal entry. 
In the second part of the thesis (Chapters Five to Seven) I will look at the micro level of  
policies, its implementation and the working practices developed at the Consular level in the 
country under consideration. I  will  show how the implementation of the visa device entails 
procedures  which are both long and unclear,  and are in  operation both on the  side of  the 
Consulate and the applicant. This issue will be developed in three steps. First of all, I will outline 
the  visa  application  process  (Chapter  Five),  considering  the  access  to  information  and  the 
collection of required documents. Secondly, in Chapter Six, I will describe the visa examination 
phase, with particular attention to the very moment of the interview at the counter and the 
official's assessment. Then, in Chapter Seven, I will look at the family reunification procedure. I 
will  investigate  both  phases,  taking  place  in  the  country  of  origin  (Senegal),  and  in  the 
destination country (Italy), in order to show the persistence of those practices of control which 
may be present even in the case of a recognised right.
To conclude, I will recapitulate my findings in the light of my initial research questions, 





The following pages outline the theoretical references and the literature review on which I 
built  the  analytical  framework  of  this  dissertation.  I  have  adopted  an  inter-disciplinary 
approach to this work, taking theoretical tools from different disciplinary fields and borrowing 
from different research streams in order to achieve an understanding of the subject as deep as  
possible. Consistent with this approach, I will in particular make use of tools appropriate to the 
fields  of  International  Relations  and  EU  studies,  together  with  those  of  History  and  the 
Sociology of Migration. Other relevant fields of study which I have paid particular attention to  
are Political Philosophy, Sociology of Law and Human Geography.
Combining approaches drawn from these fields of study, I will place particular importance 
on the following keywords: passport and visa, border, risk, implementation and discretion. I 
will first of all refer to the literature regarding the state control of movement, focusing on the  
categories of passport and visa. In the second section of this chapter, I will retrace the processes  
of categorisation and selection in the context of the history of mobilities, and then go on to 
consider the relationship between borders and the selection processes applied to people,  in 
terms of filtering practices, deterrence, and their symbolic power. In the fourth section, I will  
illustrate the understanding of the notion of  risk in the sociological tradition, as well  as its 
usages in Security Studies and Migration Studies. In the section which follows, I will review the 
literature on policy implementation in the frame of Policy Studies and also look at this field 
within a sociological framework.
To conclude, I will highlight the need to look beyond migration policy discourses per se and 
to  explore  the  micro  level  of  policies,  measures  and  practices  as  observed  in  their  daily  
application. 
State control over movement: passports and visas
States have always sought to monopolise and control the legitimate means of circulation 
inside their territory and at their borders, and this is a tangible manifestation of the system of  
inter-state relationships which was created in 1648 by the terms of the Peace of Westphalia 
(Caplan, Torpey 2001). The Westphalian sovereignty principle assumes the right to exclusionary 
practices within territories defined by borders, which means that the activities of governments 
within their own state were no longer the business of the neighbouring state unless certain 
criteria  of  external  effects  were  fulfilled.  In  this  sense  the  (unauthorised)  movement  of 
individuals across national boundaries represents a challenge to the principle of sovereignty, 
which requires a degree of territorial closure (Joppke 1998; Hollifield 2004; Sassen 1996). 
In order to guarantee security and order, argued Bertelsmann (1914) in his study on the 
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passport system conducted just before the First World War, a state has to keep a close eye on 
who enters its territory and must be free in making its decision to refuse entry. According to the 
historian Leo Lucassen (in Caplan, Torpey 2001: 236):
the  era  of  free  international  migration  only  began  around  1860,  and  even  then  state 
controls on movement did not vanish entirely. Moreover, not everybody was able to take 
advantage of the liberal wind. Some categories of aliens suffered discrimination (…) and 
the migrant poor in general were regarded with suspicion, increasingly hindered in their 
movements, and often expelled.
Torpey (2000), with the aim of examining the background of the identification and tracking 
of people's movements, retraces the historical development of passport control in Western states 
from the  French Revolution until  the  relatively  recent  past.  He links  the  emergence  of  the 
passport  to  the  “institutionalisation  of  the  idea  of  the  nation-state  as  a  prospectively 
homogeneous ethnocultural unit” (Torpey 2000: 1), and sees this as an essential and intrinsic  
aspect of the “state-ness” of states. The author argues that one of the key historical ways in  
which the state has constituted its power over society has been to make people dependent on 
states for the authorisation to move across spaces, and to classify such movement as migration. 
Following Torpey, the transition from private to state control over movement was an essential 
aspect  of  the  transition  from feudalism to  capitalism,  and in  modern  states  restrictions  to 
movement were mainly linked to military service and to access to economic resources (in the 
form of work as well as of poor relief). 
In  the  field  of  international  relations,  Salter  (2003:  20)  reaches  similar  conclusions  to 
Torpey's:
the  passport  and  its  precursor,  the safe-conduct  pass  and  the  sea  certificate,  were  the 
leading edge of sovereign authority. The evolution of the early passport regime refects the 
consolidation of the sovereign state itself (…) the passport in the guise of letters of marque  
served to extend national personality into the international realm.
As Torpey highlights, the initial sense of the term “visa” was as an endorsement of a travel 
document by a state official, in order to signify that they have “seen” the document, in a context 
where the forms of travel document varied widely. Gradually, visa requirements came to acquire 
a second function: no longer mere endorsements, but rather a form of permission. According to 
Ryan (Ryan, Mitsilegas 2010), the international visa regime was further developed in the 1930s, 
as a result of refugee fows associated with Nazi’s Germany policies, particularly after the events 
of 1938 (Anschluss; annexation of the Sudetenland; Kristallnacht pogroms), which led potential 
destination states to use visa restrictions. Subsequently, in the post-war era, visa requirements 
became commonplace within immigration control regimes.
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As Puntervold Bø (1998) and Neumayer (2006) demonstrate, contemporary nation-states 
employ  bilateral  visa  restrictions  in  an  attempt  to  manage  the  complex  trade-off  between 
facilitating and promoting economic and political interests while still maintaining immigration 
control and upholding security. As a consequence of this trade-off, a system has been put in 
place that is highly unequal in granting access to foreign spaces. 
Only people that are believed to be beneficial for the growth of the economy are enabled to 
move: the skilled, touristic and entrepreneurial foreigners. In this sense, and from an economic 
and political perspective, Neumayer (2010) estimates the effects of visa restrictions on bilateral  
travel, pointing out that countries that are more dependent on trade and tourism impose fewer 
restrictions, whereas the richer countries fearful of illegal immigration and the more autocratic  
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Italian emigration
After the advent of national unity in 1861, Italian emigration policy was “swinging between  
positions and groups with shades of opinion which faded from strong opposition to the  
development of a mass emigration to unreserved support, with a wide series of intermediate  
positions” (Sori 1979: 255, my translation). The first act concerning emigrants, which was 
put into force in 1868, was aimed at protecting them “obliging them to demonstrate means  
of subsistence for the long trip and for the first settlement expenses in foreign lands”. Then a 
circular in 1873 “gave instruction to the mayors to deny the nihil obstat for expatriation to 
young conscripts, militaries without honourable discharge, disabled and, more seriously, to 
those unprovided of means” (Ibid: 256). Emigration freedom was thus controlled, and at 
the end of 1880s “a series of measures against the activities of emigration agents were issued 
but  remained  unsuccessful:  the  clandestine  agents  proliferated  as  well  as  clandestine 
expatriations and illegal departures from foreign ports” (Ibid: 261). 
The “new liberal and industrialistic climate” of the Giolitti presidency was marked by the 
first passport law, drafted in 1901(Ibid). It was a law for emigrants, to ensure that Italians 
would  not  be  denied  entry  to  American  ports,  but  “even  if  the  law  was  not  presently  
intended to restrict departures, it could be used to that end at some time later” (Torpey  
2000: 105). 
With the outbreak of the war, the government suspended the right of emigration of those 
obliged to  do military  service.  In 1915  there  were  restrictions on both  emigration and 
immigration: the requirement of a passport and work contract for those who wanted to 
leave  was  imposed;  a  passport  and  visa  had  to  be  issued  by  diplomatic  or  consular 
authorities in the country of departure for those who wanted to enter Italy. 
It is worth mentioning the Single text n. 2205 of 13 November 1919 on emigration and 
emigrants'  protection, which introduced the “red passport” for the emigrant in order to  
enable them to leave the country (this was later abolished in 1928). 
The booklet with a red cover included emigrants' rights and warnings to avoid frauds. There 
was also the possibility to add the job of the emigrant and his reading and writing skills as  
well as pages for notes on entry visas, renewals and children in charge. In particular, it had 
two tear sheets for trip details, one for the expatriation and the second for the prospective 
return. These coupons were then sent to the Emigration Committee and used for migration 
statistics. Thus, the First World War was decisive in the move to general visa regimes: it 
entailed the mistrust  typical  of  wartime and the expansion of  immigration bureaucracy 
generally kept passport controls in place after the war. Almost a hundred years later, states  
still  subscribe  to  this  view  with  few  amendments  and  passports  have  been  widely 
supplemented by visas. 
countries impose more restrictions.  The findings are the  empirical validation of his previous 
study (Neumayer 2006), in which he had already speculated on the detrimental effect of visa 
restrictions.  He concludes  that  travels  are  significantly  and substantively  affected,  and even 
though restrictions might not affect all types equally (his data are not disaggregated per type of 
travel), they will dampen all movement. The estimated coefficient suggests that the existence of 
a visa requirement reduces the bilateral fow of visitors by roughly 60 percent. Although this is a  
substantively large effect,  it is small in comparison to the geographical location and former  
colonial links, which are themselves highly correlated with visa restrictions. 
According to Neumayer (2010: 177-178), such restrictions have a stronger effect on visitors  
from developing countries (−66%) than developed countries (−36%). The reason is most likely 
that individuals in developed countries find it easier to obtain a visa and are better able to pay  
for  the direct  and indirect  costs.  Among the  various  regions  of  the  developing world,  visa 
restrictions have the strongest negative effect on travel from Latin America and the Caribbean 
(-76%), followed by sub-Saharan Africa (−66%), Northern Africa and the Middle East (−52%), 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (-45%), and South Asia (−29%).
Furthermore, Beaudu (2003) highlights the link between passports and visas, accelerated 
after  9/11  in  the  United  States  by  the  Patriot  Act  (October  2001),  which  imposes  the 
requirement for a biometric passport in order to join the Visa Waiver Programme. Thus, the US 
legislation uses this type of passport's security characteristics as supplementary requirements 
which  are  necessary  in  order  to  achieve  exemption  from  the  visa  requirement.  The  same 
approach  has  been  developed  by  the  EU  with  Visa  Facilitation  Agreements  with  Third 
Countries, which also impose the need for a biometric identifier in order to establish a visa-free 
regime for certain categories of travellers. 
It is with this background in mind that I will retrace and investigate the operational effect of 
visas as a “first line of defence”, making the right to move increasingly limited.
Suspect mobilities: a history of categorisation and selection
Since its beginning, the control of movement has been linked to social processes of labelling 
and  categorisations,  but  over  time  the  profiling  of  people  who move  is  being  increasingly 
institutionalised. Salter highlights the relation of passport control with the colonial space and 
the imperial discourse (2003: 20-21):
there are currently two worlds of travel – a zone in which travel is easy and requires few  
documents,  and  a  zone  in  which  travel  is  difficult  and  requires  a  great  number  of 
documents. International society during the nineteenth century was a precursor to this 
system, as travel within the colonies was more difficult and tightly regulated than travel 
within Europe. (..) The use of the passport as an identity document internally suggests two 
aspects of imperial discourse that are relevant to international relations. First, the colonial  
government was attempting to incorporate the colonized not as subjects but as objects of  
government  while  marking  them  as  different  and  dangerous.  Second,  the  colonial  
government  treated  colonies  as  somewhere  between  safe  national  spaces  and  unsafe 
international spaces. (…) The passport was a primary document of movement control that  
figured the colonized  in terms of  race,  class,  gender,  and complicity  with the  colonial  
project. 
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Wilson and Weber (2008) call attention to the ways in which the framing of the idea of 
nation and citizenship may infuence the perception and practices of border security. Exploring 
the policing of the Australian border, they retrace its specific genealogy, seeing this as driven in 
part by the xenophobic imaginings of a white Australian nation believing itself to be overrun by  
Asiatic multitudes  invading from the North and in part  by recent  experiences with asylum 
claimants. Fears originating in Australia’s colonial past now inform and intensify public debate  
about border control.
Class, and more specifically, poverty, have long been associated with problematic mobility 
and have been central to the process of sorting the deserving from the undeserving and the  
welcome  from  the  unwelcome.  In  a  wider  historical  perspective,  the  demonization  and 
repression of mobility has been particularly associated with the emergence of “masterless men” 
and  “valiant  beggars”  following  the  collapse  of  feudal  society,  and  with  giving  birth  to  
mechanisms of social sorting (Weber, Bowling 2008). The literature on the emergence of social 
figures  of  marginalisation,  in  particular  “the  poor”  and  “the  foreigner”,  as  well  as  on  the 
demonisation of itinerants, vagrants, vagabonds and gypsies will not be taken into account here, 
but this of course constitutes a fundamental part of the background regarding the construction 
and the management of “the marginal” by the state (Chambliss 1964; Park 1928; Polanyi 1944;  
Rogers 1991; Simmel 1908). 
More  recently,  Crettiez  and  Piazza  (2006)  investigate  the  identification  processes  in 
operation in France arguing that since the rise of absolutism, the state has tried to  fixer sur  
papiers its population, from “marginalised” to “integrated citizens”. While Van Houtum and van 
Naerssen  (2002)  describe  this  need  for  categorisation  to  sort  out  “who  is  who”  with  the 
meaningful triad “bordering, ordering and othering”. An adverse selective managerial policy of 
access  takes place alongside the identification of belonging, which must be intelligible so that 
distinctions could be enforced, leading to either surveillance or exclusion. 
Bauman  depicts  the  present-day  inequalities  in  mobility  rights  in  terms  of  two  “post-
modern  types”,  the  welcome  tourist  (which  includes  business  entrepreneurs  along  with 
holidaymakers) and the unwelcome vagabond, arguing that “the vagabonds are the waste of the 
world which has dedicated itself to tourist services” (Bauman 1998: 92). 
This idea of border as a membrane, which allows the fows to get through, but keeps the  
unwanted residue out is challenged by the idea of the post-colonial “differential inclusion” of 
foreigners  described  by  Mezzadra  (2006a),  drawing  on  Walters'  domopolitics  (2004). 
“Domopolitics” refers at the same time to the Latin word  domus (house or home) and to the 
Latin verb  domare (to tame, to domesticate,  also used metaphorically to indicate the act  of 
conquering or “subduing men or communities”). Walters (2004: 248) argues that the type of 
governance which seems to shape European migration is:
a particular politics of mobility whose dream is not to arrest mobility but to tame it; not to  
build  walls,  but  systems  capable  of  utilizing  mobilities,  tapping  their  energies  and  in 
certain cases deploying them against the sedentary and ossified elements within society; 
not a generalized immobilization, but a strategic application of immobility to specific cases 
coupled with the production of (certain kinds of) mobility.
The depiction of “migrants” as a disorderly mass of people and/or as desperate individuals  
reduces mobility to a socio-economic logic and reproduces the distinction between masses on 
the one hand and citizens on the other (Aradau, Huysmans 2009). Meanwhile, the profiling of 
people on the move (Adey 2004) is much broader, and distinctions are somewhat blurred, being 
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based on “unwritten specific types of high-risk and low-risk travellers” (Gilboy 1991). Following 
Bigo and Guild (2003a):
la  question de l'attribution individuelle  de visa  renvoyant  à  une  invisibilisation et  une 
délocalisation en amont des contrôles visant à en masquer les catégories d'attribution et le 
caractère aléatoire qui tourne à la loterie.
And moreover (Bigo and Guild 2005: 237):
the issue of white and black lists, of imposition or not of visas seems then to say less about 
safety and migration imperatives, than about the social construction of more or less shared 
fears concerning the Other and about the way Europeans seek to construct an image of 
themselves, a common identity.
Thus, my interest is in seeking to understand the social construction of who can move and 
who cannot, and its role in the processes of selection, (differential) inclusion or exclusion.
The (smart) filtering of dis-located borders
A Polish national driving in her car to Berlin will encounter the EU border for the first 
time at the physical edge of Germany. A US national arriving at Schiphol airport directly 
by plane from New York will encounter the EU border first at check-in in New York when  
his passport is examined by the airline staff and security officers there for the purpose of  
controlling the EU border. He will then re-encounter the EU border when he must pass 
through immigration control at Schiphol airport. A Moroccan national first encounters the  
EU border  at  the French  consulate  in  Rabat  when she  seeks  a  visa.  She will  then re-
encounter the border when she seeks to check in to catch her fight to Paris. She will again 
find the border when she arrives at Roissy Charles de Gaulle airport and passes through 
immigration control. So it is the individual who finds the border by virtue of his or her 
intentions and action relating to movement. But what is the border he or she activates? 1
The words of Elspeth Guild (2001:  2)  bring us directly to  the question of where is  the 
border? She considers borders as a “line of differentiation for the movement of persons”, the  
place where a control takes place, which is constitutive of whether the individual can pass or  
not. 
As Andreas and Synder (2000) note, borders have long been associated with the military 
defence of the national territory as well as privileged sites of commercial regulation. But today, 
it seems, borders are becoming more and more important as spaces and instruments for the 
policing  of  a  variety  of  actors,  objects  and processes  whose  common denominator  is  their 
“mobility”, or more specifically, the forms of social and political insecurity that have come to be 
discursively attached to these mobilities (Huysmans 2006; Ibrahim 2005). 
According to manifold scholars (among others Guild 2001; Rigo 2005), there are persons 
for  whom effective  borders  have  moved to the territory  of  countries  outside  the  European 
Union through the application of visa requirements and carriers sanctions. Moreno Lax (2008:  
322) terms this “passive interception”, to distinguish it from the active practices of interdiction 
1 Poland joined the EU on 1st May 2004, and was not a member at the time Elspeth Guild wrote this text.
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of entry: 
although no generally established definition of 'interception' exists, it is accepted that the 
notion commonly denotes 'measures applied by States outside their national boundaries  
which  prevent,  interrupt,  or  stop  the  movement  of  people  without  the  necessary 
immigration documentation for crossing their borders by land, sea, or air. Interception 
may be physical or 'active', as it is in the case of interdiction of boats at sea, as well as  
administrative or 'passive'. Visa requirements and carriers' sanctions, as they may thwart 
embarkation or continuation of journey, constitute examples of passive interception.
Zolberg (1998) uses the term “remote control” to denote immigration policies designed to 
deter immigration by regulating departures at, or near,  the point of origin.  This concept fits 
perfectly into our framework. The author argues that activities of states should occupy a central 
role  in  studies  of  human movement  or  its  absence,  because  the  study  of  the  regulation of  
movements contributes to study of the very “state-ness” of states. Bigo and Guild (2003a) have 
used the term police à distance to describe the Schengen system of visa regulation. According to 
these  authors,  the  term  designates  the  mechanisms  of  control  which  are  exercised  by 
“professionals”, employing security strategies which do not refer to national police forces but to 
diplomatic authorities and administrative bureaucracies. 
As van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002: 216) point out “semantically the word 'borders' 
unjustly assumes that places are fixed in space and time, and should rather be understood in  
terms of bordering”. Brambilla (in Riccio, Brambilla 2010: 75) uses the concept of  dis-located 
borders to identify the move away of borders from fixed areas conceived as imaginary lines of  
separation, protection and exclusion:
border  processes  express  the  complex  interplay  between  inclusion  and  exclusion,  by 
allowing  us  to  understand  the  close  link  the  inclusion-exclusion  dynamic  has  with 
different practices of ordering reality (…) What emerges, indeed, is the link between the  
creation of a precise order of the world, on the one hand, and the discursive differentiation 
between  'we'  and  'they'  that  is  created,  or  better  imagined,  through  the  process  of 
b/ordering.
From such a perspective,  borders perform diverse functions according to the side from 
which they are crossed (Cholewinski 2000). I see them no longer as a solid line but as highly 
differentiated  “border  zones”  and  I  suggest  thinking  about  borders  no  longer  in  terms  of 
metaphors of walls, but rather as highly perforated systems or regimes, where the selectivity is 
designed to encourage mobility,  in the sense of “selected travellers”,  and to curb migration, 
intended  as  “poor  on  the  move”.  As  Bauman  points  out,  the  present  world  contains 
unprecedented possibilities for mobility, yet the motto “divided we move” applies, as the degree 
of  mobility  has stratified the world into two:  one for tourists  and the other for vagabonds 
(Bauman 1998: 87). This has drawn a distinction between wanted and unwanted migration, or 
“guests and aliens” as Sassen has termed it (1999). 
In order to better articulate the way in which the concept of border is relevant to my own 
work,  I  need  to  point  out  a  few  final  insights.  Firstly,  it  is  worth  mentioning  the  idea  of  
selectivity which the concept of “smart borders” entails. According to Andreas (2003) borders  
do not impede legitimate crossings, they facilitate “low risk” frequent travellers, while detecting 
the others. Van Houtum (2010: 963-964) refers to the EU black and white lists with the notion 
of “human blacklisting”:
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of all possible geographical visions on the world, the EU thus inscribes an unambiguous 
di-visionary borderline on the planet.  It has made a di-vision into black and white list  
countries, into countries whose inhabitants are in principle unwelcome (the black list) and 
whose inhabitants are welcome (the white list). It is a form of chronopolitics as it slows  
down, illegalises, or immobilises the mobility of a significant part of the world population 
and prioritises and mobilises the travelling speed of a select human segment. 
While Hampshire (2009: 231) introduces another keyword linked to border selectivity. The 
concept of “risk management” to differentiate checks on people on the move:
the  attempt  to  reconcile  accumulation and  security  imperatives  motivates  increasingly 
differentiated control instruments and interventions. It is here that risk management plays 
a crucial role, in the determination of which fows to target for more stringent checks, and 
which  to  target  for  facilitated  entry  and  exit.  While  security  imperatives  motivate  
biometric  visas,  improved  watchlists,  juxtaposed  controls,  and  many  other  policy 
initiatives, the need to facilitate non-risky fows underpins the creation of 'trusted traveller' 
and 'smart trade' schemes.
In fact, risk management and the selection of trusted travellers are the essence of an “entry-
exit system” such as the one applied in Canada and US, and now under discussion at EU level 
(COM (2011) 680). And according to the Communication, this project is precisely known as 
“Smart Borders”:
the  fact  that  all  third-country  nationals  have  to  go  through  the  same  border  checks,  
regardless of the level of risk they present or their frequency of travel, does not represent 
an efficient use of border guards.  (…) The Smart Borders initiative would improve the 
management and control of travel fows at the border by reinforcing checks while speeding 
up border crossings  for regular travellers  (…) it would allow the accurate and reliable 
calculation of authorised stay as well as the verification of the individual travel history for 
both  visa  holders  and  visa  exempted  travellers  as  an  essential  part  of  first  line  risk-
assessment.
It is currently not possible to predict whether this entry-exit system will really be activated. 
The implementation of reliable checks at exit from the EU is a long way from being achieved.  
However, the importance of the project lies in the wording itself, in the idea of controlling every  
single movement, in and out. 
Besides  the concrete  effect  of  borders  as filters,  Andreas  (2003:  110-111,  my emphasis) 
highlights also the symbolic power of border control:
everyday  border  control  activities  -  checking  travel  documents,  inspecting  cargo  and 
luggage, patrolling coastlines and airports, apprehending unauthorized entrants - are part 
of what gives the state an image of authority and power. Statecraft is about power politics  
and deploying material  resources,  but  it  is  also about  perceptual  politics and  deploying  
symbolic  resources.  Border  control  agencies  grow  and  expand  partly  because  of  the 
symbolic power they gain from their role as border maintainers in times of high societal  
insecurity.
Finally, Tsianos and Karakayali  (2010: 385) question the sole preventive function of the 
border and they suggest the concept of “temporal control of mobility” , where camps as well as 
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border controls aim at the deceleration of circulation:
camps  do  not  attempt  to  make  migration  economically  useful  by  making  migrants 
productive in the spatial order. Rather they make migrants productive by inserting them 
into a global temporal regime of labor. This regime is not based on disciplining bodies and  
regulating whole populations. The temporal regime of global labor follows the movements 
of people and invests where it finds a productive workforce in a state of fux. This allows  
global capital to thrive on labor and life conditions that are in a state of transition and,  
most importantly, are primarily unregulated and informal.
The  deceleration function,  as  well  as  the  symbolic  role  of  visas  and  Consulates  in 
constructing the idea of a “fortress Europe”, will be investigated further through the case-study 
and the fieldwork experience.  To conclude,  as  far as the ongoing debate on the diminished 
sovereignty of nation-states and on their ability to control migration is concerned (Cornelius et 
al. 2004; Freeman 1994; Joppke 1998; Sassen 1996), I believe that the aforementioned concepts 
of deceleration and use of border as a selective filter enable sovereignty not only to persist, but 
also to expand.  And according to this  framework I will  take Consulates as the first  borders 
deployed for identification and selection of the categories of people who could or could not 
travel to the EU.  
The understanding(s) of “risk” 
When considering borders as filters for selection of movers through mechanisms of risk 
assessment, it is fundamental to understand the notion of “risk”. How has this been used in the  
field of migration? And how is it understood by the EU?
According to the Oxford Dictionary (2011):
/risk/
noun
a situation involving exposure to danger: 
fouting the law was too much of a risk
[mass noun]: 
all outdoor activities carry an element of risk
• [in singular] the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen: 
reduce the risk of heart disease
• [with modifier] a person or thing regarded as a threat or likely source of danger: 
she’s a security risk- gloss paint can burn strongly and pose a fire risk
Various specialist definitions and classifications exist in the attempt to define its meaning, 
and these definitions refect specific institutional interests. In the field of health and safety, risk 
is equated with dangers; for finance it is a matter of volatility in expected outcomes, as with the 
first meanings included in the dictionary. However, the vagueness and ambiguity of risk are in  
fact the necessary features which lead to its widespread impact. 
In the sociological field, it has been famously suggested that we live in a Risikogesellschaf 
(Beck 1992). But Beck’s risk society is not the first formulation of the need to think of security  
in terms of risk. An earlier debate tried to open the concept of “securitisation” as formulated by  
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the Copenhagen School to risk analysis (Stritzel 2007). In his masterpiece, Beck reviews the role 
of risk in structuring, reproducing and repairing the modernist historical project and he defines 
risks as a “systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities produced by modernization  
itself ” (Beck 1992: 21). As the author points out, risks are essentially about anticipation - “the  
possibility  that”,  according to the Oxford definition.  In this  sense risks  are both “real”  and 
“unreal”, and: although they signify a “not-yet-event” that may not even happen, they carry a 
practical relevance by designating and prescribing present action (Beck 1992:  34). The “real  
virtuality” arises as the risks are indeed constructed into reality. Power (2004) has effectively  
phrased it the “risk management of everything”. 
The categorising of migration as a “risk” – in terms of the third blurred Oxford Dictionary's  
meaning – is linked to the very movement of people and it can not be separated from the 
security-obsessive paradigm, or the “management  of  unease” (Bigo 2002;  Guild 2009).  One 
could argue – as we did in the first paragraph – that migration has always been an issue of 
control, something touching on the sovereign rights of states. The history of migration is replete 
with claims about the “immigrant threat” (Lucassen 2005),  and the “risks” of migration are 
exacerbated as the impact of migration on issues such as national identity and the welfare state 
move into focus. In recent years, terrorism-related concerns have further fuelled this trend, and 
have put borders in the spotlight with an overexposure of Security Studies and risks concerns 
(Aradau, van Munster 2007; Baldaccini 2008).  
At the EU level, the link between immigration control and security was clearly articulated 
in the 2004 Hague Programme, according to which:
the management of migration fows, including the fight against illegal immigration should 
be strengthened by establishing a continuum of security measures that effectively links visa 
application procedures end entry and exit procedures at external  border crossing.  Such 
measures are also of importance for the prevention and control of crime, in particular 
terrorism. In order to achieve this, a coherent approach and harmonised solutions in the 
EU on biometric identifiers and data are necessary.
Thus, through the logic of the “security continuum”, migration and border control are an 
integral part of the security field. The process in which the migration discourse shifts toward an 
emphasis on the binomial risk/security has been referred to as the securitisation of migration 
(Husymans 2000; 2006). The linking of migrants to insecurity, according to Husymans (2000: 
771), “sustains a radical political strategy aimed at excluding particular categories of people by 
reifying them as danger”. 
Vaughan-Williams (2009: 39) argues for the existence of “portable mechanisms of sovereign 
power that are inseparable from the bodies that performatively produce and sort into different 
categories”. This concept is based upon Agamben's (1995) “bare life”, and in this connection 
“borders  are  continually  re-inscribed  through  mobile  bodies  that  can  be  risk-assessed, 
categorized and then treated as either trusted citizen travellers or bare life” (Vaughan-Williams 
2009: 134). 
As  opposed  to  the  limitation  of  securitisation  to  urgency,  immediacy,  or  exceptional 
practices, Bigo (2002) proposed an understanding of securitisation as the routinised practices of 
bureaucracies.  An  attention  to  practices  and  routines  translated  to  an  attention  to  risk 
management, to the proactive practices of security professionals to prevent the occurrence of  
dangers in the future. 
Gammeltoft-Hansen (2006:  7)  points out that “if  migration is  increasingly  perceived in 
terms of risk, migration policy is increasingly embedded in a logic of risk management”, with 
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the aim of “predicting risky fows”. In operational terms, specialised ad hoc centres working on 
border management have been established in the EU to deal with the perceived areas of risk  
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2006: 23-34):
set to become the heart of the EU’s common border management strategies, the working 
methods of the Risk Analysis Centre are particularly interesting. First of all, the Centre has 
been  given  the  task  of  performing  geographical  risk  assessments,  identifying  areas  of 
particular vulnerability and recommending and coordinating action. (…) However, the 
Risk Analysis Centre has also carried out risk assessments that give a priority to particular 
issues and specific groups. It recently launched a ‘visa under false pretences’ initiative in 
cooperation with Europol, to crack down on illegitimate visa applications and use. Further,  
specific  categories  of  people  have  been  given  a  higher  priority  in  migration  risk 
management.
De Giorgi (2000) in his book on the issue of control, describes the Schengen system as a 
particular way to exert social control, in the specific approach of “actuarial control”. This term 
originates  from the  financial  sector,  and  it  is  the  assessment  of  financial  systems based  on 
statistical data projected into the future, evaluating the probability of events and quantifying the 
contingent  outcomes  in  order  to  minimise  financial  losses.  It  consists  of  the  rational 
management of risk and its  economic efficacy, as  is  required, for example,  in the insurance 
sector.  The aim is not the reduction of the subjective risk,  but the determination of criteria 
which  enable  users  of  this  method  to  classify  and  manage  determined  collectivities.  The 
individual is important as far as s/he is referable to a category. The actuarial logic of selective 
control  systematically  excludes  some  categories  of  people  through  incapacitation  and 
deterrence. In this framework, according to De Giorgi, Schengen is the very barycentre of the 
EU countries' approach towards mobility: the prevention strategy based on the assumption of 
migrants being a danger, not as individuals, but as a category of subjects “at risk”.
One could conclude that the EU definition of risk is a schizophrenic mix of the Oxford 
Dictionary meanings. I can phrase it as “the possibility that someone unpleasant or unwelcome 
will come (and be a threat or a source of danger)”. Where the threat/danger is actually the very  
(potential)  fact  they reach the EU,  mobility  itself  becomes potentially  threatening  and in  a 
Foucauldian approach, precautionary risk can be understood as a  dispositif that attempts to 
govern what appears to be ungovernable. 
Profiling  through  risk-assessment  practices  is  the  way  used  to  differentiate  access  to 
territories, and following Gammeltoft-Hansen (2006: 31):
the result is not a Fortress Europe, as many commentators would like to believe. Rather (...) 
it could be conceptualised as a  risk filter. In this sense, European borders are permeable, 
but they act as a series of risk filters sorting the mala fide from the bona fide migrant. A 
continuum  is  created  between  surveillance  techniques,  risk  analysis  centres  and 
operational initiatives that serve to identify and monitor various risk groups and target 
additional migration control at the weakest points or most risky migrants. Hence, the task  
is  no longer  to control the borders,  but to  manage the fows of  migrants  across  them. 
When control is no longer tied exclusively to the physical frontiers but takes place both 
within and outside EU territory, borders become ‘virtual’ or ‘blurred’. Instead, the migrant 
meets a ubiquitous frontier, as the risk filter is constantly being deployed to weed out risky  
elements.
The  “risk”  seems  to  be  the  leitmotiv  of  the  process  of  categorisation  -  selection  - 
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exclusion/inclusion pursued  by the  EU.  It  will  be  investigated  through the  visa  framework 
which notion of risk and how it  is “implemented” by Schengen Consulates and its  filtering 
outcomes. 
Unpacking policy implementation: bureaucrats and discretion
In the attempt to define a conceptual framework to analyse the ways in which states and 
policies shape migration processes, de Haas (2011: 6) suggests that:
any  serious  inquiry  into  the  effect  of  migration  policies  not  only  needs  to  define  the 
concept but also to 'unpack' or disaggregate 'migration policies' into the multitudes of law, 
measures  and  regulations  states  deploy  in  their  attempts  to  regulate  immigration  and 
emigration along categories that are based on national origin and further characteristics  
such as gender, age, education, occupation and officially defined man migration motives 
(e.g.  labour,  refugee,  family,  student).  As  migration  policies  are  typically  affected  and 
shaped by different, often opposed, interests, policies are typically internally incoherent, 
which further emphasizes the need to break down policies into the specific measures and 
regulation they comprise.
Before narrowing down to the migration policies' issue, I will contextualise the study of 
policy implementation in the frame of Policy Studies' literature, a field of studies which retraces  
policy-making processes whilst seeking to understand how political decisions are taken, bearing 
in mind that in Political Science, “implementation” refers to the carrying out of public policy by  
civil servants in bureaucratic agencies, the mise en œuvre, the enforcement.
First of all, it is worth stressing the lack of studies on implementation in the period before  
the 1970s, with earlier literature being focused on the decision-making and policy evaluation 
phases  (Ham,  Hill  1995).  The  literature  on  policy  implementation  gained  a  great  deal  of 
recognition with the publication of  Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) and now it  is  vast  and 
extensive,  including  different  approaches  (top-down,  bottom-up,  mixed).  Elmore  (1979) 
suggested that successful policy implementation is likely to require bargaining and negotiation.  
He questioned the extent to which, when policies are conceived, their design takes into account  
the likely behaviour of front-line staff. He suggested that policy designers should engage in 
“backwards-mapping” when undertaking top-down design and analysis.
From the beginning of the discipline, Policy Studies insisted on the need to go beyond 
organisational  charts  and  formal  procedures  to  touch  upon  actors  who  actually  have  the 
possibility to steer the course of a policy.  And there are many cases in which the weight of 
formal positions in infuencing policy tends to be denied more than confirmed (Regonini 2001: 
316). It is the idea of retracing processes back and considering front-line staff which is relevant 
in my work, as is Lindblom's (1980) notion of policy-making as a complex process without a 
beginning and an end, with open borders. 
In this sense, a fundamental reference for this work is the book “Street-level bureaucracy: 
Dilemmas  of  the  individual  in  public  services”,  where  Michael  Lipsky  (1980)  analysed  the  
behaviour of front-line staff in policy delivery agencies. Lipsky refers to these frontline workers 
as “street-level bureaucrats”. These are public employees who “interact directly with citizens in 
the course of their jobs, and have substantial discretion in the execution of their work” (1980: 
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3). Examples are teachers, police officers, judges and others who interact directly with citizens 
in order to provide benefits or sanctions on behalf of their bodies of reference. However, there 
are intrinsic problems when implementing public policies, as: street-level bureaucrats have to 
respond to  citizens  with only  a  limited  amount  of  information  available  or  only  a  limited 
amount of time to make a decision. Moreover, very often the rules to be implemented do not 
always correspond to the specific situation or context of the citizen involved. In response, street  
bureaucrats  develop  coping  mechanisms.  They  simplify  the  nature  of  their  job  or  develop 
routines so that they feel they are doing their job well in some way. This is possible as they have 
a certain degree of discretion – or autonomy – in their work (1980: 14). Thus, Lipsky underlines 
the importance of the implementation phase as a decision-making part of the process, which is  
political and not only technical. 
Public policy-based interventions are defined not only by law and provisions, but also by 
the evaluation of individual workers, who have to be considered as part of the policy-making 
community and not simply the “executor” of someone else's choices.  Following the work of 
Lipsky,  the  concept  of  discretion  has  received wide  attention in  the  policy  implementation 
literature. Ham and Hill (1995) dedicate a chapter in their analysis of public policies to the issue 
of  discretion (chapter 9:  171 and followings),  underlining the ubiquity of  the phenomenon 
linked to the inherent limitations of control, and stressing the difficulty of understanding the 
nature of this concept as well as the risk of giving a priori definitions.
There is a division in the literature as to whether discretion has positive and/or negative 
effects. On one hand, too much discretion might result in not reaching the goals set by the 
policy hypothesis, and street-level bureaucrats can pursue their own, private goals, and might 
be shirking the implementation of the policy or even sabotaging it. On the other hand, in many  
situations street-level bureaucrats face situations which are too complicated to be reduced to 
programmatic formats. In these circumstances, discretion makes it possible to adapt the policy 
to the local needs of the citizens/clients, which increases the meaningfulness of the policy for 
clients. Following Lipsky (1980:  111),  discretion and resource  constraints,  with the need to 
categorise to work faster, lead to bias towards users:
the bureaucratic sources of bias discussed here are nurtured in street-level bureaucracies. 
Here work is characterised by high degrees of discretion and resource constraints and the 
need to control clients in order to process work efficiently. When work is structured as it is  
in street-level bureaucracies we come to look for the need to differentiate among clients, so 
much that it seems as useful to assume bias (however modest) and ask why it sometimes 
does not occur, than to assume equality of treatment and ask why it is regularly abridged.
After Lipsky's analysis, manifold studies aimed to determine if operational discretion is to 
be considered present/absent, avoidable/unavoidable, as something to tackle or to enhance. The 
analysis conducted by Maynard-Mood and Musheno (2003) observed that the performance of 
operational functions includes a daily mediation, not only between the different directions and 
adaptation  of  these rules  to  concrete  situations,  but also between personal  convictions  and 
regulatory approaches. They have not only confirmed the infuence of the choices and actions of 
workers on the operational definition of policies, but also claim that this infuence is greater  
than that exerted by the policy makers. Evans and Harris (2004) show how the decision-making 
autonomy of the executive level on the one hand cannot be avoided, whilst on the other hand it  
should not necessarily be regarded as an obstacle to the realisation of policy objectives set out 
upstream. It can be evaluated as an expression of expertise which makes the action in some way 
fexible  and adaptable  to  specific  situations  that  bureaucrats  are  faced  with.  More  recently,  
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Saruis  (2008)  explores  the  role  of  social  workers  in  the  implementation  of  social  policies 
directed against poverty and social exclusion; Evans (2010) investigates social workers in mental 
health  services  in  the  UK,  in  his  book “Professional  discretion in  welfare  services.  Beyond 
street-level bureaucracy”.
To conclude, a fundamental contribution to the debate comes from Vincent Dubois, with 
the study of the administrative practices of the French institution Caisse d'Allocation Familiale,  
literally  family  benefit office. With his  masterpiece  La vie au guichet (1999),  Dubois  builds 
bridges between diverse intellectual traditions, connecting Michael Lipsky and Pierre Bourdieu. 
Bourdieu (1990) enters the field of implementation by exploring the housing policy in France 
and its droit et passe-droit, regulations and exceptions. Like all regulations, which always allow 
the  agents  responsible  for  implementing  them  some  room  for  manoeuvre,  from  strict 
application to derogation and even simple transgression, the regulatory measures constituting 
housing policy  are reinterpreted and redefined within the various territorial fields (regions,  
departments) in which the application of the building rules to particular cases is negotiated, and 
the  choices  are  defined  within  the  specific  power  relations  set  up  within  administratively 
defined  territorial  units.  The  territorial  authorities  thus  enter  into  complicated  conficts, 
negotiations and exchanges which incidentally allow the norms to be adapted to the situation.
By carrying out an in-depth investigation of workers-recipients' relations, Dubois's work 
combines the legacy of the Chicago School, in particular Erving Goffman's method of looking 
at the meaning of everyday encounters, with the French Sociology of Bourdieu that places these 
interactions in the contexts of institution and class, race and gender relationship.
Cholewinski (2002) has analysed in a legal frame the rules concerning the issuance of visas 
to third-country nationals and the extent to which they may lead to discrimination. The report 
“Borders and Discrimination in the European Union” concluded that EU rules are drawn up in 
general  and vague terms and provide too much discretion to officials.  I  will  question these  
practices, although the coming into force of the Community Code on Visas (April 2010) aims to 
discipline and harmonise this field (Meloni 2009). Furthermore, I will test to ascertain whether 
the notion of street-level bureaucrats can be applied to Consular officials in the field of visa  
procedures as well as investigating daily encounters and practices of discretion. According to 
Schuck (in Brettell, Hollifield 2008: 244):
many conventional assumptions about bureaucratic authority, drawn from the Weberian 
ideal-type,  simply  do  not  apply  to  immigration  policy  (..)  much  of  what  low-level  
immigration officials do is invisible, both literally and figuratively, to their bureaucratic 
superiors, and even visible conduct is  often uncontrollable through either the ordinary 
structure of hierarchical rules or the economy of incentives. In effect, power day-to-day 
immigration  decision  runs  bottom-up  instead  of  top-down.  The  unusual  operational 
autonomy enjoyed by low-level immigration officials is further protected by certain legal  
principles peculiar to the immigration field.
The micro level of daily practices
Studies of migration policies “in the making” and their administrative actors have largely 
contributed to a revitalization of social sciences in the field of Migration Studies (Weil 1991;  
Spire 2005; Ellerman 2007; Laurens 2008, 2009). By focusing their work on the trajectories and 
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practices  of  administrative  actors,  manifold  scholars  have  highlighted  the  fundamental  role 
played by these actors at various levels. From decision to implementation, they are the ones 
carrying out immigration policies, fashioning and shaping their evolution. Moreover, several 
authors have focused on the genesis and development of these policies at the supranational – in 
this case European – level (Guiraudon 2000, 2003; Geddes 1999; Lavenex 2006; Boswell 2008,  
2009).  Guiraudon (2000), in developing the concept of “venue shopping”, has argued that the  
manifold actors involved in the management of migration remove immigration from public 
debate,  and  policy-making  is  shifted  up (intergovernmental  cooperation),  down 
(decentralization to local authorities) and  out (non-state actors as non-profit institutions but 
even to the private sector). Lahav (1998: 690) argues that:
the processes of devolution and privatisation in migration regulation are consistent with a 
trend towards more selective and restrictive immigration policies. They are consistent with 
trends evident in other EU policy areas, namely to shift the externalities of policy-making  
outside  of  central  government.  These  shifts  in  implementation  to  private,  local  or  
international  arrangements  refect  less  an  abdication  of  state  sovereignty,  than  an 
experiment in which national states involve agents as part of rational attempts to diminish 
the costs of migration. 
Tsianos and Karakayali (2010: 376) in their empirical research conducted in the south-east  
border region of the EU show that the “implementation of migration laws (and the Schengen 
acquis) greatly depends on the set-up and the construction of a civil and non-statal discourse 
around migration”.
However,  analyses  that  attempt  to  focus  on  the  micro  level  of  migration  policy 
implementation are scarce, and France has definitely shown the way in this field of study. 
After the pioneer work of Lantz (1998) on the administrative steps which migrants have to 
undertake to go and stay in France, Bigo and Guild (2003b) focused on the Schengen visa and  
its daily bureaucratic practices. A fundamental reference of our work is Spire (2008), with his 
work on the French administration in charge of migration control. The author stresses on the 
“policy at the counter” (politique des guichets) calling on experience obtained through years of 
participant observation in Prefectures, work offices and a Visa Office in a French Consulate in 
Africa,  arguing that  “il  faut  déplacer le  regard,  des discours  aux pratiques,  et des  principes  
juridique à  leur application”.  Moreover,  the author investigates the effect  of  the practices of  
control and selection on student mobility towards France (Spire 2009).
More  recently,  the  NGO  La Cimade released two reports  on migration administration, 
focusing on Prefectures (Cimade 2008) and Consulates (Cimade 2010). The latter investigates 
French Consulates in Algeria, Mali, Morocco, Senegal, Ukraine and Turkey through fieldwork 
observation. The  access  to  information  and  the  application  steps  involved,  are  considered 
together with the point of view of applicants, in order to highlight difficulties and to propose  
suggestions, concerning both the legal framework and the concrete local level.
As regards Italy, relatively few studies investigate local administration and migration policy 
implementation. The Ismu Foundation has promoted some studies of this type. Firstly, Zucchini 
(1997;  1998)  rejects  the  idea  that  local  immigrant  policies  can  be  understood  as  coherent 
programmes  promoted  by  coherent  political  majorities,  and  he  observed  a  high  degree  of 
differentiation  in  the  methods  of  providing  services  for  migrants.  A  reconstruction  of 
immigrant policies in eight cities (Zucchini 1997), based on official documents and in-depth 
interviews,  highlights  two  main  dimensions  of  differentiation:  the  importance  of  the  third 
sector and the level of confict and fragmentation within the public administration. Zucchetti 
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(2000) went on to study the municipal councils  of the Lombardy region, while  Fasano and 
Zucchini (2001) analysed some innovations introduced by the immigration law 40/1998. Their 
aim was to establish whether the institutional and social actors involved in the implementation 
of the text actually behaved in the intended way, and how it affected migrants' lives and infows. 
To this end, the study focused on three different local contexts in the Lombardy region, and the  
authors found that the Police Headquarters adopted extremely discretionary and bureaucratic 
procedures (such as asking for documents which were not explicitly mentioned in the law).
A  similar  conclusion  was  reached  by  Triandafyllidou  (2003)  in  her  study  of  the 
organisational culture and identity process that guides the daily routines of police officers, using 
the Foreigners' Bureau of the Florence Police Headquarters as a case study. According to the 
author, the discretionary practices adopted refect a formal hierarchy and a patronage culture in 
combination with new demand for efficiency and user-friendly services.  In fact,  patron and 
client  relations  or  the  common-sense  ideologies  of  organised  philanthropy  towards  “needy 
foreigners” prevail over the rational organisation of work. 
It  is  worth  mentioning  the  entire  volume  in  which  Triandafyllidou's  contribution  is 
included: the  Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (JEMS 29,  2003) focuses on migration 
policy  implementation  by  state  administrations,  taking  four  EU  countries  as  case  studies. 
Triandafyllidou  has  also  completed  a  useful  report  on  the  state  of  the  art  in  the  field  of  
immigration policy and its implementation in Italy (Veikou, Triandafyllidou 2001).
In this work I will argue that acts of implementation necessarily entail interpretations by 
actors in the field situation (Yanow 1993), and following the introduction of the JEMS special  
issue  (Jordan,  Bo,  Triandafyllidou  2003:  211)  “the  outcomes  of  implementation  stem  from 
interactions between strategies and practices of officials and target groups (…) implementation 
is essentially a political activity just as policy-making is”. 
Furthermore,  Campomori  (2007)  investigates  the  role  of  policy-making  carried  out  by 
workers in migrant services, testing the notion of “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky 1980) and 
exploring forms of discretion that can take place. More recently two reports by FIERI (Caponio, 
Pastore,  Ricucci  2012)  and  the  Cattaneo  Institute  (Colombo,  Piro  2012)  investigate  the 
administration of migration as regards the issuance of stay permits respectively in the cities of  
Torino/Cuneo and Bologna.
It is worth underlining the division between a positive (Campomori 2007; Caponio et al.  
2012;  Colombo,  Piro  2012)  and  a  complex  and  not  completely  positive  (Spire  2008, 
Triandafyllidou  2003)  view  on  discretion.  The  positive  approach  considers  the  effect  of 
discretion as tending towards the delivery of benefits for the foreigner. Even though it entails  
uncertainty and differentiations, discretion allows to the adaptation of regulations in favour of  
migrant's rights. On the other hand, Spire (2008) explores the use of the power of discretion as  
the absence of transparency, the faculty of choosing among different options set out by the law. 
Discretion can also lead to implementation practices being bent towards the goals of efficacy 
and performance criteria. Triandafyllidou's (2003) findings suggest that the administration uses 
a high level of discretion in processing migrants' applications for permits. The discretionary 
practices adopted refect the combination of a formal hierarchical and clientelistic culture with 
new demands for efficiency and a user-friendly service. In the end, the administration manages 
to show high levels of output, but in reality a rather poor outcome, as real efficiency is not  
achieved  and  clientelistic  relations  or  common-sense  ideologies  of  organised  philanthropy 
towards “needy foreigners” prevail over a rational organisation of the work.
I  will  look  at  these  dynamics  at  the  consular  level,  connecting  them  with  academic 
references and the diplomats' perspective, in the attempt to retrace the implementation process.  
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In doing this I will attempt to contribute to unpacking the multitudes of laws, regulations and 
practices  regulating the access to  mobility  (when a visa  is  required).  Investigating everyday 
practices of Consulates and the profiling process applied to visa applicants will  enable us to 




In light of the research outline and of the conceptual framework explained in Chapter One,  
a fieldwork study to be conducted in an overseas Consulate and a series of interviews with 
employees involved in the administration of the system emerged as the most appropriate means 
of obtaining input for this study. I have adopted an ethnographic approach, and in this Chapter 
I will discuss the pitfalls and advantages of this, and also the procedure and the logic behind the 
collection of observations and interviews which have formed the main strands of my research 
process. 
In the first section of this chapter I am going to sketch out the issues which come into play  
when undertaking research based on the investigation of Schengen issues, the ethics and access 
to the field, presenting the research methodology and my methods of enquiry. In the second 
paragraph I will consider the fieldwork I conducted in Dakar with regard to the features of the 
terrain: my positionality, field relations and my contact-making strategy. Finally, I will discuss 
how  I  investigated  the  Italian  migration  administrations,  in  particular  the  Single  Desk  of  
Immigration operating within the Prefectures, which plays a role in the family reunification 
process.
Research design 
Investigating Schengen: confidentiality and security issues
In this paragraph I would like to discuss the methodological issues which are related to the 
process of “investigating Schengen issues”.  It  is  worth noting that  Schengen is  considered a 
confidential issue by Member States, and several relevant documents are not accessible on the  
Eurolex database. Moreover, an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application 
of the Schengen acquis (Schengen evaluation working group, widely referred as “Sch-eval”) is 
already operational but a regulation aimed at disciplining it is still under discussion. 
A  first  proposal  for  this  legislation  was  drafted  in  20102 (COM(2010)  624),  and 
amendments  (COM(2011)  559)  are  currently  awaiting  a  first  reading  in  Parliament3.  Since 
reports on Schengen's states evaluations are currently classified as restricted, we only know that  
they consist of questionnaires and on-site visits to Member States' consular posts. According to 
my interviews with officials at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  Scheval's  reports and 
recommendations mainly concern applicants' waiting times. 
2 It  should  be noted  that  this  proposal  replaces  the proposal  COM(2009)  102  to  establish  a  similar  evaluation 
mechanism, which lapsed due to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
3 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?  id=588376 . 
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To draw comparison with the United Kingdom, the UK Border Agency has an Independent 
Chief Inspector whose role is to provide an independent external assessment of the agency, both 
in the UK and abroad. Reports of inspections conducted in visa sections including findings and 
recommendations, are made available to the public4.
At a national level, Italy does not have any monitoring on its consular sections as is the case 
in France for example, where a special reporter is charged with this duty. The French official of  
the Senate, Adrien Gouteyron, wrote a report for the Senate in 2006 passing “de l’autre côté des 
guichets  des  consulats  de  France,  afin  de  prendre  connaissance  du fonctionnement  de  nos 
services des visas” (Gouteyron 2007). Italy is also lacking in reports from NGOs on visa issuing 
procedures,  in contrast  to France,  where  La Cimade has undertaken this exercise in French 
Consulates (Cimade 2010). Thus, there is a serious lack of comparative knowledge in the field 
and as an evidence of the growing awareness of it, “Visa policy as migration channel” is one of  
the issues that the European Migration Network (EMN) selected as a topic for ad hoc national 
reports in 2011. 
Nevertheless, the focus of reports is on national visas (to be distinguished from Schengen 
visas), which are within the competence of States, and the Schengen level is taken into account 
only as far as it concerns the general legislation. Furthermore, as regards the EMN Italian report 
- which includes my contribution on Senegal (EMN 2012a) – where there is any field enquiry  
on  the  implementation  of  policies,  it  consists  of  a  study  of  the  law  and  an  analysis  of 
quantitative data drawn from the case studies considered.
Therefore,  the lack of public  monitoring, the confidentiality of  the field as well  as  data 
protection and security  issues make it  difficult  to  investigate consular practices  concerning 
Schengen  visas.  It  is  instead  slightly  easier  to  investigate  family  reunification  procedures 
(national  visas)  comparing  Member  States'  practices,  as  has  been  done  by  EMN  (2012b). 
Nevertheless, the implementation level is split between the country of origin (for issuing the  
visa to the family member) and the country of living (for authorising the reunification). I will  
consider family reunification visas in a separate chapter (Ch. 7) because of the difference in the 
type of visa, the required documents, and issuing procedures.
Methodology 
The ethnographic  lens I  decided  to use consists  of  an approach which concentrates  on 
watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions through informal and formal 
interviews,  and  collecting  documents,  and  is  based  on  the  stream  of  qualitative  research 
techniques (Amit 2000; Corbin, Strauss 2008; Silverman 2010).
Ethnographic studies on policy, administration, and officials stem mainly from the street-
level  bureaucracy literature,  and up until  now they have mainly  concerned teachers,  police, 
social and health workers (Maynard-Mood, Musheno 2003; Evans 2010). 
In particular, French scholars have developed sociological studies on administrative work 
(Weller 1999) as well as conducting ethnographic research on the state and its administrations. 
Latour  (2002)  investigates  la  fabrique quotidienne  du droit taking  the  French  State  Council 
(Conseil  d’Etat)  as  the  setting  for  fieldwork.  He  conducted  periods  of  observation  and 
interviews, stressing the importance of exploring dossiers (Ibid: 83-84) :
toute  affaire,  du moins  dans  nos  pays  de  droit  écrit,  a  pour  enveloppe corporelle  une 
4 See http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/ and http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk/en/aboutus/independentmonitor/.
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chemise cartonnée liée par des élastiques. Si l’ethnographe veut obtenir ce mélange instable 
de proximité -  que seule procure l’étude de terrain – et de détachement – qui permet de ne  
pas  reprendre  d’emblée  des  concepts  ternis  par  un  trop  long  usage  -,  il  lui  suffit  de 
substituer aux vagues propos sur le droit, la loi et la normativité une enquête méticuleuse 
sur les dossiers – gris, beiges ou jaunes, étiques ou gras, faciles ou complexes, anciens ou 
nouveaux  –  et  de  voir  ou  ils  nous  mènent.  Oui,  commençons  le  droit  par  le 
commencement,  c'est-à-dire  per  les  tampons,  les  élastiques,  les  trombones  et  autres 
agrafeuses – l’outillage indispensable des affaires. Les juristes parlent toujours des textes,  
mais rarement de leur matérialité. C’est a elle qu’il faut nous attacher.
I have already referred to Dubois' masterpiece (1999), where the author investigates welfare 
and the workers-recipients relationships associated with it through an ethnographic study of 
poverty and the poor, drawing on extensive observations and interviews. More recently, Dubois 
(2009a) has described his methodology of in-depth fieldwork conducted in order to analyse the 
concrete  practices  through which  a  policy  is  enforced  in  everyday life  using the  phrase  as 
“critical policy ethnography”. In fact, this author's research focuses not on a social group per se 
(the  poor  in  his  case)  but  on  practices  and  the  inherent  balance  of  power  created  by  its  
legitimised political  treatment.  His perspective  tends to deconstruct  prevailing categories of 
understanding to reveal the relations of domination that underpin the situations observed (Ibid: 
237):
the categorization of population is in my opinion a crucial point. Ethnographic work is a  
key  tool  in  deconstructing  official  categories  and  also  allows for  the  revelation of  the 
practical logics from which they originate.
In the present work, it is the aspect of the institutions relevant to the people's experience,  
not the people themselves (travellers, potential migrants), that constitutes the object of inquiry.  
To conclude my reference to French academic literature, a fundamental point of reference for  
the  research  described  here  is  the  study  conducted  by  Alexis  Spire  (2008)  in  Prefectures, 
Embassies, and Immigration Offices. Spire worked for these institutions in order to gain field 
experience, observing the daily routine and interviewing key actors. Drawing upon years of  
research, the author seeks to explore the mise en œuvre de l'immigration choisie. 
Interesting fieldwork research has also been conducted by American scholars at the end of 
80s, concerning categorisation and the decision-making processes of immigration inspectors at 
ports of entry (Gilboy 1991), and the review of visa denials by consular officers (Nafziger 1991).
As regards Italy, there are a few studies concerned with structures of the State as well as 
migration administrations which are worth mentioning. 
Quassoli  (1999)  applies  ethnography  to  juridical  institutions  in  search  of  the  social 
construction of migrant criminality. He investigates the equation “immigration is criminality” 
through  the  analysis  of  case  files  and “typical  profiles”  of  charged  foreigners.  His  study  is 
particularly  interesting  in  the  field  of  research  on  labelling  practices  (where  through  an 
interaction,  a  characteristic/behaviour  perceived  as  deviant  is  made  known)  and  it  is  an 
example of retracing the daily mechanisms of classification of social identities used on behalf of 
the state. 
Another  in-depth  study  on  the  operation  of  a  section  of  the  state  is  Palidda's  (2000) 
ethnographic study on “post-modern police”. The author stresses the scarcity of research on the 
state in the field of contemporary social sciences, which has mainly dealt with the system of 
parties, the electoral exchange and social negotiation. He investigates the “new social control”, 
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retracing  the  police’s  history,  organisation,  the  characteristics  of  its  staff,  the  approach  to  
learning, and changes and adaptation to new requests related to security. His analysis includes 
data and documents of institutions; observations from the field in police headquarters as well as  
in  prisons  or  on  the  road  and  draws  on  hundreds  of  interviews  and  conversations  with 
policemen,  carabinieri, social workers, journalists, judges, lawyers, former inmates... collected 
over a period of around ten years.
In the field of migration, Triandafyllidou (2003) investigates the processes of issuance of 
stay permits in an Italian Prefecture through observation and interviews in order to explore the 
implementation  of  immigration  policy  and  the  culture  of  discretion  among  officials. 
Campomori (2007) explores the role of policy-making of workers (street-level bureaucrats) in 
the field of migration, considering three cases of management of policies in three Italian cities,  
and underlining the blurred borders between public and private sectors.
More recently, there have been two parallel researches which concern the management of 
migration  in  Italy  and  include  investigating  the  issuing  of  stay  permits,  having  access  to  
observation  in  offices  and  interviewing  migrants  and  officials  involved  in  administrations 
(Caponio et al 2012; Colombo, Piro 2012).
Finally, it is worth mentioning a study focusing specifically on Embassies and visas, taking 
the cases of  the Italian Embassy and Consulate in Casablanca (Infantino 2010). The author  
adopts an ethnographic approach on the side of applicants, exploring their paths towards the 
interview at the counter for the visa, the access to information, as well as obstacles and filtering 
devices. More recently, an issue of the review publication  Sociologies Pratiques (n. 24/2012) is 
devoted  to  the  topic  of  Au  guichet:  savoir  et  pouvoir  dans  l’ordinaire  administratif,  with  a 
contribution on practices involved in the attribution of visas by Infantino and Rea (2012).
When  following  the  path  set  by  these  references,  the  ethnographic  methodological 
approach allows us to reject the  a priori dichotomy between the juridical and the social. The 
immediacy  of  the  ethnographic  approach  invites  us  to  look  at  the  daily  making  and 
interpretation of the laws themselves, and  adopting this approach entails consideration of the 
significant methodological issue of how to effectively access the field. 
At first, my research plans did not involve focusing on the Italian Consulate in Dakar, and I 
was not convinced of the value of presenting it as my unique case study. As often happens in  
qualitative research, where the possibility for access is one of the main drivers in the choice of  
the case to study, it was the evaluation of the feasibility of the fieldwork that led to my choice to 
focus on Senegal, and it proved very difficult to widen the study due to access issues (this point 
will be developed further in the next paragraph).  But is one case study enough? 
I believe the answer lies in questioning “enough for what?” and in seeing this research not 
as an attempt to provide categorical “truths” about Consulates in general, but as an attempt to 
raise  questions about  such institutions,  and the  implementation of  policies at  this  level,  by 
looking at a single case in detail.  I acknowledge the limitation of the study, and there is no 
attempt to generalise beyond the single case. 
The Italian Consulate in Dakar is not a case in the sense that it is “typical” or “distinct” from 
others, the aim is to provide insight into a wider issue and to test theoretical tools. It is an 
“instrumental  case  study”  as  Stake  (2000:  437-8)  phrased  it,  where  the  main  focus  is  on 
something else, on concerns, or problems that are real for people and that are situated within 
their relationship to an institutional order.
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Accessing the field
The first issue that arises when gathering ethnographic data is the access to the field, and 
the  very  fact  of  negotiating  access  can  generate important  knowledge  about  the  field  itself 
(Hammersley,  Atkinson 2007).  Since the field of this study consists  of Schengen Consulates 
abroad, a  concrete obstacle  was the  direct  access  to  such closed and formal settings where 
boundaries are clearly marked and not easily penetrated.
In  Italian  Embassies/Consulates,  initial  access  negotiations  are  focused  on  official 
permission that can be granted by key personnel. As a researcher it is very difficult (not to say 
almost impossible) to have access to observation periods or to interview officials because every 
step needs not only the agreement of the Ambassador but also the authorisation of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. The investigation of consular bureaucracy cannot be addressed without being 
sure of having reliable contacts in Embassies, which entails the trust, in addition to the concrete 
permission, of the diplomats in charge.
As regards Italy, for students there is a channel to access Embassies just before or within 18  
months after obtaining their degree through an internship program (known as “MAE-CRUI”), 
thanks to a partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministero Afari Esteri) and the 
Conference  of  Italian  Universities'  Directors  (CRUI).  The  internship  is  available  in  Italian 
Embassies, Consulates or Cultural Institutes all over the world and it has been created as a first  
step experience for a possible diplomatic career. 
This is the way I accessed the Italian Consulate in Dakar, which is the case study of the 
current work.  The internship enabled me to conduct a pilot survey in Senegal, which become 
later on my unique fieldwork case study. With the enthusiasm born of achieving the research 
opportunity  associated  with  my  internship,  I  planned  a  comparative  study  on  visa  issuing 
procedures in Italian Consulates in three/four countries, with the aim of investigating policy 
implementation and criteria of accessing mobility. I thought about Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and 
Ukraine because of their migration links (and also, in the case of Libya, colonial links) with  
Italy, and I started to collect contacts in Embassies and to send mails. But it quickly became 
apparent that it would be very difficult to obtain clear answers from the diplomats in charge, 
with no one owning/wanting the responsibility to allow me to pursue my field enquiries.  It 
seemed impossible for me to find a framework to lead to acceptance of a researcher in a Visa 
Office apart from the internship I had already obtained in Senegal. 
Bureaucratic obstacles led me to change my research design, considering my fieldwork in 
Dakar to be all the more valuable as it was and not so easily repeatable. Thus, I capitalised on  
my  prior  experience  to  gain  access  to  the  Visa  Office  using  my  existing  relationship  and 
contacts, a progression which is not uncommon for qualitative researchers (Silverman 2010: 
204). I sought permission for and obtained agreement to access the Italian Consulate in Senegal 
for a second time, giving brief details of my research's methods and aims to the gatekeepers  
(diplomats). 
Methods
I decided to thoroughly explore the Italian consular post in Dakar with ethnography tools. 
In the current work, data are gathered from a range of sources but participant observation and 
relatively informal conversation are the main ones. 
The  initial  exploratory  phase  of  ethnographic  research  (Jan-Mar  2010)  allowed  me  to 
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identify where observation should begin and how, and which actors needed to be shadowed. 
Following this, I was to pursue another month of fieldwork in November 2011 (authorised by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), collecting fresh data and interviews, after the coming into force 
of the Visa Code (April 2010). 
My pilot survey and the pre-fieldwork phase allowed me to prepare operational questions 
and methods to investigate them, but in ethnographic research the development of research 
problems is rarely completed before the fieldwork begins (Hammersley, Atkinson 2007: 28). As 
regards my experience, the setting itself comes first: an opportunity (the internship) arises to  
investigate it and problems spring from the nature of that setting. 
As an example, although the focus of the research concerns Schengen visas, I decided to 
include  visas  for  family  reunification  in  the  study  as  well,  because  during  the  fieldwork  I  
observed practices of control even in the case of a recognized right. Thus, in order to retrace the 
whole issuing procedure of family reunification visas I investigated both the first step in Italy  
(nulla osta) and the second one in Senegal (visa), conducting a week of observation at a Single 
Desk for  Immigration  of  a  Prefecture  (June 2012).  Chronologically,  I  firstly  conducted my 
fieldwork at the Consulate in Dakar and then I investigated the issuing of the nulla osta by the 
Prefecture, taking as my field the Prefecture of Pisa (Italy), the setting which is geographically 
closest to where I am based.
To develop my research questions, a combination of methods has been used, with emphasis  
given to qualitative research techniques. The study combines methods and data from a variety  
of sources, collected through:
· desk review of literature and “grey literature” (internal reports of agencies);
· policy documents, EU legislation and communications; 
· on-line research on Italian Ministries and the websites of migration administrations;
· documents and forms of the Italian Consulate in Dakar and the Prefecture of Pisa;
· statistics on visas and stay permits;
· participant observation at the Visa Office in Dakar and the Prefecture of Pisa;
· informal conversations with officials during work time;
· meetings and interviews with key informants (EU Commission - DG Home Affairs; Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs);
·  participant observation and informal conversations outside of the Embassy (queuing / 
waiting in the street).
Each  method  conducted  in  the  fieldwork  phase  will  be  developed  further  in  the  next 
section of this chapter, outlining the benefits and limitations. 
As regards quantitative data, this is a minor part of the work. Statistics on visas have been 
collected and analysed. At a Schengen level, data are available through a yearly document issued 
by the  Council  of  the EU (“Exchange of  statistical  information on uniform visas issued  by 
Member States' diplomatic missions and consular posts”). 
At the Italian Consulate in Dakar I collected electronic extracts of data on visas stored in  
the Visa Information System, from 2005 to 2010. The VIS is not operational in Dakar in terms 
of collection of biometrics,  but the software replacing the Visa World Network (RMV,  Rete 
Mondiale  Visti),  the  L-Vis,  has  already  been  implemented.  Data  include  statistics  on 
application/issuance/refusal with disaggregated data per typology of visas.
The  timetable  of  the  study  is  set  out  below,  and  shows  how  the  various  interrelated 
segments of my research have been ordered over time. The sequence shown begins with the 
direct experience obtained during the internship, before moving on to study and analysis of the 
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relevant laws and the forms used in the processes which fall within my field of interest. A review 
of the literature followed on from this, before I embarked on fieldwork and the collection of  





forms, documents, statistics of 
the Italian Consulate in Dakar
EU communications and 
policy documents
Literature review
Interviews: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Rome
(May)










Table 1. Timetable of the research.
The fieldwork 
The  structure  of  the  fieldwork  may  offer  the  reader  important  insights  into  the 
characteristics of my research material. The process of knowledge acquisition through fieldwork 
is far from easy, as it involves working in an environment which is full of contradictory forces,  
power  asymmetries  and communication obstacles.  Several  scholars (feminists  in particular) 
invite  us  to  consider  these  tensions  as  a  fundamental  part  of  the  process.  In  feminist 
conversations about fieldwork, refexivity has often implied analysis of how the production of 
ethnographic knowledge is shaped by the shifting, contextual, and relational contours of the 
researcher’s  social  identity  and  her  social  situatedness  or  positionality  with  respect  to  the 
subject of the study (Haraway 1988). 
The concept of refexivity acknowledges that the orientations of researchers will be shaped 
by their socio-historical locations, including the values and interests that these locations confer 
upon them. In this approach, social research cannot be carried out in some autonomous realm 
that is insulated from the wider society, and the production of knowledge by researchers has 
consequences on the outside (Hammersley, Atkinson 2007: 15). The more we are aware of the 
subjectivity involved in data analysis (positionality), the more likely we are to see how we are 
infuencing interpretations (Corbin, Strauss 2008: 32). 
I  will  illustrate  here  the  rationale  behind  the  process  of  making  contact  with  the 
bureaucracies' milieu and the challenges faced when working within it.
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Positionality and field relations
I  acknowledge  the  need  for  any  individual  conducting  research  to  be  self-aware.  This 
awareness extends to the moment in which s/he writes or speaks, and include awareness of the 
specific “location” from which s/he is doing so and how this location affects the modality and 
the outcome of this process. This perspective has been taken up by several methodologists in  
human and social sciences, and it is indeed widely acknowledged that the interpretation of the 
research material cannot be separated from the whole research experience, and that the self-
refexive nature of a research standpoint must be taken into account. In this paragraph I will  
provide refections upon my own position, in the belief that the location does not only affect the 
way in which the fieldwork takes place, but also has an infuence on the whole of the research  
(Haraway 1988; Henry 2003).
In accordance with the internship agreement, I was assigned to the Political Office, at the 
first foor of the Embassy in Dakar, under the supervision of the Prime Chancellor. I actually 
spent most of the time there,  but during this  time I had the opportunity to ask about visa  
applications  and assessment  procedures,  giving  me  the  opportunity  to  use  this  time as  an 
exploration phase. Subsequently, I was allowed to stay at the Visa Office for two weeks in order 
to learn its activities, although this was not foreseen by the internship programme. The only  
condition of my presence at the Visa Office was the respect of privacy and data protection. I was  
allowed to look at all administrative procedures and documents, reports and data, except the 
ministerial circulars which are not supposed to be available to the public, but only for internal  
use.
Although I explained my interest in the field of visas to both the Prime Chancellor and the 
officials, since my PhD project would probably have been centred on that issue, my positionality 
was the one of the  stagiaire,  not of the researcher. They consider me as “the student coming 
from an academic environment and not knowing anything of the daily work of a Consulate”. 
This  proved  to  be  a  favourable  identification  for  me,  since  they  were  not  suspicious  nor 
mistrustful towards my curiosity, and they explained their work to me as if they were training 
me for  their  job.  In  concrete  terms,  I  could not  actively  help  officials  at  the counter,  but I 
assisted them in small tasks to helm them in coping with their daily workload, both at the 
counter and in the back office (preparing forms, making copies, passing stamps, etc.).
When I  returned  to  the  Embassy  in  November  2011,  my  positionality  was  completely 
different, as was my presence at the Visa Office. First of all, I was there as a researcher; secondly, 
almost  all  the officials remembered me as the  stagiaire of  the Prime Chancellor.  These two 
factors lead to some remarks worth mentioning:
· I explained my project in very concrete terms, both to diplomats and officials, setting out  
for them what I was interested in understanding and collecting, but omitting the theoretical  
aims of the research (Consulates as borders, selective access to mobility);
· having been “taken up” by the Prime Chancellor, I was channelled in line with existing  
networks of friendship and enmity, finding it difficult to achieve independence from such a 
person, but since the Prime Chancellor is hierarchically superior to the officials I was accepted 
with respect and considered a sort of “eye” of the Chancellor;
· in order to avoid officials' understanding of me as intrusive, and as someone investigating 
their possible “mistakes”, I  took care to ensure the officials'  perception of my research as an 
attempt to study their work practices to improve visa issuing procedures;
· since officials already knew me, they feel comfortable (and found it useful) to allow me to  
carry out several tasks, which enabled me to conduct a proper participant observation.
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Nevertheless, I  was obviously considered an outsider by officials, who tried to show me 
their  efficiency  and  their  correctness.  They  did  not  exercise  control,  but  I  think  they 
underestimated some aspects of my research. Their practical interest was seeing themselves and 
their colleagues presented in a favourable light and because of this reaction of showing off the 
efficient side of the administration as an automatic machine, I decided not to use questionnaires 
with officials but instead to rely on informal discussion which took place during the work time, 
whilst sharing their tasks and trying to be useful. This led to my location being seen more the 
one of the “student-prospective official” rather than the one of the “researcher-inspector”. 
My behaviour has been based on curiosity to learn their job and availability to carry out all 
kinds of duties. I developed my own role in the field and I do think this approach allowed me to 
observe the Visa Office in its daily routine as far as my presence as an outsider permitted. 
To conclude, when returning to the Embassy it was no longer possible for me to take on a  
novice role, and my relationship with visa applicants and key informants was the one of the 
researcher working at the Consulate, with the paradoxical reversion of me considered as an 
informant on procedures, instead of them as informants for my research (as also observed by 
Infantino 2010).
Participant observation 
During my first period at the Consulate I observed all the procedures at the Visa Office, 
sometimes asking officials for clarifications. I also observed a reunion of the Schengen consular 
cooperation (March 2010) dedicated to responding to the coming into force of the Visa Code 
and to the issues of harmonisation of supporting documents among consular posts. Moreover, I 
took pictures outside the Consulate during the queuing hours  and in the waiting area (see 
Annexes).  For  reasons  of  security  it  was  not  allowed  to  take  pictures  inside  the  Embassy.  
Photography has long been used in anthropology, but by contrast it has only been employed 
more recently in sociology and other disciplines to analyse spaces. I use pictures in the attempt 
to trace a memory of those places and to fix into images what I could not fix in words in my  
research diary.
In November 2011, my second spell  of  fieldwork in Dakar was specifically dedicated to 
participant observation and interviews. I  worked the whole month in (and out of) the Visa 
Office, in particular spending two weeks at the counters for Schengen visas, and one week at the 
counters  for  family  reunification  visas.  I  spent  a  further  week  with  the  queue  outside  the 
Consulate, and hanging around in “waiting places” such as street coffee and copy centres, as 
well  as  in the  waiting area  of  the Consulate,  under  the  tent.  In  addition,  I  collected forms 
(information to applicants, application forms, refusal letters) and I looked up the archive of 
consular cooperation (reports of reunions, mails...).
Direct observation was the main technique employed. I  participated in several activities  
which included:
· at the counter, filling forms with date and stamp, printing appointment slips, by sitting 
next to the employee;
· stickering visas on passports, which allowed me to look at dossiers;
· return of passports on Wednesday afternoon, which allow me to look at refusal letters;
· observation of the assessment procedures for applications, in the afternoon with the Head 
of the Visa Office.
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We decided that if applicants were surprised at my presence or if they asked any questions, I 
would be introduced as an intern. This made it possible to explain my silent attitude and my 
note-taking. In fact we had almost no need to use this disguise because people rarely asked  
about me; and when they did, they had already assumed that I was an intern.
To track the development of my research understanding as well as to provide an overview 
over a  period of  time I  kept a  research diary,  choosing the most  practical  and manageable 
format for the context: a small notebook I could easily keep in my hand or in my bag. The aim  
was  to  make  an  entry  every  day  of  work  or  whenever  something  useful  that  I  wanted  to 
remember came up. 
Following the principles of  qualitative  research on  observational  notes  (Corbin,  Strauss 
2008:  124)  I  wrote  down  records  of  actual  events,  adding  theoretical  notes  denoting  my 
thoughts about those events or reminders about some procedural aspects of the research. The 
note-taking while out in the field was not lengthy or unnecessarily detailed, to avoid the risk of 
losing sight  of  what  was going on;  during  actual  participant observation it  was not always  
possible to write or the opportunity for this was very limited, so I did it as soon as possible after 
the observed action. The written record I produced is not perfect, but it is good enough to serve  
my analytical purposes adequately. It describes in practical terms what I did on a day-to-day 
basis, with “end-of-week” re-writings being recorder on a laptop. 
One can never record everything, and a selection has to be made as the research progresses 
and as emergent issues are identified, notes become more restricted and focused in their subject 
matter. However, more tacit knowledge is gained than is ever contained in the written record. 
More  specifically,  I  took notes  from observations  and interviews at  the  counters,  and from 
discussions or useful conversations among/with officials and applicants. I also maintained an 
ongoing “to do” list of questions on items that I wanted to find out more about. 
The contents  of my notes  were treated as confidential,  with individuals  denoted by the 
initials of their role's name and a number (ex. D1 for “Diplomat n°1”, O3 for “Official n°3”...) 
and I sent my research notes and transcriptions of interviews to be approved respectively by the  
Prime Chancellor and the interviewees. They did not object to anything. The officials at the Visa  
Office were four in total, plus the Head of the office. Three of them were on contract and one 
was an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose location changes by rotation every four 
years.
Interviews
These  direct  observations  were  complemented  by  two  extensive  interviews  with  key 
informants occupying central positions in the power structure: the Prime Chancellor and the 
Head of the Visa Office of the Italian Consulate in Dakar. Having consented to an interview,  
interviewees did not object to audio-recording with a small mp3 recording device (which I kept 
aside on the table). I transcribed interviews in the language in which I conducted them (Italian) 
and I translated into English only those extracts mentioned in the text. The full transcription is 
time-consuming but necessary, because questions were all relevant and what is on the recording 
that has not been transcribed will probably be forgotten. Moreover I had only two formal and  
recorded interviews, while for the most part the conversations were informal and they were  
recorded only in my research diary. 
The  two  formal  interviews  were  pre-structured  around  a  set  of  themes  (see  Table  2), 
selected between the first and the second fieldwork periods according to the main features of  
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the implementation of visa policies that I wished to explore. After the list of issues to included 
in the interview had been covered, the interviews became refexive toward the end, allowing the 
discussion to fow in a way that seemed natural. Most of the questions required the interviewee  
to provide a specific piece of information, but others were relatively open-ended. I  acted as  
active-listener to catch inputs for further questions.
Table 2. Themes for structuring the interviews.
Furthermore,  the  interviews  included  questions  raised  from  fieldwork  or  during  the 
interview itself, as well as the general remarks of interviewees on the Schengen visa system. The 
perspectives  of  the  diplomats  were  of  particular  importance,  not  just  to  highlight  actor's  
subjective  view  reducing  reality  to  this  level,  but  also  to  examine  the  actor's  meaning, 
representations,  experiences  and  practices  as  more  than  subjective  views,  since  they  are 
infuenced by broader processes, relations, and structures. 
(How to explore) Italian administrations of migration
The broader framework of this study is the context of administrations of migration, and 
Consulates abroad are only a small part of it. In Italy the administration of regular migration  
involves  millions  of  people  and a  number  of  civil  servants,  workers  of  different  kinds  and 
volunteers  which  is  difficult  to  ascertain,  but  is  of  the  order  of  tens  of  thousands.  An 
administrative apparatus of this relevance and complexity might be expected to be the subject  
of intense debates and research, but this is not the case in Italy. Migration policies on the whole  
constitute a relevant issue, but only some specific functions of this heterogeneous policy field 
rise  to  the  surface  as  media and political  priorities.  More specifically,  this  does  happen for 
repressive  functions  as  surveillance  at  borders,  especially  sea  borders,  selected  for  their 
“newsworthiness”, as well as expulsions or the fight against the exploitation of migrants...
Therefore, management of regular migration is a disregarded policy field notwithstanding 
the huge number of subjects involved and the relevance of the interests at stake (entry and stay 
rules, labour market, social fabric...), and two recent working papers by the research centres 
FIERI and the “Carlo Cattaneo Institute” shed light on this precise issue (Caponio et al. 2012; 
Colombo, Piro 2012).
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· Individual tasks of the interviewee
· Visa application process: description of the procedure
· Official's role and training
· Assessment/issuing procedures: description of the procedure
· Schengen Consular Cooperation: use and opinions
· Coming into force of the Visa Code: implementation and changes involved
· Consular harmonisation at EU level
· “Operational knowledge” in situ and implementation
· Discretion: where is there room for it? How?
· Outsourcing: who decides/advantages and disadvantages
· Use of EU handbooks: real use?
· Refusal form: use and opinions
· Opinions on the notion of “migratory risk”
To trace the structure of the Italian administration in charge of migration control, first of all 
I  identified the parts  of  Ministries  and bureaucracies  dealing with migration issues.  Then I 
looked  up  the  national  official  websites  (Ministries,  Municipalities,  Police...)  as  well  as  the 
regional administrations' websites (eg. P.A.eS.I. Project -  Pubblica Amministrazione e Stranieri  
Immigrati), and I then drew up schemes of bodies and their functions. 
As regards numbers, the Ministry of the Interior does not have any publications or data 
available, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes a statistical yearbook with data on all  
its offices, human resources and finance (MAE 2011).
As regards the specific field of the research (visas), I had meetings with three officials of the 
Visa Centre (Office VI) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I went to Rome (December 2011) and 
I spent one day in the Office VI to explore its role and functions. I was not allowed to record  
and I could collect only notes of my conversations with the personnel. More specifically, I spoke  
with officials in charge of:
· the Help Desk for the region of Sub-Saharan Africa;
·  the Schengen  acquis'  application (and national representative in the Visa Committee in 
Brussels);
· appeals  of  visa  refusals  and  the VIS  (and  national  representative  in  the  VIS  roll-out 
reunions in Brussels).
Furthermore, in order to collect updates on recent proposals on Schengen issues I met in 
Brussels  (May  2011)  an  official  of  the  European Commission  -  Directorate  General  Home 
Affairs,  specifically  of  the  Unit  B-3/Visa  Policy,  under  the  Directorate  B “Immigration and 
Asylum”. There are around 300 officials in the DG and 7-8 people are assigned to the Visa Unit,  
in charge of the Visa Code and the Local Schengen Cooperation. 
Finally, I conducted  one week of observation at the Single Desk for Immigration of the 
Prefecture of Pisa, in order to follow the application for family reunification and the issuance of  
the nulla osta (authorisation to reunification) as well as the arrival of reunified family members,  
and to observe the effect of the Integration Agreement which recently came into force (March 
2012). My interest was specifically the issuance of the nulla osta, this being the first step for the 
family reunification process and the possible “access to mobility” of the family member. 
I already had contacts at the Single Desk in Pisa because of my earlier research, so it was  
easy to be accepted. I asked the Prefect for an authorisation to enable me to assist officials in  
their daily work for a week. I collected forms, notes of applicants' interviews and participated in 
informal discussions with three officials while working there. One week was enough to enable  
me to follow and understand the procedure and the officials' approach, because the issuance of 
the  nulla  osta  depends on the  acceptability  of  the dossier  and on the fulfilling  of  required 
documents, and there is no margin of discretion at the level of the Single Desk. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  field  of  bureaucratic  discretion  is  the  issuance  of  the  required 
documents  for  the  nulla  osta.  Municipalities  and  employers  are  in  charge  of  this,  and  the 
procedures as well as the documents themselves can be different from place to place. I will not  
go into details on this, since this was not part of my investigations. However this could be an 
interesting field for further research. 
As a complement of the research, I visited a patronage (ACLI) and a private “migration 
service centre” in Pisa, to check their information policy and the services they offered, and to  
gain better knowledge of the whole path pursued by applicants. I went into the two offices, 
introducing myself as a University researcher interested in exploring their services as regards 
support to applicants for family reunification visas. They answered my questions and I collected 






Italian administration in charge of migration control
The organisation of migration polices in  Italy comes under the jurisdiction of different 
Ministries. It is worth noting a shift over time in the emphasis on the various Ministries. With  
the 1986 law, the emphasis is on the Ministry of Labour (migrants as foreign workers), while the 
“Martelli law” (1990) stresses the control of migration through the Ministry of the Interior. 
Following on from this,  the “Turco-Napolitano law” (1998) includes  the  Ministry  of  Social  
Solidarity and entails a significant development of the integration field, which previously was 
only vaguely involved. The Consolidated Act does not really change the structure as it is, but it 
increases the workload of peripheral administration within the Ministry of the Interior, which 
is  required  to  deal  with  the  administration  of  stay  permits  and  with  the  function  of 
coordination with the local structures of other Ministries.
The multiple levels of administrative action which the issue of migration entails (social and 
protection policies, integration, control) have always brought about problems of coordination 
among the different administrations in charge of the processes involved. However, at the same 
time, the difficulty of dealing with the issue as a whole has left the required competencies split  
among several bureaucracies.
In the following pages I explore shape of the Italian administration in charge of migration 
control  in  order  to  unravel  the  constellation of  Ministries  and offices  which deal  with  the 
production and the implementation of policies regarding foreigners. The focus is on the area of 
control, without taking into account the integration field, nor the implication of social policies, 
but mainly concentrating on the “management” of foreigners. 
This chapter is an attempt at drawing the structure of the administrations, as suggested by 
Spire  (2008),  and  of  highlighting  the  mechanism  of  “selection  at  entry”  which  have  been 
deployed during the history of migration policies, before going into details of the investigation 
of the micro level of policy implementation (Part II). I will firstly present an overview of the 
institutional framework from which the migration policies stem. Secondly, I will illustrate in 
detail the role of the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Labour, in the attempt to 
understand their tasks and competencies in managing this field. Finally, I will  look at other 
relevant bureaucracies which have entered the migration field in recent years.
Historical overview of the institutional framework
In the 1960s and 70s, neither a real debate nor a framework for an elaborate migration 
policy emerged. Italian public administrations randomly adopted manifold small emergency 
measures, taking sectorial decisions aimed at facing specific situations. Besides these, there were 
control measures implemented on the basis of laws inherited from fascism (e.g. the police single 
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text of 1931), created for completely different reasons,  and to which were added ministerial 
circulars responding to the needs of law and order (Ministry of the Interior) and the protection 
of Italian workers (Ministry of Labour). 
In 1963, with the postwar slow down of economic growth, the Ministry of Labour decided 
to stiffen the requirements for entry of foreign workers on the administrative side, replacing the 
Ministry of the Interior as the main actor managing this field (Einaudi 2007: 98-102). 
Following  Einaudi,  it  is  worth mentioning  two examples  of  categories  from an “avant-
gardist” movement towards Italy in the aftermath of the war (1960s-70s): students and care 
workers. In the framework of this research it is worth mentioning them in the light of their  
management  by the  immigration law.  Migrants  from the  first  of  these two categories  were 
controlled and curbed, while  in contrasts, the second of these categories continues to represent 
the easiest way to enter and to be regularised in Italy.
The fow of foreign students was stopped first of all by the suppression of scholarship after 
1970 because of the associated politicisation, which was considered “excessive” by the Italian 
authorities:  “according to  academic  authorities  and the  government,  foreigners  became too 
numerous, they were considered potential criminals, with lack of motivation or unwilling to go 
back to their country at the end of their studies” (Einaudi 2007: 105). In 1973, when 20% of the  
foreigners in Italy had a stay permit for study, a circular from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
called for the curb of registration from abroad. Following the publication of this circular, it  
became compulsory for those applying for university places to have obtained 80/100 at the high 
school  level  and  to have  a  scholarship  or sufficient  means of  subsistence.  The circular  was 
revoked a year later following demonstrations by students and trade unions.
In 1977, the then Minister of the Interior Francesco Cossiga and the Minister of Education 
Franco Malfatti proposed the cessation of registrations for foreign students for a period of two 
years,  but  effective  demonstrations  organised  by  students  hampered  the  approval  of  the 
proposal. In 1981 the Ministry of Education introduced entry quotas applicable to every student 
faculty,  which  are  still  in  force.  After  the  introduction  of  the  “Martelli  law”  in  1990,  new  
requirements were introduced for the renewal of the stay permit for study, involving checks on 
examination performances and means of subsistence.
As regards those incomers seeking domestic care work, these individuals have also been 
subjected  to  similar  mobility  controls  and curb  reactions.  A circular  from the  Ministry  of 
Labour restricts the employment of foreigners to full-time contracts, because hourly-paid part-
time employment was still attractive for native Italians (Einaudi 2007: 107).
Nevertheless, for several years care work has been the most accessible channel for entering 
Italy with documents or to regularise a migrant's position (Sarti 2009). In 1991, the “Martelli  
law” notwithstanding, a circular was published which remained in force until 1995, restricting 
entry for regular work to those non-EU citizens who requested authorisation to work before 
migrating, “to establish a care work relation in Italy”. Moreover, the circular forbids the incomer 
“to provide subordinate activity for two years” in a different sector from the one of domestic 
care. 
Between 1991 and 1995 a high percentage of the authorisation to enter Italy for work (44-
69%) was made up of those issued for domestic care services.5 Since this time and up until the 
present, the aforementioned sector represents a “privileged” channel of entry or regularisation: 
in 2000, 69% of authorisations to work were those for care workers; in 2002 the regularisation 
was  reserved  for  domestic  helpers,  care givers  (colf, badanti)  and  subordinate  workers  and 
340,000 were the requests for domestic and care workers; in 2005 domestic care accounted for  
5 Circular n.156, 29 November 1991, revoked from the circular n.145, 17 November 1995 (Sarti 2009: 71).
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44% of requests for employment from abroad received by the Ministry of Labour; in 2007 the  
fux decree reserved a quota of 65,000 places for domestic helpers and care givers (Sarti 2009;  
Einaudi 2007). 
The 2008 quota was limited to 150,000 home care workers; in 2009 there is only an amnesty 
for the regularisation of domestic and care workers; in 2010, 30,000 out of 98,080 were reserved 
to care workers.
The lack of policy responses by political forces has been compensated for, especially during 
the period 1977 to 1998, by trade unions and associations, among which the Catholic Church 
played a  prominent  role,  in  particular  through its  political  arm,  the  Migrantes  Foundation 
(which  was  created  by  the  CEI,  the  Italian  Episcopal  Conference),  and  the  local-level 
operational arm of Caritas (Einaudi 2007: 112). Caritas became the lead agency for services for 
migrants, working closely with the Ministry of the Interior, obtaining access to and processing 
the  Ministry's  data  since  1990,  and  also  publishing  the  annual  statistical  dossier  (Dossier  
Caritas-Migrantes).
In  the  absence,  then,  of  a  specific  body  to  deal  with  the  issue  of  immigration,  the  
government of national unity led by Giulio Andreotti put the Interministerial Committee for 
Emigration in charge of it. The committee met in January 1978 and the first systematic study on 
the foreign presence in Italy was initiated. So the period between 1979 and 1986 marked the 
run-up to the first tranche of laws addressing migration.
The first relevant law was drafted in 1986 (L.  943/1986, the “Foschi law”),  according to 
which migrants were considered as foreign workers, as is made clear in the title “Norms in the 
matter of placement and treatment of non-EU workers and against clandestine immigration”. 
The law embodied the implementation of an EU directive, provided for regularisation for illegal 
migrants and tried to regulate the conditions for admission and residence of foreigners coming 
into the country. Important responsibilities were therefore assigned to the Ministries of Labour, 
Social Security and of Foreign Affairs. The latter set up a committee aimed at regulating fows, 
controlling illegal immigration and combating trafficking. It was composed of representatives of 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Labour and of the Interior, as well as unions and employers’  
associations.
Following on from the “Foschi law”, the measure known as “Martelli Law” (L.  39/1990) 
tightened  the  conditions  for  entry  into  the  country  and  enlarged  the  margins  for  the 
regularisation of those already present in the national territory. In theory, this 1990 law paved 
the  way  for  further  planned  immigration  by  making  annual  fow  decrees  mandatory  and 
imposing 30 October as a deadline for issuing the decree (art. 2). In practice, up until 1998 the 
decrees were issued at the end of the years whose infows they were supposed to regulate, and a  
large quota of  the planned fows were taken up by  de facto amnesties,  family reunions and 
permits for humanitarian reasons. This shows a discrepancy between the letter of the law and its 
actual implementation. 
The Martelli law assigned the responsibility of coordinating planned annual infows to the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior,  together  with  the  Ministries  of  Foreign  Affairs,  of  Budget  and  of 
Economic Planning, Labour and Social Security. These ministries were also supposed to consult  
others involved, such as the Ministries of Public Health and of Education, as well as the main  
unions,  the  National  Council  of  Economy and Labour (CNEL)  and the  Conference  of  the 
Regions. The system was more or less the same as provided by the 1986 law, with slightly more 
infuence given to the regions. 
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After  the  political  crisis  in  Albania  and  the  consequent  massive  infows  of  Albanian 
refugees to Italy (1991), the only example of a Ministry which would focus on migration was 
formed.  Combined  with  a  general  need  to  improve  coordination  in  policymaking,  the 
“Albanian crisis” motivated Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to introduce a Ministry for Italians 
Abroad and Immigration (1991-1992). However, this ad hoc Ministry had no portfolio and was 
always  overwhelmed  by  more  powerful  competing  Ministries  and  their  departments,  and 
consequently achieved little  success.  Then,  in  1993 (L.  107,  April  13) a special  autonomous 
Department of Social Affairs within the Presidency of the Council - again a ministry without a 
portfolio - took control of this policy sector.  A special General Direction on Immigration was 
then established in the department. Under this department's minister, a first draft of the major 
reform of the legal status of migrants in Italy was prepared, with the help of a commission 
including experts and civil servants from the main ministries (Zincone 2011: 265). 
The 1998 law, widely referred to as “Turco-Napolitano law” (L. 40/1998, then Consolidated  
Act with the enacting of the Legislative Decree n. 286/1998), can be considered to be the first 
reform  regarding  migration  and  migrants’  rights  that  was  conceived  with  a  long-term 
perspective in mind rather than under emergency conditions. The compilers of this law had the 
intention of treating immigration as a permanent phenomenon and regulating the subject with 
a  comprehensive  act,  providing  for  both  integration  and  control  measures  (Veikou, 
Triandafyllidou 2001). 
The regulatory structure in force prior to the enactment of the Turco-Napolitano law was 
not held to be capable of adequately disciplining the phenomenon in terms of integration. This 
structure  was,  in  fact,  a  series  of  “buffer  laws”,  partial  regulations  that  refected  both  an 
emergency  attitude,  that  tackled  migration  each time as  an emergency,  and  a  functionalist  
attitude, that considered migrants only as a work force useful to the national economy, ignoring 
the problem of social and cultural integration. The shortcomings of this structure, which made 
it impossible to control undocumented migration, were corrected by a series of regularisation 
measures, which had the unexpected consequence of attracting new undocumented migrants,  
who were trusting that there would be new amnesties in the future, or had the intention of  
procuring fake documentation in order to take advantage of the amnesty which was currently in 
force (Zincone, Di Gregorio 2002).
Article  3  of  the  Turco-Napolitano  law  deals  with  migration  policies,  including  quotas, 
international treaties and local policies of integration. Under the terms of this article, a three-
year plan of migration fows is defined and the annual quotas are to be determined each time by 
the president of the Council of Ministers and Parliament according to the needs of the labour  
market.  National  as well  as  regional  actors are involved in deciding how implementation is 
carried  out.  The  article  anticipates  the  formation  of  Territorial  Councils  for  Immigration 
(Consigli territoriali per l'immigrazione) with the aim of taking responsibility for local policies. It 
stipulates that it is the Prime Minister's duty to prepare the “action plan on immigration policy 
and  foreigners  on  state  territory”  every  three  years  (documento programmatico),  after  a 
consultation procedure  with the Ministries involved, the National  Council  of  Economy and 
Labour  (CNEL),  the  Conference  for  State-Cities  and  Local  Autonomies,  the  Permanent 
Conference for relations between the state,  regions,  the autonomous provinces of Trent and 
Bolzano,  the  NGOs  which  are  deeply  engaged  in  migrants  assistance  and  integration,  the 
municipal organisations and those employers who are well represented at the national level. 
According to article  2 bis,  the coordination role,  fundamental  for the determination of 
entry  fows  of  foreign  workers,  is  being  played  by  the  Committee  for  coordination  and 
monitoring of migration policies, which relies on the support of a special Technical Working 
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Group which is also composed of interministerial officials, established at the Ministry of the 
Interior – the Central Directorate for Immigration and Asylum Policies.
By late 1999, to simplify the procedure and coordinate the various offices and ministries, a 
permanent roundtable was set up, hosted by the Presidency of the Council. General reforms to 
restructure public administration (e.g. L. 300/99) also set in motion a process of functional re-
organisation and gave rise  to  many changes both within the  Ministries  and between them, 
reducing their number. In 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took this opportunity to replace 
the  General  Department  for  Emigration  and  Social  Affairs  with  a  new  Department  for 
Migration Policies and Italians Abroad, although this change did not go take effect until 2002. 
The aforementioned reform also merged various Ministries when it was implemented in 2001. 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Security incorporated the Department of Social Affairs and 
became a sort of “Ministry of Welfare”,  which inherited the Immigration Division (Zincone 
2011; Einaudi 2007; EMN 2009). 
As  regards  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  responsibilities  for  migration  and  migrants 
previously shared between the Ministry of the Interior and the two General Divisions for Police 
and  Civil  Rights  (the  latter  addressing  only  asylum  seekers)  were  brought  together  in  the 
Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration (Zincone 2011: 268). 
Although the Ministry of the Interior has always played a prominent role in immigration 
and migrant-related policies, it is worth underlining a shift of responsibilities from the Ministry 
of Welfare to the Ministry of the Interior, which also became involved in matters previously  
dealt  with  by  Social  Affairs.  Under  the  third  Berlusconi  government,  the  Ministry  of  the 
Interior (headed at that time by Giuseppe Pisanu, of  Forza Italia) took the lead not only in 
combating illegal entry and crime, but also in the field of integration policies.
Furthermore,  with  the  decentralisation  process  regions  were  assigned  legislative 
responsibility  for  public  health,  housing  and  large  parts  of  education.  Starting  in  1990,  a 
decisive set of reforms gave an even more relevant role to local authorities in the making of  
migrant policy. Pressure from the Northern League created a new impulse for the constitutional 
revision of the “Form of State” (Title V of the Italian Constitution), which had begun with the 
introduction  of  regions  in  1970.  A  reform  process  towards  a  more  federal,  decentralised 
structure of the state has been taking place since 1999 and it has already involved a profound 
redistribution of responsibilities  between the central  government and the regions, including 
matters concerning migrants. Following on from the first budget law of the 2001 Berlusconi  
government, the National Fund for Migration Policies and other social funds were merged into 
a single general Social Fund. Regions became responsible for deciding on the allocation of these 
resources to the sub-regional local authorities. This decision-making reform was accompanied 
by a sizable cut to the fund itself,  resulting in local  governments having to carry a heavier  
financial  burden for integration.  From this  stems  the  decentralisation to  local  bodies,  civil 
society associations and post offices, which will be covered in more detail later in this chapter.  
However,  this  attempt  to  delegate  and  decentralise  caused  considerable  confusion  over  the 
responsibility of issuing and renewing permits, making the situation even more chaotic. The 
subsequent centre-left government opted for an online procedure,  but this  solution did not 
prove  successful  either  –  the  circuits  got  overloaded,  resulting  in  the  entire  system  being 
jammed up (Zincone 2011: 272-273). According to Zincone (2011: 264):
too many actors  involved in too many acts requiring excessive transfers of paperwork, 
back and forth from one ministry or department to another.  Once again,  this  leads to  
another discrepancy between the letter of the law and what is put into practice. Decisions 
are actually made by a far more limited number of actors and, as a consequence, the formal  
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actors excluded by the real decision-making process take offence.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the creation of a proper “Ministry of Immigration” in France 
in  2007.  The  Ministère  de  l'immigration,  l'intégration,  l'identité  nationale  et  le  développement  
solidaire was operational until 2010, when it was merged back into the Ministry of the Interior 
(Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'outre mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l'immigration). It was 
criticised for its reference to the French national identity, and significant debates on the issue 
animated France in 2009.6
Ministry of the Interior
There are two departments of the Ministry of the Interior that handle migration issues. 
Firstly, the aforementioned Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration, created in 2001, 
operates in the field of tasks typical for the Ministry of the Interior: protection of civic rights, 
included  the  rights  concerning  asylum  and  immigration.  To  run  this  task  in  the  area  of 
migration policies there are three internal structures of the Department: the Central Directorate 
for  Civil  Rights,  Citizenship  and  Minorities;  the  Central  Directorate  for  Immigration  and 
Asylum Civil Services; the Central Directorate for Immigration and Asylum Policies (see Figure 
1). 
More specifically, the Central Directorate for Immigration and Asylum Policies deals with 
the  analysis  and planning of  migration policies  through peripheral  institutions  such as  the 
Territorial  Councils  for Immigration and the Single Desks for Immigration (Sportelli  Unici  
Immigrazione). Both are set up in the Prefecture (Prefettura), which forms part of the Ministry 
of the Interior, being its administrative and policy branch for matters concerning security. More 
specifically, in each prefecture there is the “Area IV” which deals with civil rights, citizenship,  
the juridical condition of the foreigner, immigration and asylum.
The Territorial Councils for Immigration locally monitor the presence of foreigners on the 
territory as well as the capacity to absorb the migration fows. They are chaired by the Prefect 
and made up of  representatives  from the  relevant  local  administrations of  the State,  of  the 
Region, of local bodies, of the chamber of commerce, of the bodies which are locally active in  
the field of assistance to migrants, of workers’ associations, of employers and of third-country 
nationals. 
Single Desks for Immigration have been set up by law 189/2002 (art. 18),  and they are  
charged  with  issues  relating  to  first  recruitment  of  foreign  workers,  family  reunification 
procedures and coordination of the activities of other offices involved. Such Desks are found in 
each Prefecture/Regional Office of the Government (UTG) where, in a single office, one can 
have access to the services provided by the Regional Directorate for Work, Police Headquarters  
and the Prefecture itself. However, the Single Desks perform what we could call the front-office 
tasks while the Directorates and Police Headquarters are responsible for back-office  activities. It 
is  worth mentioning that this  office carries out the process to determine the meeting point 
between  foreign  labour  supply  and demand before  the  bureaucratic  operative  phase  of  the  
insertion of foreign workers. We have already seen that the entry fows criteria are determined  
6 Among others: Vampouille T., 'L'Identité nationale, vie et mort d'un ministère contesté',  Le Figaro, 16 November 
2010.
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by the action plan. In addition to the quantitative criteria, the exigencies recommended by the 
Regions and the instructions furnished by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies must be  
taken into consideration. The latter is concerned with the actual demand of the labour market  
and they are notified by peripheral offices who single out the required profiles in terms of 
professional qualifications and job responsibilities. Local institutions and sector entrepreneurial 
organisations also participate in this process (EMN 2010). 
Secondly, there is the Department of Public Security, chaired by a Prefect (Prefetto, the head 
of the Prefettura) with competences of Head of the Police – General Director for Public Security. 
The  Department  has  several  Central  Directorates  including  a  Central  Directorate  for 
Immigration and Border Police,  which is  the body responsible  for border and immigration 
management at land borders, sea borders and air borders. It promotes strategies for controlling 
and countering the illegal immigration phenomenon and it manages different issues related to 
the presence of foreign citizens on Italian territory. In 1998 the Strangers Service and Border 
Police  were  merged  together  but  it  was  only  the  measure  known  as  “Bossi-Fini  law”  (L. 
189/2002,  art.  35)  which  separated  the  “immigration  directorate”  from  the  previous  wide-
ranging Directorate for road, rail, postal, border and immigration police (Einaudi 2007: 271). 
At the present time, the Directorate is divided into the Office for General and Juridical 
Affairs, the Immigration Service, and the Border and Strangers Police Service. More specifically, 
the latter is divided into two divisions: the first one coordinates the activities of nine border 
areas (18 sub-areas and 35 sea/land scales), while the second is in charge of supporting activities 
regarding stay permits, visas, citizenship, and asylum. Moreover, the division II  manages the 
peripheral network of 103 immigration offices in police headquarters (questure). 
The  questura is the provincial headquarters of the national police force and it deals with 
issues of public security and the fight against crime. The Foreigner's Office (FO) of the questura 
controls and regulates the stay and work of foreigners: it is responsible for the issue and renewal  
of stay permits. The FO of each questura has a “stay” section (sezione soggiorni) that manages 
the stay and work of migrants and an “expulsion” section (sezione espulsioni) which deals with 
enforcement  and  expulsion  orders  (for  a  case  study  of  the  FO  of  the  Florence  police 
headquarters see Triandafyllidou 2003). The prefecture is functionally superior to the questura 
although the latter holds the operational power. 
The Polizia di Stato (Italian National Police) was established in 1981 by demilitarising the 
former Corpo delle Guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza and it belongs to this Department. The Polizia  
di Frontiera (Border Police branch) is a component of this aforementioned corps, which is also 
responsible for aviation security at airports and for return procedures.
As regards the control at borders in airports, the Border and Strangers Police Service is in  
charge of manifold specific roles. According to the report on Malpensa airport in Italy (SEA 
2010), we can mention:
. the passaportisti  (“passport officials”), the border guards who check required documents 
for the entry in the Schengen area;
. the SVIF office, in charge of verifying the authenticity of documents;
.  the INAD team for the repatriation of push backs (the procedure is called “inadmissible 
passenger”);
.  the  border  office,  in  charge  of  following  application  procedures  for  international 
protection. 
Thus, it is exclusively up to the Central Directorate to coordinate the surveillance activities,  
and to prevent and to counter illegal immigration coming to Italy via the sea, in cooperation 
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with the maritime military forces and with the port authorities  (L.189/2002, art. 10). 
Finally, the Immigration Service deals with administrative and operational activities to curb 
irregular migration and the consequent international police cooperation. It is divided into three 
sections: the first one (I) coordinates the tackling of irregular migration, including expulsion, 
repatriation and detention in centres; section II manages operations at sea as provided for by 
the interministerial decree of 14th July 2003 and officials abroad working on irregular migration 
matters; section III manages international relations with both EU and non-EU states.
Figure 1. Structure of the Ministry of the Interior.
Parts of the administration in charge of migration. Elaboration of the author.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  through  the  Directorate  General  for  Italians  Citizens 
Abroad  and Migration  Policies,  has  well-circumscribed  competence  on  immigration,  to  be 
exercised in cooperation with other Ministries, most notably with the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. In particular, it has the tasks of providing for 
consular affairs and dealing with issues concerning foreign nationals in Italy, as well as carrying 
out analysis of migration and social issues related to organisations and international bodies.  
Moreover, the Directorate General European Union, through office III, deals with the issue of  
European Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the free movement of people (including the 
development of the Schengen acquis) and migratory fows towards the EU.
Within the Directorate General for Italians Abroad and Migration Policies, there are two 
offices competent to deal with migration issues: Office V (Immigration and Asylum policies)  
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and Office VI (Visa Office,  Centro Visti). Office V deals with legal and administrative matters 
concerning foreign citizens in  Italy,  asylum seekers  and refugees,  collaborates to  produce a 
program  for  migratory  fows,  and  deals  with  the  promotion  of  bilateral  agreements  on 
migration. 
On the other hand, Office VI works on matters of visas for foreign nationals  and their 
admission arrangements. Concerning visas, this office is the main point of reference. A section 
of this office is in close contact with diplomatic posts abroad, supporting them in dealing with 
law and practical issues in their daily work. In order to have a deep knowledge of contexts and 
problems arising, the office is divided into five geographic areas, with each one managed by one 
or  two  officials.  These  are:  Europe,  Asia  and  Oceania,  North  and  South  America,  the 
Mediterranean and Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, a help desk has been 
created for the technical and IT support of consular posts abroad. This service is not part of the 
Ministry but it is outsourced to a specialised external agency.
Office VI also deals with appeals against visa refusals, develops the implementation of the 
Schengen acquis, and it is a part of the Visa Committee in Brussels as well as being a participant  
in the VIS roll out committee. 
As  regards  the  diplomatic-consular  network,  this  consists  of  325  offices  abroad,  which 
include  Embassies  (126),  Consular  offices  (97),  cultural  institutes  (92)  and  other  forms  of 
representation. The total also includes some offices which are not currently operational, such as  
that  in  Nouakchott  (Mauritania).  More  specifically,  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  there  are  21 
Embassies, 3 Consular offices and 3 cultural institutes. Moreover, there are 49 honorary consuls,  
quite a high number when compared to other areas. The honorary consuls who are actually 
operational, because they are formally in charge of dispositions, are 388 in total (MAE 2011). 
Unlike  the  professional  officials,  honorary  officials  do  not  have  public  function  status 
within the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs.  They are in charge of  consular functions  limited by 
specific  minister's  decrees  and  they  can  only  earn  reimbursement  of  expenses  and  a 
contribution for office and representative's charges.
As at December 31st 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 8,101 officials, among whom 
5,552 were located abroad, and of which 60% were employed in Embassies and permanent 
representations. Of the personnel involved abroad, 2,583 were regular staff, 2,618 temporary 
staff, and 351 were regular staff in other administrations. Out of the total personnel abroad 
count, 9% (498 units) were dedicated to Sub-Saharan Africa (MAE 2011: 16 and followings). 
Other human resources come also from the Italian National Organisation for Tourism (ENIT),  
which employs part of its staff in Consular posts of emergent countries as China, India, Russia,  
and Ukraine (AISE 2012), experiencing high visa application rates.
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Figure 2. Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Parts of the administration in charge of migration. Elaboration of the author.
Ministry of Labour and Social Policies
The  Ministry  of  Labour  and  Social  Policies,  through  the  Directorate  General  for 
Immigration  and  Integration  Policies  (formerly  the  Directorate  General  for  Immigration) 
contributes  to  plan  quotas,  monitors  workers,  manages  bilateral  cooperation  with  third 
countries and integration policies, and cooperates in studying and preventing work migration 
fows. In particular, it has two divisions dealing with migration: division II for “Immigration 
policies” and division III charged with responsibilities for “Work services and active policies for 
immigration”. 
The  Ministry  of  Labour  has  always  played  a  fundamental  role  in  the  mechanisms  of 
selection at entry, in order to make the infux of migrants fit with the demand for labour in Italy, 
“balancing the needs emerged with the forecast data of the Italian economy, and the internal  
dynamics of the supply of foreign labour, highlighting the employment rates and the typologies 
most  compatible  with  the  needs  of  the  business  community”  (Documento  programmatico 
2001-2003: my translation).
According to article 21 par. 7 of the Consolidated Act, a computerised registry of non-EU 
workers (Anagrafe Informatizzata dei Lavoratori Extracomunitari) has to be implemented by the 
Directorate General for employment of the Ministry of Labour. With regard to this registry 
there was also reference in the fow planning document over the period 1998-2000, and such a  
formula was already being applied to migration from Albania.  The idea of  a  list  of  foreign 
workers to draw from had already been proposed in the 60s by trade unions and associations, 
but decisions in the field of migration remained specific to some cases and really inorganic until  
the publication of the Consolidated Act (Einaudi 2007: 101).
Moreover, the Ministry has signed an agreement with the IOM (20 December 1999) for a 
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project  of  ordered  and  programmed  entry,  orientation  and  training  of  Albanian  workers. 
Following the document of fow planning for 2001-2003, the “shift of the policy of fow control  
from a quantitative to a qualitative approach cannot be other than a natural evolution (…) It  
seems  necessary  to  undertake  the  study  of  'qualitative  filters'  that  favor  those  with  higher  
educational  skills”.  In  fact,  the  attempts  to  achieve  “ordered  and  programmed  entry”  have 
almost always failed, both because the mechanism was not really implemented and the timing 
of the attempt was late compared to the reality of migrants already present in Italy. 
Figure 3. Structure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. 
Parts of the administration in charge of migration. Elaboration of the author.
Recently another project has been developed by a company working directly for the Italian 
Government. Italia Lavoro is a joint-stock company wholly owned by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance. It acts as an instrumental entity of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy for the 
promotion and management activities in the field of labour market policies, employment and 
social  inclusion.  More  specifically,  there  is  among  its  projects,  the  initiative  called  “the 
international mobility of labour” concerning the regulation of fows. The project stems from the 
implementation of articles 23 and 27 of the Consolidated Act (introduced by the Bossi-Fini 
law). Article 23 establishes a title of pre-emption for prospective migrants who attend learning 
activities and professional training in their countries of origin, while art. 27 par. 1(f) considers 
internship as a “particular case” of work entry.
The  program  aims  to  develop  a  network  of  offices  for  the  coordination  of  work  and 
immigration  (Uffici di Coordinamento per il Lavoro e l'immigrazione,  UCL) in countries with 
which bilateral agreements are concluded, with the task of facilitating the network between the 
employment services of the countries of origin with public and private Italian agencies for the  
management of  entries for work for non-EU citizens. The project intends to introduce this 
preferential entry channel because fow decrees for work are not expected in the coming years. 
The keywords are the “qualification of fows”, which means that prospective migrants will be 
selected through a sort of human resources' office. The project started in March 2006, and it will  
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end in December 2012. The selection of employees for UCLs is already decided upon, but the 
implementation  phase  is  still  ongoing. Chosen  countries  for  the  first  development  of  the 
international  network  are  Albania,  Moldova,  Ukraine,  Egypt,  Tunisia,  Morocco,  India, 
Bangladesh, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, China, Peru and Ecuador7.
So far, initiatives to implement article 23 have been random, and entrusted with the specific 
interest  of  organisations  qualified to perform them. On the  Ministry  of  Labour  and Social 
Policy's website we can read reports on pilot projects accomplished in 2004-2005 and all the 
projects approved in the years 2007-2009.8
During the period 2004-2005, the Directorate General of Immigration has promoted some 
pilot projects concerning training, vocational guidance and Italian language learning, intended 
for  those  who  have  entered  Italy  at  the  end  of  their  courses,  to  be  employed  by 
companies/families from the regions involved in the project. These projects were on benefit of 
200 Moldovan workers, 250 Tunisian and 100 workers from Sri Lanka, selecting candidates for 
migration in cooperation with the competent local authorities.
The first pilot project was carried out in Tunisia in 2004, in collaboration with the Tunisian  
Ministry  of  Labour and with  the  direct  involvement  of  the  Veneto  and Lombardy regions,  
through their respective regional agencies for employment: Job Veneto and Lombardy Regional 
Work Agency. The selection of workers was carried out directly by representatives of Italian 
companies and the Regions, with the technical assistance of Italia Lavoro, from among a group 
of  600  Tunisian  workers  were  interested  in  working  in  Italy.  Given  the  high  degree  of 
specialization of selected workers (welders, construction, etc...), it was not necessary to put in 
place job training courses. The 250 selected workers have instead taken a course in the Italian 
language, which was delivered by the Dante Alighieri Institute.
Another project is being undertaken in collaboration with the Region of Tuscany, and is 
concerned with workers in the domestic sector who originate from Sri Lanka. The Ministry of  
Labour and Social Affairs, the Region of Tuscany and the diplomatic delegation of Sri Lanka in  
Italy, signed a special agreement in July 2004 which included the commitment of the parties to  
implement a project to select, orientate and recruit in Italy 100 workers from Sri Lanka, who  
then get a job in the field of assistance and care in Tuscan families (specifically in the provinces  
of Florence, Pistoia, Prato and Siena). 
To carry out the operations on the ground, the Ministry has had recourse to IOM, who had 
already worked in Sri Lanka, in the phase of selection as well as with the bureaucracy regarding 
entry visas and the organisation of transfers to Italy, with this being done in agreement with the  
Offices of the Region of Tuscany.
A third pilot  project  has provided training to about 200 workers  from Moldova (tilers, 
metalworkers engaged in the storage and handling of goods), who entered employment with 
businesses in Lombardy, Veneto and Piacenza. The pilot project - started in December 2004 - 
was launched by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies in agreement with the Government 
of the Republic of Moldova and in close collaboration with Veneto and Lombardy, with the 
Province of Piacenza and with the technical assistance of IOM.
During the period 2007-2009 other training projects have been approved, for a total of 990 
beneficiaries, in the following countries: Morocco (360 participants), Peru (210), Ukraine (165), 
Moldova (90),  Tunisia (30),  China (30),  Albania (20),  India (15),  Ethiopia (15),  Nepal  (15),  
7 Italia Lavoro website (http://www.italialavoro.it/) → “aree di intervento” → “immigrazione”.
8 Respectively at the URLs: 




Nigeria (10), Russia (10), Philippines (10) and Brazil (10). Although these initiatives are about 
highly skilled labour, from a wider perspective, these numbers were of little relevance when 
compared to the high estimates figures that characterise the additional labour needs in Italy, 
and this is a small group of participants that involves a significant financial backing. For this  
reason,  it  was  decided  to  harmonize  these  initiatives  through  the  direct  involvement  of 
enterprises or other intermediate agencies. 
According to the inter-ministerial plan “Italy 2020” for integration drawn up by Ministries 
of Labour, Interior and Education (2010), “the mechanism of training in Countries of origin - 
the titles of pre-emption - is now of no effect. Public action should lead to a real possibility for  
enterprises  and  authorised  intermediaries  to  develop  appropriate  forms  of  selection  and 
recruitment on the basis of lists of available and trained workers, having attended courses that,  
in  the case of  highly  qualified personnel,  may be  perfected and completed in  Italy,  linking 
regulatory  institutions  and  active  employment  policy  measures  currently  available,  starting 
from apprenticeship and traineeship (...) in this perspective, the relationship and cooperation 
with specific communities from abroad who express interest and planning skills with which 
may be developed an ongoing dialogue and opened to integration and immigration circularity,  
represent a model to be favoured and enforced”.
Moreover, the lack of coordination of projects as well as of monitoring of activities meant  
that these initiatives remained isolated and not really organic to Italian migration policies. 
The project  promoted by  Italia Lavoro provides for the extension of the types of actors 
authorised to conduct courses, which must necessarily follow the introduction of workers into 
the Italian labour market, and thus the effective implementation of the programme seems to be  
easier. Nevertheless, there are many inconsistencies, from the choice of countries to the way of  
managing relationships with local counterparts,  and there have been refusals  to fit  into the  
project by some countries, such as Ecuador, not accepting the terminology used in the project,  
in contradiction with some of the principles contained in its constitution, or the Philippines,  
refusing to acknowledge that would-be incomers have something “to learn” from Italy.
The Ministry  of  Labour and Social  Policies  Natale  Forlani  interviewed in  July  2011  by 
FIERI argues that:
the new approach will give a central role to the operators of demand and supply of  
labour  and  will  include:  the  creation  of  electronic  lists  of  availability  of  workers  in 
countries  of  origin  and  accreditation  of  operators  authorized  to  do  training  and 
intermediary  activities  in  these  countries.  Until  recently,  in  our  country  organisations 
recognised to mediate between demand and supply of foreign labour did not include all  
operators  registered  with  the  Italian  intermediaries  (for  example,  temporary  work 
agencies,  consultants,  recruitment companies),  which also offer the best  guarantees for 
transparency, fairness and gratuity of services offered; fortunately this has changed. In this  
context,  the  “old”  fow  decree  will  have  only  a  residual  function.  In  addition,  some 
categories  may enter  Italy  out  of  the fow decree:  those who will  do a  training course 
abroad – including language courses - will be able to enter our country extra-quotas and in 
the same way that seasonal workers who have worked for more than two years can enter 
with the  nulla osta for several  years.  The first  calls  for public co-financing for training 
abroad were published in countries with which agreements have already been concluded 
or are about to be concluded. It concerns training for people who will have the certainty of  
a  job.  We are  putting  in  by  2012  about  6  million  euro  for  this  co-financing.  At  last,  
privileged quotas will play a very positive role and not remain in the abstract any more: by  
matching programming of decrees with privileged quotas we implement the framework 
based  on  the  selection  of  workers  from  countries  of  origin.  Thus,  synchronizing 
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agreements to tackle illegal immigration with the qualification and training abroad. 9
As emerges from this interview, this reform seems to fundamentally affect the system, but it  
is to be carried out in a manner which has little visibility, and the concrete implementation of 
the aforementioned changes can only be assessed only in the coming years. 
 
Other migration bureaucracies 
Municipalities, Patronages and Post offices
The Bossi-Fini law has reduced the length of stay permits, and renewal is only possible for a 
period of equal length, and not more than twice as was provided for in the Turco-Napolitano 
law, and time of renewal is defined as being from 30 to 90 days before the date of expiry. In the  
face of such changes no additional resources have been provided for the offices dealing with 
foreigners, resulting in an increased workload and inconvenience for users. 
To address these problems, in September 2004, the Ministry of the Interior adopted law 
271/2004  “Regarding  urgent  provisions  on  the  immigration  issue”,  which  authorised  the 
Ministry to sign agreements with “dealers of public services or other non-public bodies” for the 
collection and forwarding of applications to the questure, as well as for the subsequent issuing of 
the documents. This law paves the way for the signing of memoranda of understanding between 
the Ministry and the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI), the first of which 
was signed in April 2005, with the participation of some Italian cities.
These initiatives by the national government seem, therefore, to institutionalise and give 
legitimacy to the various experiences developed at the local level in the attempt to facilitate 
bureaucratic procedures for issuing and renewal of permits, in a bottom-up approach to policy  
making. 
At the same time, however, other measures taken in the same field appear as an attempt at 
centralisation  of  procedures.  In  February  2006,  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  concluded  an 
agreement with the Italian Post Office spa, “entrusting to the latter the entire field of renewals,  
9 Translation by the author. The interview is available at:
http://www.fieri.it/politiche_dell_immigrazione_per_lavoro.php  . 
The original text in Italian: “Il nuovo approccio darà un ruolo centrale agli operatori di domanda e offerta di lavoro e  
prevederà: la costituzione di liste di disponibilità elettroniche nei paesi di origine e l’accreditamento degli operatori 
autorizzati a fare formazione professionale e attività d’intermediazione negli stessi paesi. Fino a poco fa, nel nostro 
paese, tra le organizzazioni accreditate a intermediare tra domanda e offerta di lavoro straniero non figuravano tutti gli 
operatori  iscritti  all’Albo degli  intermediari  italiani (ad  esempio,  agenzie lavoro temporaneo,  consulenti,  società  di 
selezione), che pure offrono le migliori garanzie perché sono tenuti alla trasparenza, alla correttezza contrattuale e alla  
gratuità dei servizi offerti; questo per fortuna è cambiato. In questo quadro il “vecchio” decreto fussi avrà soltanto una  
funzione residuale. Inoltre, alcune categorie potranno entrare in Italia al di fuori del decreto fussi: chi farà un percorso  
di formazione all’estero – anche linguistica – potrà entrare nel nostro paese extra-quote e allo stesso modo i lavoratori  
stagionali che hanno lavorato per più di due anni potranno entrare con i nulla-osta pluriennali. Sono stati pubblicati i  
primi bandi di cofinanziamento pubblico per attività di formazione all’estero nei paesi con cui sono già stati conclusi gli  
accordi o si è in via di conclusione. Si tratta di formazione per persone che avranno la certezza di un posto di lavoro. 
Stiamo mettendo in campo da qui al 2012 circa 6 milioni di euro per questi cofinanziamenti. Infine, giocheranno un  
ruolo molto positivo e non più astratto le quote privilegiate: facendo coincidere decreti di programmazione con quote 
privilegiate mettiamo in atto il quadro di riferimento basato sulla selezione degli ingressi dai paesi di origine. Quindi, 
sincronizzando gli accordi di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina con la qualificazione e la formazione all’estero.” 
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without any involvement of municipalities”. This is similar to what was done in the process of 
regularization of 2002, when the post office had worked as a front office of the Ministry of 
Labour (Caponio, Pastore, Ricucci 2012). Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior concluded a 
memorandum of understanding, this time involving patronages, which undertook to provide 
free assistance to foreigners in completing the application.
The new procedure for the issuance and renewal of residence permits, which comes into 
force in December of the same year (2006), provides that the foreigner fill out and send via the  
post office a so-called “kit”, including the documentation necessary to obtain the stay permit.  
The procedure returns, then, to a situation of centralisation in the collection phase and the first  
treatment practices, and all this change in procedure did not immediately appear to produce 
excellent results. 
At  the  beginning  of  2007,  in  fact,  many  questure seized  up,  because  of  organisational 
difficulties between the various actors involved in the cumbersome procedure and due to the 
high number of  practices.  At  the  same  time,  the  pilot  experimentation with  ANCI,  which  
started with the 2005 protocol, was extended to nine other municipalities, and in April 2007, 
thanks  to  an  agreement  signed  between  ANCI  and  the  Italian  Post  Office,  a  “network  of 
assistance by municipalities to foreign citizens in filling the forms” was set up. This network 
currently  provides  for  the  participation  of  456  public-facing  counters,  for  a  total  of  131 
municipalities involved, 73 associations of municipalities and the province of Trento (Caponio, 
Pastore, Ricucci 2012: 14).
Therefore,  three  bodies  become  actually  involved  in  migration  administration: 
municipalities, patronages and Italian Post Offices. 
Figure 4. Logos of the Ministry of the Interior, Italian Post Offices, Patronages and ANCI.
Home page of the official information website portaleimmigrazione.it
More specifically, the municipalities and patronages ensure that, working free of charge and 
within the scope of their institutional purposes, the activity of providing information, advice 
and assistance to  foreigners  is  available,  aimed  at  the  correct  setup procedure  for the  stay 
permits' requests. 
The procedure is operationalised through the website portaleimmigrazione.it. The restricted 
area dedicated to foreigners allows checking the state of progress, while in the restricted area for 
municipalities  and patronages  the request that the foreign national  will  later  present  at  the 
counters of the Post Office can be electronically filled in. It is worth underlining that patronages 
become the prime front office for dealing with migrants involved in bureaucratic procedures as 
well as in job and house seeking. A charitable institution such as ACLI, for example, has 379 
bases  in Italy,  with more than 5,000 employees and volunteers,  and 84 bases abroad,  in  20 
countries.
The Post Office is involved with a specific “Friend Desk” (Sportello Amico). These counters 
are set up not only for migration issues but in the attempt to be user-friendly and to simplify the 
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relationship between the administration and citizens. In total there are 5,740 counters where  
migrants can handle the “yellow kit” provided for renewals. 
Until a few months ago the procedure envisaged a cost of 30 euros for the Post Office, with 
users paying 14.62 euros of revenue stamp costs and the fee for the stay permit of 27.50 euros, 
making  up  a  total  of  72.12  euros.  On  the  top  of  this,  from  30  January  2012  there  is  an 
“integrative contribution”, which varies from 80 to 200 euros, as provided by the decree of the 
Ministry  of  the  Economy  of  6  October  2011,  enforcing  the  provision  introduced  by  the 
“Security Package” (L. 94/2009).
There is no further contribution payable for applicants aged under 18, or for a residence  
permit for asylum, subsidiary protection, humanitarian reasons, medical care, or the renewal or 
the conversion of a valid residence permit. While the contribution amounts to 80 euros for a  
stay permit for a period of over 3 months and equal to or less than a year; 100 euros for a stay  
permit for a period of over one year and equal or less than two years; 200 euros for a long-term 
residence  permit  (or  in  case  of  a  company  manager  or  a  high-skilled  employee).  All  the 
information is available on the Italian Post Office's website (poste.it). 
Does the system work? Long waiting times, software problems, and lack of coordination 
between  Post  Offices  and  questure were  all  experienced  when  the  system  was  put  into 
operation10. Difficulties in supplying kits to Post Offices, a problem which was criticised by the 
local government of Prato (Tuscany) and by an NGO in Rome11, reports of a black market in 
kits which in Milan reached the price of 500 € per kit12... these are just two specific examples of 
the problems which were experienced. 
An  attempt  to  reduce  waiting  times  was  put  in  place  in  March  2009,  with  the 
implementation of a directive proposed by the Chief of the Police Manganelli, under the terms 
of which  questure undertook to deliver residence permits within 45 days. Two changes have 
been made possible thanks to a closer collaboration between Post Offices and questure: first of 
all, the appointment at the Immigration Office (in order to proceed with the production of a  
fingerprint image) is fixed directly at the Post Office and scheduled within a maximum of 15 
days; secondly, the electronic acquisition of the practice by the competent questura. From Post 
Offices,  the  envelope  containing  the  application  is  sent  to  the  Post  Office  Service  Centre  
pertaining to the area (of which there are five in Italy) then to the National Processing Centre 
(Centro di Elaborazione Nazionale,  under the Ministry of the Interior), and after it has been 
scanned, it is sent back to the questura. The latter, which has already received (and often started 
working  on)  the  electronic  data  processing  work,  checks  the  completeness  of  the 
documentation and, if necessary, request the submission of additional documents, otherwise it 
sends the data electronically to the Polygraphic Institute of the state for printing of the permit.  
The Polygraphic Institute has ensured the printing of electronic permits within a further 15 days 
from the receipt of the approved practice (Caponio, Pastore, Ricucci 2012: 15). The printed stay 
permit card is then returned to the Immigration Office and issued to the foreigner, who in the 
10 'Permessi  di  soggiorno,  Poste  in  tilt.  Code,  caldo  e  proteste',  da  Il  Piccolo  di  Trieste, 27  May  2009: 
http://www.meltingpot.org/articolo14572.html - 'Permessi di soggiorno, rinnovi ancora in tilt', 27 September 2010,: 
http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/attualita-permessi_di_soggiorno_rinnovi_ancora_in_tilt_11702.html –  Cirillo  A., 
'Caos sui permessi di soggiorno. Poste in tilt, questura senza dati', L'Espresso, 5 February 2007.
11 'Esposto  alla  Procura  dell'assessore  Silli  contro  le  inadempienze  di  Poste  italiane,'  27  December  2010: 
http://comunicati.comune.prato.it/generali/?action=dettaglio&comunicato=14201000001671 -  'Problemi  con  gli 
uffici postali per il reperimento dei kit per rilascio ed il rinnovo di permessi e carta di soggiorno', 19 January 2007:  
http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/briguglio/immigrazione-e-asilo/2007/gennaio/toss-aduc-poste.html.
12 Caruso G., 'Milano, mercato nero per il kit del permesso di soggiorno', L'Unità, 18 January 2007.
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meantime can check through the internet the state of his application and book an appointment 
to pick up the document.
The aforementioned changes, together with other organisational improvements made at the 
local level, have contributed in some contexts to absorb the delay and to make the bureaucratic 
mechanisms for issuing residence permits more fuid. Although almost everywhere is still  a 
long way from the delivery of permits within the limit of 20 days established by the law, the 
discomfort and dysfunction now seem to be partially reduced (Colombo, Piro 2012).
Asylum seekers and refugees' protection
As regards asylum seekers and refugees, the protection system called SPRAR (Servizio di  
Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati) set up by the law 189/2002 is the base of the public 
service  of  assistance  to  international  protection  seekers.  It  provides  support  to  public 
institutions which deal with this issue, coordinated by the central service managed by ANCI 
with the Ministry of the Interior. It is then up to local institutions to set up the system, which in 
practice entails great differences among regions. 
All Italian regions except Val d'Aosta provide the service, which is available in 68 provinces 
(of  a  total  of  109)  with  around  3,000  funded  places13. In  2010,  the  SPRAR  had  6,855 
beneficiaries (SPRAR 2011). It is worth mentioning that in 2011 Italy received 34,115 asylum 
requests. Among the 24,150 examined requests (including some dating from previous years) 
16,995 were denied and 7,155 were given positive decisions, among which: 1,805 were assigned 
refugee status; 2,265 subsidiary protection and 3,085 a stay permit for humanitarian reasons 
(Eurostat). 
Moreover, asylum seekers can be hosted in CARA (Centri Accoglienza Richiedenti Asilo), 
which are structures where the foreigners can stay between 20 and 35 days during the period of 
identification and whilst they are waiting for the procedure of examination of the refugee status  
(DPR 303/2004 – Legislative Decree 25/2008). Anyway, as far as asylum seekers are concerned 
the  system is  not  able  to  cover  the  demands  made on it,  and  with the  additional  demand  
resulting  from  the  events  of  2011(termed  the  “North  Africa  Emergency”  by  the  Italian 
government) an extra-ordinary system of hosting asylum seekers is now being managed by the 
Civil Protection and several associations.
Carrier sanction
It is worth mentioning the role of the carrier sanction (art.  10, Consolidated Act).  This 
mechanism of coercion of the private sector into carrying out the controls was inserted into the 
Schengen Implementing Agreement as a requirement for all states. The carrier is obliged to take 
all the necessary measures to ensure that an alien carried by air or sea is in possession of the 
travel  documents  required  for  entry  into  the  territories  of  the  destination  country.  At  the 
request of the border surveillance authorities the carrier shall be obliged to return the aliens to 
the Third State from which they were transported, or to the Third State which issued the travel  
document on which they travelled, or to any other Third State to which they are certain to be 
admitted. Thus their role is not only to police the border abroad created by the visa system but 
13 See  the  SPRAR  website  and  the  interactive  maps  about  territorial  projects:  http://www.serviziocentrale.it/?
ProgettiTerritoriali&i=2&s=4.
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to form it for those persons who do not require visas (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2006; Guild 2001).
Control at sea
The  Italian  Coast  Guard,  a  specialised  corps  of  the  navy,  is  controlled  mainly  by  the 
Ministry  of  Transportation  and  Infrastructure.  It  collaborates  with  the  Ministry  of  the 
Environment  and  the  Ministry  of  Fishery.  The  corps'  organisation  is  capillary.  A  central 
headquarters  is  located  in  Rome where  it  manages  15  maritime  regional  offices,  128  local 
maritime offices and 48 smaller stations. The number of personnel working for the Italian Coast  
Guard is 10,962. The Coast Guard has 150 naval ships, 21 aircraft and many underwater forces. 
The first priority of the Coast Guard is search and rescue at sea followed by maritime safety, the  
marine environment and maritime fishing control.
In addition, the  Guardia di Finanza corp (under the Ministry of Economy and Finances) 
includes central air and naval headquarters, which coordinates and controls the operational, 
training, logistic and administrative sectors for the corps' open-sea deployment system.
To conclude, the plethora of administrations in charge of migration control constitutes a 
complex framework. It is not easy to understand the exact tasks of each office well enought to 
investigate their daily work. Following Zincone (2011: 179):
Italian  decision-making  follows  not  just  general  trends,  but  also  some  general  rules.  
Immigration and immigrant policies are pieces of a larger puzzle. They are embedded in  
the institutional, economic and international contexts in which they are conceived and 
reconceived. They can be part of economic strategies, they can be inserted into security  
provisions and they can be adopted with the aim of  reinforcing national  identity. Like 
other policies, they can include internally contradicting measures and confict with other 
policies born of the same period. The international context can discipline and correct the 
more radical political attitudes, unless of course radicalism also prevails in the democratic  
EU. Policies are continuously moulded by a combination of factors and by the action of 
very different agents, many of them located outside formal law-making processes. This is  
why politics always matters, but does not always lead the race.   
I will go on to develop the area of migration administration managing access to mobility 
through the visa policy, which means the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the consulate network. 
Thus,  after  presenting  the  topic  of  administrations  and  before  turning  to  the  fieldwork 




Schengen/Italy : policies of (im)mobility
With regard to the regulatory framework of mobility, the regulation of entry visas in the 
Italian territory has legal basis both in EU and Italian law. In this chapter I will firstly explore 
the  Schengen  common  visa  policy.  More  specifically,  I  will  pay  attention  to  recent 
developments,  since  this  is  a  field  where  important  policy  developments  are  currently  in 
progress. In line with this approach, I will mention the Visa Code, which came into force in 
2010, the Visa Information System, which became operational for the first roll-out countries in 
2011,  and  the  prospective  projects  of  the  Entry-Exit  system  and  the  Registered  Travellers  
Programme.
Secondly, the Italian visa framework and its legal channels of migration will be presented. 
The EU system has not developed common legal channels for (labour) migration. The Treaty of 
Lisbon  contains  a  strong  limitation  clause  which  protects “the  right  of  Member  States  to 
determine volumes of admission of third-country  nationals  coming from third countries to 
their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed” (art. 79 par. 5 TFEU, 
my italics). The ambiguity in the wording leaves this issue open: does it enable Member States to 
have complete sovereignty? Or has the EU any competences in regulating legal channels of  
migration?
Apart from the right of family reunification covered by the 2003/86 directive (which will  
later be considered in detail), four directives on the issue of mobility have been released: the 
2004/114 on the conditions of admission of students; the 2005/71 concerning procedures for 
researchers; the 2009/50, known as the “Blue Card directive”, for highly qualified employment; 
the 2011/98 for a “single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals 
to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-
country workers legally residing in a Member State”.  Approved after four years of discussion, 
the  latter  establishes  a  single  application  procedure  for  single  permits  for  third-country 
nationals to reside and work in the territory of an EU Member State and a common set of rights 
for  third-country  workers  legally  residing  in  a  Member  State.  Although  the  directive  was 
welcomed by the EU as an “important step in facilitating legal migration” creating “a clear set of 
rights for legal migrant workers” (MEMO/11/901), Pascouau and McLoughlin (2012) show in 
their policy brief that it merely constitutes a small step forward in EU migration policy. These  
authors argue that the adoption of this new text can be seen as a success but it remains narrow 
in its scope and content, and it does not further enhance harmonisation.
Moreover, two proposals are currently under discussion: the directive for intra-corporate 
transfer  of  non-EU skilled workers (COM (2010) 378) and the directive regarding seasonal 
workers (COM (2010) 379). Foreseen in the Policy Plan on Legal Migration (COM (2005) 669), 
the last three directives form the so-called “legal migration package”,  with which the EU is  
trying to mark a renewed effort in building a common immigration policy. 
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EU visa policy  
Institutional framework 
First of all, the EU visa policy covers only the regulations on short-term visas (up to 90  
days),  while  the  issuing  of  long-term  visas  is  the  competence  of  the  Member  States.  The 
Schengen area is comprised of the 28 Schengen States, that is the 27 EU Members States (other  
than Britain and Ireland) as well as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Its origins can be traced 
back  to  the  1980s,  when the  Member  States  established  intergovernmental  cooperation on 
justice and home affairs.  This cooperation was prompted by a desire to strengthen security, 
particularly in the light of a perceived increase in cross-border crime and migration infows 
which were deemed to require a strong and coordinated response from the Member States.  
Cooperation in this field was also linked to the establishment of free movement of persons 
within the EU, with the conclusion of the Schengen Agreement in 1985, which was followed by  
the  Schengen  Implementing  Convention  (CISA)  in  1990,  which  required  the  adoption  of  
“compensatory” measures by the Member States, such as a common visa policy and effective 
external  border controls.  It  contained the detailed framework required to proceed with the 
abolition of  intra-Member State  border controls  on the basis  of a common external  border 
control system. 
In  view  of  the  importance  of  border  controls  and  the  issuing  of  visas,  the  Executive 
Committee of the CISA was charged with preparing two handbooks, one on the procedures to  
be used at the external borders of the Schengen States and a second on how consular authorities 
should issue short-stay visas to third-country nationals. The manual on the issuing of visas was 
entitled the Common Consular Instructions (CCI). The CCI were issued to all  participating 
States'  consular  authorities  for  the  purpose  of  determining  visa  applications.  They  were 
confidential  and  remained  confidential  until  they  became  part  of  EU  law.  The  Treaty  of 
Maastricht (which came into force in 1993) provides for powers over a visa blacklist (art. 100 (c) 
TEC). Although the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (which came into force in 1999) incorporated the 
Schengen acquis into the EU legal framework with the Amsterdam protocol (now a protocol to 
the Lisbon Treaty), the status of the CCI was uncertain and they were not legally binding until 
the Community Code on Visas came into force (Balzacq, Guild et al. 2006). The CCI have been 
amended regularly  as  they include practical  rules.  A simple  search on  CCI in  the  Council  
registry  reveals  hundreds of  documents,  most of which related to amendments  of the CCI, 
many of which are confidential.14
Finally, according to the Treaty of Lisbon (which came into force in December 2009) “the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  acting  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  legislative 
procedure, shall adopt measures concerning: (a) the common policy on visas and other short-
stay residence permits” (art. 77 par. 2 TFEU).
There are, therefore, two sources for the current law on visa policy: the Union law (under 
former  art.  62 EC,  now art.  77 TFEU) and secondary legislation stemming from Schengen 
Agreements. Legal entry is defined on the basis of criteria provided by Regulation 562/2006,  
known as Schengen Border Code. Article 5 sets out the conditions for “an entry of a third-
country national into an EU Member State” for stays “not exceeding three months per six-
month period”. Legal entry is permitted under the following conditions: they possess a valid  
14 Council of the European Union, Public Register: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ accessed on 30.04.2011 with 
the key word “common consular instructions”.
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travel document or documents authorising them to cross the border,  and a valid visa;  they 
justify  the  purpose  and conditions  of  the  intended  stay  and they  have  sufficient  means  of 
subsistence, both for the duration of the intended stay and for the return to their country of 
origin or transit; they are not persons for whom an alert has been issued in the SIS; they are not  
considered to be a threat.
Black and White lists
On the basis of former article 100 (c) EC, a list was set up determining third countries  
whose nationals must have a visa at the time of the crossing of the external borders of the  
Member States. For third countries not appearing on the common list, Member States remained 
free to choose whether to impose a visa obligation or not. Gradually the Member States reached  
a harmonised position and two lists were drawn up: the first one of 32 third countries whose 
nationals where subject to the visa obligation in all the Schengen States; the second list of 44 
countries who were not (Bigo, Guild 2005; Peers 2011).
Full  harmonisation of  visa  requirements  occurred  with  the  publication  of  Regulation 
539/2001, which establishes the exhaustive “black” and “white” lists. Favoured countries appear 
on the “white list”, which means that their nationals do not require visas to enter the territory of 
the Union; countries whose nationals are “suspect” are on the “black list” and they must always 
have a visa obtained abroad before arriving at the borders of the Union. In the time between  
1995 and 2005, the black list was updated four times. The most significant changes took place in 
2001, facing up to the new security challenges with the addition of 31 new countries and the 
removal  of  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  due  to  their  future  entrance  to  the  EU  after  the  fifth 
enlargement. 
Figure 5. World map showing the EU visa list ex EU Council Regulation 851/2005, amending Regulation 
539/2001. Countries on the « black list » in red, while countries on the « white list » in green. 
Drawing by Olivier Clochard, Migreurop (2011).
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At the time of writing there are 30 countries on the white list and 135 countries on the black 
one. Because of its link to the Schengen border-free zone, the content of the EU’s visa list policy 
has generally been shaped by the preferences of the participating states. It is clear, however, that  
the avoidance of irregular migration is at the heart of the policy (Ryan, Mitsilegas 2010). The 
aim of the system is to make sure that individuals who are not wanted by anyone of the Member 
States are not permitted to enter the territory. 
The lists themselves do not discriminate directly on the basis of the GDP of the countries 
whose nationals do or do not have to get visas (ex. Saudi Arabia, UAE). However, the white list 
contains  rich  countries  almost  exclusively.  The  content  of  this  list  is  an  indication  of  the 
traditional prejudices of the Member States in respect of race and religion, and ensures that  
almost all countries, the majority of whose population is either black or Muslim are omitted.  
Not one country whose population is primarily Islamic is on the white list, with the exception of 
Brunei.  These prejudices are supplemented by a second level  of privilege or discrimination: 
wealth. Almost all of Africa is in the black list, while most of South America is in the white list.  
In conclusion, the black list denotes suspicion towards particular cultural identities, countries at 
war and poor countries (van Houtum 2010).
According  to  the  explanatory  memorandum,  the  Commission  (Document  500PC0027: 
Commission Proposal,  COM (2000)  027,  in Bigo,  Guild 2005: 244,  my italics)  explains  the 
reasons for the inclusion and exclusion of certain countries from the list as follows:
Illegal  immigration:  the  visa  rule  constitutes  an  essential  instrument  for  controlling 
migratory fows. Here, reference can be made to a number of relevant sources of statistical  
information  and  indicators  to  assess  the  risk  of  illegal  migratory  fows  (such  as 
information and/or  statistics  on  illegal  residence,  cases  of  refusal  of  admission  to  the  
territory, expulsion measures, and clandestine immigration and labour networks), to assess  
the reliability of travel documents issued by the relevant third country and to consider the  
impact of readmission agreements with those countries;
Public  policy:  conclusions  reached  in  the  police  Cupertino  context  among  others  may 
highlight specific salient features of certain types of crime. Depending on the seriousness, 
regularity  and  territorial  extent  of  the  relevant  forms  of  crime,  imposing  the  visa 
requirement could be a possible response worth considering. Threats to public order may 
in some cases be so serious as even to jeopardise domestic security in one or more Member  
States. If the visa requirement was imposed in a show of solidarity by the other Member  
States, this could again be an appropriate response;
International relations: the option for or against imposing the visa requirement in respect 
of a given third country can be a means of underlining the type of relations which the  
Union is intending to establish or maintain with it. But the Union’s relations with a single 
country in isolation are rarely at stake here. Most commonly it is the relationship with a 
group of countries, and the option in favour of a given visa regime also has implications in  
terms of regional coherence. The choice of visa regime can also refect the specific position 
of a Member State in relation to a third country, to which the other Member States adhere  
in  a  spirit  of  solidarity.  The  reciprocity  criterion,  applied  by  States  individually  and 
separately in the traditional form of relations under public international law, now has to be 
used by reason of the constraints of the Union’s external relations with third countries.  
Given the extreme diversity of situations in third countries and their relations with the 
European  Union  and  the  Member  States,  the  criteria  set  out  here  cannot be  applied 
automatically, by means of coefficients fixed in advance. They must be seen as decision-
making instruments to be used fexibly and pragmatically, being weighted variably on a 
case-by-case basis.
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In considering the set of criteria provided by the Commission, the first two grounds relate 
specifically to the activities of individuals, the risk of illegal immigration, and crime. In her  
analysis  Guild  (2001)  defines  the  former,  related  to  individual  behaviour,  as  being  rather 
arbitrary  and  the  latter  as  being  ambiguous,  because  there  is  no  harmonisation  between 
Member States on the concept of a threat to  public order.  Only the third ground relates to 
countries: international relations, in terms of “regional coherence”.
It should be noted that the move of EU borders to within the territory of foreign states takes 
place  unilaterally  by  decision  of  the  Council,  and  the  lack  of  a  requirement  to  justify  the 
treatment of each country separately means that it is impossible to tell which part of which 
justification is in action. Visa requirements are for all nationals of a country on the black list, so 
the assessment of risk is in effect not connected to the individual behaviour of the person who 
seeks to travel, but, as the European Commission has stated “the decision to issue a visa should 
gradually move from the presumption of risk associated with the applicant’s nationality to an 
assessment of individual risk” (COM 2009 (262): 19). Although the starting point of the visa 
system continues to be nationality, the real targets are particular classes of individuals. Are these 
third-country nationals  by definition more likely to be illegal  immigrants or criminals  than 
nationals of other countries? It seems so, in the EU approach, and it is only through the visa 
application that a particular individual could be seen as an exception to the national identity 
and judged not to be a threat to the Union. Bigo and Guild (2005: 237) state that:
the issue of white and black lists, of imposition or not of visas seems then to say less about 
safety and migration imperatives, than about the social construction of more or less shared 
fears concerning the Other and about the way Europeans seek to construct an image of 
themselves, a common identity.
The Visa Code and the Handbooks
With Regulation 810/2009, the EU has pooled in one legal instrument the old “Schengen 
Decisions” and the Common Consular Instructions. The Visa Code, as it is commonly called, 
came into force on the 5th April 2010.The main innovations introduced by the Visa Code are 
presented in the table below (see Peers 2011 for a detailed explanation of the legal framework).
Amendment Expected effect
Merging transit visa and short-
stay visa (Art. 2)
The list of visa types does not contain the transit visa anymore that implies 
that for the purposes of transit or/and a short stay the same visa type will  
be issued.
Long-stay visa issued by a 
Member State will allow holder 
to move freely in the territory of 
Member States under the same 
conditions as a residence permit 
(Regulation 265/2010)
This amendment will allow the holders of the long stay visas to travel to the 
other Member States for three months in any half year, under the same 
conditions as the holder of a residence permit. This regulation will restore 
the principle of the freedom of movement of persons inside the Union that 
could not be previously enjoyed by the holders of the long stay visas, who 
were bound to stay only within the territory of the state that issued the visa.
Introduction of the unified 
application form (Art. 11)
The  unified  visa  application  will  be  used  by  all  the  Consulates  of  the 
Member States.
The general visa fee is 60 euro.  The visa fee remains at  35 euro for the 
nationals  of  third  countries  which  have  concluded  visa  facilitation 
agreements with the EU and for children from 6-12 years of age, regardless 
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Visa fee (Art. 16) of the country of origin. The following categories of persons are exempt 
from paying the visa fee: children under 6 years, representatives of non-
profit organisations, aged 25 years or younger, participating in seminars, 
conferences, sports, cultural or educational events organised by non- profit 
organisations,  researchers  as  defined  in  the  Recommendation  n. 
2005/761/EC, school pupils, students, post-graduate students travelling to 
the Community for the purposes of study or education.
Equal treatment of visa 
applicants (Art. 9, 23)
The maximum response time for obtaining an appointment for lodging an 
application is defined as two weeks, and the time allowed for the Member 
State to take a final decision on the application as 15 calendar days. Only  
under exceptional circumstances and in individual cases can this deadline 
be exceeded. If  a visa facilitation agreement envisions shorter  deadlines, 
they shall be applied in relation to the nationals of the states that concluded 
such agreements with the EU.
Issue of visas with long 
validity for frequent travellers 
(Art. 24)
Where an applicant can prove a need for frequent travelling and he/she is 
known by the Member State’s consulate for his/her integrity and reliability,  
a visa with a validity of up to 5 years and allowing for  multiple entries 
should be issued.
The list of supporting 
documents has been specified 
(Art. 14)
Annex II contains a more closely specified but still non-exhaustive list of  
supporting documents to be presented by visa applicants.
Biometric data (Art. 13)
During  the  first  application  for  the  Schengen  visa  the  applicant  shall  
provide his/her biometric data such as a photo, scanned or taken at the 
time of application, and 10 fingerprints taken fat and collected digitally 
that will be introduced into the VIS.
Motivation of visa refusal 
and the right of appeal of such 
negative decisions
(Art. 32)
As of 5 April 2010, all the Consulates of the Member States are obliged to 
provide the notification in cases of visa refusal, containing the explanation 
of said refusal and information about the appeal procedure in line with the 
national legislation of  the Member States.
Table 3. Innovations introduced by the Community Code on Visas (Shamray 2010).
Under the Visa Code, visas are divided into:
. Uniform Schengen Visas (USV), valid for all the contracting parties' territories (type C),  
with one or more entries (multiple-entry visa);
.  Limited  Territorial  Validity  Visas  (LTV),  valid  only  for  the  Schengen  state  whose 
representatives  issued  the  visa.  They  are  issued  solely  for  humanitarian  reasons  or  in  the 
national interest;
.  Long Stay or “National” Visas (NV), only valid for visits longer than 90 days (type D), 
with one or more entries, in the territory of the Schengen state whose mission issued the visa.
To ensure a harmonised application of the common rules, in accordance with article 51 of 
the Visa Code, the EU Commission has published the “Handbook for the processing of visa  
applications and the modification of issued visas” (Commission Decision adopted on 19 March 
2010) and the “Handbook for the organisation of visa sections and local Schengen cooperation” 
(Commission  Decision  adopted  on  11  June  2010).  The  latter  is  to  be  used  for  the 
implementation of EU legislation on the common visa policy by Member States’ central and 
consular  authorities  in  charge  of  running  consular  services,  and  for  ensuring  cooperation 
between Member States’ authorities at central and local level. The former sets out operational 
instructions concerning how consular authorities should issue short-stay visas, providing clear 
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guidance in  each and every  individual  case  that  might occur,  and also  recommending best 
practices when the case is not clear. Some examples from the handbook are as follow:
Examples  of  incoherence  between  declared  purpose  of  stay  and  factual  information 
provided:
an applicant claims to travel to an industrial area, staying in a cheap hotel, for the purpose  
of tourism;
an applicant claims to visit a professional event at  dates that do not correspond to the 
actual dates of the event;
an applicant claims that the purpose of the trip is to visit a friend, but it turns out that the 
person concerned is absent during that period;
a trader in jewellery claims to have been invited to attend a medical conference. 
Examples of cases where such further scrutiny may be necessary:
A visa applicant indicates ‘family visit’ as the purpose of his journey to Slovakia, where he 
wishes to visit an aunt. The consulate has doubts about the family link between the two and  
asks for further proof of the family link.
A third-country national has been invited to a Member State for a period of two months 
for specific studies/research at a university laboratory, presenting an authentic invitation 
from the university. During the examination of the application, doubts arise concerning 
the exact purpose of the studies/the research (risk of proliferation of chemical weapon) 
and the consulate wishes to verify the invitation and the background for it further.
A third-country national claims to  be a family member of a French national  living in 
France (thus not covered by Directive 2004/38) and presents a certificate of marriage in a 
location  where  such false  ‘tailor  made’  certificates  can  be  obtained  easily  and  further 
information must be obtained from local authorities.
(...) However, a consulate may, in justified cases, request additional documents during the 
examination of an application which are not mentioned in the harmonised list published 
locally. Examples:
an employment contract presented by an applicant is due to expire shortly; the consulate 
request the applicant to provide information regarding his future employment/economic 
situation;
the signature on an application from a minor is suspicious and therefore the consulate  
checks the signer’s identity by comparing with the signature on other official documents;
in case of the death of a relative in a Member State: a death certificate; 
in case of a wedding in a Member State: a marriage announcement.
The Handbooks constitute a single set of operational instructions to be applied by Member 
States’ relevant authorities. They neither create any legally binding obligations upon Member 
States nor establish new rights and obligations for persons who might be concerned by them.  
Rather they aim to ensure a harmonized application of the legal provisions. The handbook for  
processing visa application is  addressed towards the consular officials who make use of it for 
their routine practices, and thus it proves to be a most interesting aid to understanding of the  
approach of consular officials towards visa applicants. The other handbook “for the organisation 
of visa sections and local Schengen cooperation” focuses on the harmonization of practices, 
which is in fact carried out mainly by the Member States’  consulates themselves,  located in  
capital cities around the world with cooperation in situ.
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Local Schengen Cooperation
Local cooperation is one of the central axes of visa policy, and in recent years there has been 
considerable progress in the field (Fernandez 2006). While for external borders and asylum 
there are specific agencies for coordination – respectively Frontex and the  European Asylum 
Support Office, although the latter does not have enough power to act, as now, in the field of 
visas, Member States are charged with the implementation of the policy. Thus, except for the 
Visa Committee (art. 52 Visa Code), as regards law at the EU level, the operation of Schengen  
governance relies on consular cooperation. 
Schengen states  have  been  strongly  encouraged to  cooperate  at  a  local  level  since  the  
beginning of the Schengen visa policy (Council Recommendation 96/C 80 of 4 March 1996 
relating to local consular cooperation regarding visas). Then, after 2001, the EU suggested an 
intensification of the exchange of information in consular cooperation, because it deemed this 
to  be  relevant  in  the  fight  against  terrorism,  illegal  immigration  and  trafficking  in  human 
beings. “Remembering the events of 11 September 2001 that created a need to intensify controls  
in connection with the movement of persons across the external borders, both in the short term 
and in the long term..” is the text which begins the 2002 Council document (Council of the EU,  
Adoption  of  conclusions  on  intensified  consular  cooperation).  Issues  of  harmonisation, 
cooperation in detecting false documents, sharing statistics, and best practices continue to be 
the focus of further EU documents up to the present time.15
The  Visa  Code  provides  instructions  for  local  consular  cooperation,  renamed  “local 
Schengen  cooperation”,  with  article  48.  First  of  all,  the  form,  scope  and  intensity  of  the 
cooperation  should  refect  local  conditions.  Generally,  there  is  a  formal  system  of  regular 
meeting of visa officers of the EU Member States in capital cities  around the world.  Under  
certain circumstances,  such cooperation may be carried out in a less  formal and structured 
manner, as daily exchanges of information between officials by telephone or e-mail. Meetings 
normally take place at least every two or three months. They are called and organised by the 
Consulate  of  the  country  which  has  the  presidency  of  the  Union,  which  notifies  consular 
representations of other Schengen States (and sometimes even non-Schengen States) via e-mail 
about  visa  refusals,  dates  of  regular  meetings  between  their  representatives,  and  also 
information on applicants which “may be exchanged from time to time”. 
The local information exchange includes (art. 48 par. 3):
(a) monthly statistics on uniform visas, visas with limited territorial validity, and airport 
transit visas issued, as well as the number of visas refused;
(b) with regard to the assessment of migratory and/or security risks, information on:
(i) the socioeconomic structure of the host country;
(ii) sources of information at local level, including social security, health insurance, fiscal 
registers and entry-exit registrations;
(iii) the use of false, counterfeit or forged documents; 
(iv) illegal immigration routes;
(v) refusals; 
(c) information on cooperation with transport companies; 
(d)  information on insurance  companies  providing  adequate  travel  medical  insurance, 
including verification of the type of coverage and possible excess amount.
15 From the  2003 document  (Council  of  the  EU,  Improving  the  efficiency  of  an  intensifying  consular  cooperation  
between the Member States in third countries. Doc. 10529/03, VISA 106, COMIX 390, Brussels 16 June 2003) to the  
Visa Code.
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In  order  to  gain  and  maintain  mutual  trust,  the  Member  States  set  up  a  Standing 
Committee in 1998. Its mandate is set out in a decision of the Schengen Executive Committee  
(SCH/Com-ex (98) 26 def) and consists of two separate tasks:
1. verification that all preconditions for application of the Schengen acquis (e.g. lifting of  
border  controls)  have  been  met  by  Member  States  wanting  to  join  Schengen (putting  into 
effect);
2. verification that the Schengen  acquis is being correctly applied by the Member States 
implementing it (implementation).
This  mechanism  thus  draws  a  distinction  between  “putting  into  effect”  and 
“implementation”.  Therefore,  first  of  all,  checks  have  to be  made to  determine  whether  the 
conditions for mutual trust are met before the  acquis can be put into effect. Second, mutual 
trust then needs to be maintained by checking correct implementation of the acquis. 
June 2012 was the date foreseen by the Visa Code for the release of the public report “First  
annual report on Local Schengen Cooperation” (2010-2011) but the Commission has failed to 
publish it, releasing a ten-page bi-annual report 2010-2012 in November (COM(2012) 648) . 
Outsourcing
It is worth noting that consular practices in the field of Schengen visas are experiencing a 
high level of “dispersal” because they no longer take place just within the Embassies' walls. In 
Europe since 2004-2005, Member States have made increasing use of private service providers 
to handle parts of the visa application procedure, which was previously handled entirely by 
Consulates (Beaudu 2007).  This process  has occurred on a national  basis  without any legal  
framework for outsourcing.  The extent  of  these practices varies  among Member States and 
according to location: at first, private service providers were mainly dealing with the reception 
of visa applications, and then they started to check them and collect visa application fees and 
service fees before forwarding them to Consulates. 
The framework provided by the CCI provisions seems to acknowledge a de facto situation 
rather than setting out to introduce new discipline to the field, especially when it affirms that  
the use of intermediaries “... is both common and useful, particularly in countries with a large 
surface area” (CCI, VIII.5, my italic).
Thus, outsourcing was not a new organisational practice and gaining an understanding of 
the real extent of it is far from easy: the EU legislation aims at the harmonization of practices 
but the outsourcing itself is at the discretion of each Embassy; the websites of the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs generally do not mention the use of externalisation and, although the larger 
companies operating in this field are easily visible, the smaller external service providers are  
difficult to discover.
In  recent  years  the  increasing  use  of  external  providers  (Beaudu 2009)  has  driven  the 
growing  regulation of this issue, with the coming into force of the EU Regulation 390/2009 
regarding biometrics (now included in the Visa Code), bringing the introduction of provisions 
on  the  reception  and  processing  of  visa  applications.  The  introductions  of  biometrics  and 
outsourcing  are  linked  because  the  collection  of  biometric  data  entails  an  increase  in  the 
number of appointments needed for applicants at the Consulates. Moreover, the visa fee has 
been increased to 60 euros because of prospective costs of biometrics, and the service fee for the 
outsourced services is still an additional cost, which is regulated so that it shall not exceed half 
64
of the amount of the visa fee (art. 18 Visa Code). 
In order, therefore, to facilitate the registration of applicants and to reduce the costs for 
Member States, “new organisational possibilities need to be envisaged in addition to the existing 
framework  of  representation”  (Reg.  390/2009:  1),  and  two  main  organisational  modes  are 
foreseen: co-location and Common Application Centres (art. 41 Visa Code). In the former, staff 
of the diplomatic missions or consular posts of one or more Member States shall process the 
applications (including biometric identifiers) addressed to them at the diplomatic mission or 
consular post of another Member State and share the equipment of that Member State. In the  
latter, staff of the diplomatic missions or consular posts of two or more Member States shall be  
pooled in one building in order to receive the applications addressed to them. Furthermore, 
honorary Consuls may also be authorised to perform some or all of the same tasks which can be 
outsourced (art. 42 Visa Code). 
Two  kinds  of  cumulative  conditions  can  justify  the  decision  to  make  use  of  external 
providers. Such a decision may be taken if the above mentioned forms of cooperation prove not 
to be appropriate for the Member State concerned and (a) if there are particular circumstances 
in terms of a high number of applicants - which does not allow the collection of applications 
and of data to be organised “in a timely manner and in decent conditions” - or (b) if it is not 
possible to ensure a good territorial coverage of the third country. Only with these requirements 
in place may a Member State “as a last resort cooperate with an external service provider” (art. 
40 Visa Code, my italic).
More specifically, the various tasks that may be carried out by an external service provider  
are listed in art. 43 par. 6 of the Visa Code. One or more of these tasks may be carried out by the 
same external service provider, but the provider is not entitled to participate in any way in the 
decision-making  process.  It  is  also  worth  noting  the  distinction  between  commercial 
intermediaries (art. 45) and external providers: the former can provide the lodging but not the 
collection of visa applications.
The  Visa  Code  introduces  an  obligation  for  Member  States’  central  authorities  and 
Consulates to provide harmonised and extensive information to the general public in relation to 
the visa application procedure (art. 47). Moreover, the Commission is in charge of publishing a 
whole  range  of  information  based  on  Member  States’  notifications  in  relation  to  consular 
presence  throughout  the  world,  use  of  external  service  providers,  accredited  commercial 
intermediaries, annual statistics, authorities responsible for extending visas, etc (art. 46, 47). 
As regards the Handbooks, the issue of outsourcing is approached in the one concerning 
the organisation of visa collection (part III). It is worth mentioning the principles that should 
be respected, according to their legal basis in the Visa Code (art. 40-44). First of all the “one 
stop  principle”,  according  to  which  the  applicant  should  only  be  required  to  come to  one 
location  in  order  to  submit  the  application.  Then  the  principle  of  human  dignity  in  the 
reception of visa applicants; the principles of hierarchy (outsourcing as a last resort solution),  
transparency (public information) and “direct access”, that is the ensured entitlement to submit 
an application directly at the Consulate, particularly in the case of cooperation with an external 
service provider.
The Visa Information System (2011) and other control mechanisms on applicants
The Visa Information System (better known as VIS) is a system for the exchange of data on 
short-stay visas among the Schengen States. It consists of a central database, a national interface 
65
in  each Schengen State,  and  a  communication infrastructure  deployed  between the  central 
database and the national interfaces. The VIS is connected to the national visa systems of all  
Schengen States via the national  interfaces to enable competent authorities of the Schengen 
States to process data on visa applications and on all visas that are issued, refused, annulled, 
revoked or extended. 
The VIS is composed of two systems, first the VIS central database with alphanumerical 
searching capabilities and secondly an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) that 
compares new fingerprints against those in the database and returns hit/no hit response, along 
with matches.
 More specifically, the system has a four level structure (see Figure 6):
.  the Schengen central authority (C-Vis), for the exchange of visa data between Member 
States. The principal central VIS (Central Unit, CU) is located in Strasbourg (France) and a  
back-up central VIS (BCU), capable of ensuring all functionalities of the principal central VIS is 
located in Sankt Johann im Pongau (Austria). The two have a point connection via s-TESTA16;
.   the national  interface (Fe-Vis)  managed by the national  authority,  as  the Ministry  of 
Foreign Affairs in Italy. Every connection to the C-Vis is through the national interface and this 
system is linked with the N-Vis as well as with the application of the Ministry of Interior (I-Vis), 
developed for the  issuance and check of  visas at  the border and designed for Immigration 
Offices attached to Police headquarters (questure) and  Border Police;
.  the national database (N-Vis);
.  the consulates network (L-Vis).
Figure 6. The structure of the Visa Information System. Elaboration of the author.
Furthermore,  the  VIS  has  other  complementary  components.  The  system  “Biometric 
Matching System” (BMS) is an integrated component providing services dealing with digital 
finger prints. The VIS Mail System is a component developed by OBS/HP (Orange and Hewlett 
Packard) in order to replace the consultation mechanism, called VISION. Although VIS Mail is 
considered as part of VIS, this mechanism is neither physically nor logically connected to VIS.  
VIS Mail is hosted in Bratislava with a back up in Strasbourg. 
The L-Vis is an empty box not yet linked to the system except for the first roll-out countries. 
The  Commission  was  in  charge  of  the  development  of  the  central  database,  the  national 
interfaces  and the  communication infrastructure  between  the  central  VIS  and the  national 
interfaces.  Their  development  was  funded by  the  EU  budget  (the  cost  amounted  to  €  135 
16 Secure trans-European network managed by DG Informatics (DIGIT): EU Commission, DG Home, Directorate C  
(2011),  Maintenance  in  working  order  of  the  Visa  Information  System  (VIS),  Annex  5,  Executive  summary, 
Restricted Call for tenders.
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million  between  2004  and  2011).  Each  Schengen state  is  responsible  for  the  development,  
management, and operation of its national system. The Agency for the management of large-
scale IT systems in the area of justice, freedom and security will be the Managing Authority of 
the  VIS.  Until  the  Agency  becomes  operational,  the  Managing  Authority  will  be  the 
Commission and the French authorities, in line with the relevant legal framework. 
The VIS continuously processes the information collected by Schengen states' Consulates.  
For example, any information entered by local visa authorities will be available in the VIS for all 
users within a few minutes. Border authorities can then verify visa holders' identities at the 
border crossing points in just a few seconds. The VIS operates 24/7, 365 days a year.
The huge database  was  created to  tackle  visa  shopping,  overstaying  and security  issues 
linked  to  cross-border  crimes.  It  contains  the  information  on  the  whole  “visa  history”  of 
applicants, including their biometric and personal data, information on travel documents, dates 
and places of visa application, type of visa requested, details of the person issuing the invitation,  
main  destination  and  duration  of  intended  stay,  intended  dates  of  arrival  and  departure, 
intended border of first entry or transit route, residence, current occupation and previous visa 
applications. Data protection and the practical use/sharing of the database are just some of the 
issues the EU has already to deal with in the everyday implementation of the VIS (Brower 
2008).
The database will be accessible by visa, immigration and asylum authorities as designated 
by participating states and competent authorities responsible for carrying out checks at external 
borders and within the national territories. According to article 31 of the Regulation concerning 
the VIS, data “may be transferred or made available to a third country or to an international 
organisation listed in the Annex if necessary in individual cases for the purpose of proving the 
identity  of  third-country  nationals,  including  for  the  purpose  of  return” (my  italic).  Thus, 
although apparently set up as an administrative file, the VIS system will in practice function as  
an intelligent tool for the purpose of identifying third-country nationals staying illegally in the 
territory in order to enforce a return decision or removal order.
After  several  postponements,  as  from  11  October  2011,  the  Visa  Information  System 
(established  by  Council  Decision  2004/512/EC  and  EC  Regulation  767/2008)  became 
operational in a first group of third countries. The VIS will not start operations in all Schengen 
consulates  worldwide  at  once,  but  will  be  progressively  deployed,  region  by  region.  In 
November  2009,  the  Commission  adopted  a  Decision  (2010/49/EC) determining  the  first 
regions for the VIS consular rollout. Thus, VIS operations commenced in all Schengen states'  
visa-issuing  Consulates  in  North  Africa  (Algeria,  Egypt,  Libya,  Mauritania,  Morocco  and 
Tunisia) in October 2011, and began in the Near East (Israel, Jordan, the Lebanon, and Syria) 
on 10 May 2012. According to the current planning, it will subsequently be deployed in the Gulf 
region  (Afghanistan,  Bahrain,  Iran,  Iraq,  Kuwait,  Oman,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  United  Arab 
Emirates and Yemen) on 2 October 2012. According to the Report on the functioning of the 
Schengen area (COM (2012) 230) “the VIS is working well and by 30 April 2012, the system had 
processed 775,489 applications, 611,419 issued visas and 99,242 refusals”.
In April 2012 the Commission adopted a Decision (n. 274) determining a second set of 
regions for the VIS consular rollout.  This  set  includes  Senegal  and all  the  other remaining 
countries. The start of the roll out in West Africa (region 4), and also in Central Africa (region  
5) is anticipated for 14 March 2013, provided that all the Member States, who are required to  
notify their readiness to the Commission by 11 January 2013, are ready. Following on from this  
milestone,  the rollout is  scheduled to proceed as follows:  on 6 June 2013 in region 6 (East 
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Africa) and region 7 (South Africa); on 5 September 2013 in region 8 (South America); on 14  
November 2013 in region 9 (Central Asia),  region 10 (South-East Asia)  and region 11 (the  
occupied Palestinian Territory).
In October 2011 the “Visa Mail 1” system was implemented, providing for the circulation of 
electronic  mail  messages  among  Member  States.  This  system represents  a  tool  of  consular 
cooperation for the exchange of information on activities of Member States and their peripheral 
posts relating to the issue of Schengen visas. All messages will be monitored by the European 
central system (the C-Vis Mail Relay).
Even  before  the  implementation  of  VIS,  each visa  application  had  to  be  automatically 
checked through an electronic procedure in the Schengen Information System (SIS). This is a 
common list of persons not to be admitted,  made up of all  persons signalled by any of the 
Schengen states according to their national understanding of the criteria for inclusion and their 
national  interpretation  of  public  order  and  security.  The  definition  of  these  persons  for 
exclusion is defined by article 96 of the Schengen Implementing Agreement, and seems to be 
primarily based on what they did or represented while they were within the territory of the 
Union. The SIS is a relatively small minority listing, while VIS will cover every visa applicant.
Other control mechanisms on visa applicants have been retained within the Visa Code. 
Annex 5 (b) to the CCI (which has remained confidential) set up a “list within the list” (Guild 
2001: 69): each Member State notifies the others of which nationalities on the visa list are of  
specific interest to it. Any application for a visa by a national of a country in the Annex 5 (b) list  
must  be  passed  on  to  the  Member  State  which  has  expressed  an  interest,  ignoring  the  
reciprocity principle and lengthening waiting times of applicants. The Visa Code renamed this 
process “prior consultation” (art. 22) and it foresees the consultation of the central authorities – 
which means the Intelligence Agencies  – of  Member States  during the examination of  visa 
applications lodged  by  “nationals  of  specific  third  countries  or  specific  categories  of  such  
nationals” within seven days, after which there is an assumption of “silence-assent”, in respect of 
applicants' rights. 
Moreover,  under  article  31  of  the  Visa  Code,  a  Member  State  may  require  its  central  
authorities to be informed  ex post  of visas issued by the Consulates of other Member States. 
More security-oriented Member States may ask for the possible annulment/revocation of the 
visa after receiving the information, and the Commission is strict and firm in its response to a 
negative  advice. However, article 31 allows consultation in line with selective criteria among 
applicants according to categories chosen by the states. 
Countries of  “prior consultation” and of “ex-post information” are listed respectively  in 
annexes 16 and 17 of the Visa Code, but the information on which country has requested the  
consultation/information is still  confidential.  As regards the first annex, out of a total of 29 
countries, 12 are in Africa (all the north: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia), while Annex 
17  lists  62  countries,  among  which  25  Africans.  On  both  lists,  the  “specific  categories”  of 
nationals include Palestinians, refugees and stateless persons.
Finally, a supplementary informal system of mala fide lists, built on discretional profiling of 
persons considered “risky”, is held in Consulates.  Thus, on one hand the EU border moves to 
within the Third State and, on the other hand, it continues to be manipulated from a distance by 
EU Member States according to their understanding of risks.
As we have  seen,  the  SIS,  Eurodac and VIS cover various categories  of  “people on the 
move”: persons that should be refused entry or that are searched for by one of the EU Member 
States (SIS), asylum seekers (Eurodac) and travellers with a visa requirement (VIS). However, 
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according to the European Council and the EU Commission, these information systems still fail 
to detect another important category of migrants: the so-called overstayers. An overstayer is a  
person whose legal residence (stay permit or visa) has expired and thus resides illegally in the 
EU. The next step of the EU is to improve the management of mobilities,  registering every 
movement (entry and exit), in order to detect overstayers.
A future of « Organised Mobility »: EES and RTP
With  the  Communication  “Preparing  the  next  steps  in  border  management  in  the 
European Union” (February 2008), the Commission addressed the potential  offered by new 
technologies  and  introduced  new  ideas  on  the  development  of  an  integrated  border 
management strategy within the EU. These ideas have come to be known as “Smart Borders”.  
This approach was endorsed in December 2009 by the European Council in the Stockholm 
Programme. The importance of the work on Smart Borders was more recently underlined in the 
“Communication on migration” (May 2011) where the EU Commission, under the paragraph 
“organised mobility”, calls for the reinforcing of border checks while at the same time speeding 
up border crossing for regular travellers, in order to seek a “right balance between enhanced  
mobility of bona fide travellers and the risk of irregular migration and threats to public policy 
and security” (COM (2011) 248: 11).
Then,  on  25  October  2011  the  European  Commission  presented  the  Communication 
“Smart Borders – options and the way ahead” according to which (COM (2011) 680: 4):
the  fact  that  all  third-country  nationals  have  to  go  through  the  same  border  checks,  
regardless of the level of risk they present or their frequency of travel, does not represent 
an efficient use of border guards. Seeking to increase security and to speed up travel fows 
just by increasing the number of border guards is not a viable option for many Member  
States as they strive to curb budget deficits. The long queues, especially at airports, present 
a poor image to visitors to the European Union and both airport operators and airline 
companies  consistently  request  faster  and  smoother  passenger  fows  for  increasingly 
shorter connection times. The Smart Borders initiative would improve the management 
and control of travel fows at the border by reinforcing checks while speeding up border 
crossings for regular travellers. This would enable border guards to cope with the ever-
rising number of border crossings - without an unrealistic increase in human resources 
needed for border control and without compromising security. 
The Communication describes a package consisting of a Registered Travellers Programme 
(RTP) and an Entry/Exit System (EES). The latter is used for the registration of entry and exit  
data of persons who will reside or have resided within the EU. The EES only registers the fact 
that somebody has entered or left the EU and not where the person can be localized during the  
period of residence. In September 2009, a one week data collection exercise took place to test 
the added value of the EES (Council of the European Union, Doc. 13267/09). About 12 million  
persons  were  registered  on  the  system,  and  about  75% of  the  registrations  concerned  EU 
citizens, whilst only 12% of these registrations concerned the initial target group, that is, Third-
Country nationals with a visa requirement. 
The  Registered  Travellers  Programme  would  allow  third  country  nationals  to  use  the 
automated  gates  which  check  third  country  nationals'  identity  and  travel  history  through 
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biometrics, making access to the EU easier for “frequent trusted travellers”. Visa applicants can 
apply to join the fee-based programme at the same time their application is submitted, while 
visa-exempt travellers  may apply  on arrival  in  the Schengen area.  They have to enrol  their 
fingerprints and they receive a card containing a unique number, which is swiped on arrival and 
departure at the border using an automated gate. The gate would also read the travel document 
(and the visa) and the fingerprints of the traveller, which would be compared to the relevant  
databases. If all checks are successful, the traveller is able to pass through the automated gate. 
The  fingerprints  would  be  anonymous  and  the  result  that  would  be  returned  to  border 
authorities would simply be a hit/no-hit, confirming that the person is indeed the same who 
applied for the RTP.17
According to the EU Commission, the package “can be seen as a responsibility of the EU, 
for  example,  to  justify  maintaining  the  visa  requirement  on  the  nationals  of  a  given  third 
country by showing that there is a problem of overstaying and/or to reintroduce visas in the 
case of abuse of a visa-free regime (…)  The most relevant principles for a registered traveller 
programme would be,  firstly,  accurate risk management” (COM (2011) 680:  11). Legislative 
proposals for the entry-exit system were expected to be available in September 2012.
Italy: legal channels of entry 
The only way of entering Italy “legally” is by having a (short or long-term) visa issued by 
one  of  the  Italian  diplomatic  posts  abroad.  The  focus  of  policies  has  always  been  the 
management of labour movements, since migration is considered a “fill in the gaps” solution.  
The  other  main  area  is  family  reunification.  The  law  provides  mechanisms  of  entry  and 
bureaucratic procedures for these “types” of movements.18 In the next chapter, I will go through 
an  overview  of  the  current  framework  to  assess  the  accessibility  to  movement  in  and  out 
resulting from the implementation of these procedures.
17 EU Commission Background note (July 2011) “Background information on smart borders initiative”, available at:  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/jul/eu-com-smart%20borders-note.pdf.
18 I will not consider asylum in my analysis of mobilities, since adequate coverage would require a level of detail  
beyond the current scope.
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Visa policy 
Before  1990,  visa  policies  were  basically  a  patchwork  of  partial  agreements  and 
decentralised decisions.  In 1985, tourist visas were not required for citizens of 78 countries,  
among them Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal and several other countries (Sciortino 1999: 
242). Five years later, visas has become the key instruments of Italian immigration control, and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was required to define the visa requirements annually, taking 
into  consideration  both  the  origin  of  the  immigration  fows  and  the  nationalities  of  those 
sentenced for drug trafficking in the previous three years. Consistent with this process, visas 
had been introduced for Senegal, Gambia, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania and Turkey, 
which were at the time seen as the most immigration-risky countries. Measures to push back 
foreigners  without  the  necessary  visas  at  the  border,  those  who  have  been  expelled  or  
considered dangerous to the State's security, organised criminals, smugglers, terrorists, or those 
“which are manifestly without a livelihood in Italy” were strengthened (Einaudi 2007: 153). 
Following Einaudi (2007: 156-157, my translation):
after  the  introduction  of  visas  in  1990  manifold  strategies  of  human  smuggling  were 
developed as well as the production of false administrative acts needed to allow the border 
crossing  (passports,  acts,  work contract)  or  the simulation of  false  objective  situations 
(marriages of convenience with Italian citizens in order to obtain stay permits and Italian 
citizenship). (…) This led to the restriction of even the legitimate and necessary movement 
of people, with aims such as tourism, trade, investment, culture or research.
As for the regulatory framework of entry visas, the Italian Parliament ratified the Schengen 
agreement with law 388/1993, and the agreement came into force a few years later. Visa policy  
was defined as a discipline by Legislative Decree n. 286/1998 (Consolidated Act) - as amended 
by  law  189/2002  and  subsequent  amendments  -  in  particular  article  4,  which  governs  the  
provisions related to entry into the state territory.
The types of visas, the conditions and specific requirements for the issuance of each visa are 
provided  in  the  Consolidated  Act,  the  rules  implementing  the  Regulation  and  the  recent 
Interdepartmental  Decree  of  11  May  2011  “Defining  the  types  of  entry  visas  and  the 
requirements  for  granting  them”. In  particular,  compared  to  the  previous  rules,  the  decree 
introduces the following innovations:
· it simplifies the discipline of visas requested for family reasons, merging together the two 
visas for “accompany family member” and “family reunification” into the new visa for “family 
reasons”;
· it  separates  the  student  visa  from  the  one  for  “research”  which  is  now  seen  as  an 
autonomous discipline;
· it abolishes the visa for “integration into the labor market”, which was removed from the  
Consolidated text since 2002;
· finally, it introduces the new visa for “volunteering”, which allows entry for young people 
aged between 20 and 30 years who are admitted to participate in volunteer programs.
Therefore, the types of visas currently in force,  corresponding to the various reasons of  
entry, are the following: adoption; business; sports competitions; medical treatment; diplomatic; 
invitation;  self-employment;  subordinate  employment;  mission;  family  reasons;  religious 
grounds; re-entry; elective residence; research; study; transit; airport transit; transport; tourism; 
work-holidays; volunteering.
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It  is  worth mentioning art.  4  of  the decree  which underlines  the  EU call  for  the  risk-
assessment of applicants as well as the relevance of interviewing them. The evaluation of the 
“migratory risk” also has to be taken into account for long-term visas, but only those issued for 
study reasons and those brought to attention “in case of negative verification on authenticity 
and reliability of the submitted documentation, as well as on veracity and reliability of issued 
statements”. In these cases, “the diplomatic-consular post will refrain from issuing the visa” (art. 
4 par. 2). 
In addition to the above-mentioned decree,  there is the Directive of the Ministry of the 
Interior which is dated 1st March 2000, “Defining the means of subsistence for the entry and 
stay  of  aliens  on  Italian  soil”.  A  foreign  national  wishing  to  enter  Italian  territory  or  the 
Schengen  area  must  have  sufficient  financial  resources  available  to  guarantee  maintenance 
throughout the planned visit (see Table 4). Foreign nationals have to demonstrate as an essential 
condition that they possess the means of subsistence by showing liquid cash, bank guarantees, 
insurance policy guarantees or equivalent credit instruments, vouchers for prepaid services or 
other documents demonstrating access to sources of income in Italy.
As regards a visa for business, medical treatment - and an accompanying person in this case 
- sports competition, or for religious reasons, for transit, transport or tourism, the Ministry of  
Interior's Directive of 1st March 2000 has defined means of subsistence for the admission and 
stay of aliens within Italian territory as follows:
Table 4. Determination of required means of subsistence for the entry into the national territory  
(Directive of 1 March 2000, OJ n. 64 of 17 March 2000).
Finally, State's  discretion in the issuing of the visa is widely recognised by a consolidated 
jurisprudence. The visa is a legitimate interest and not a subjective right (Corte di Cassazione 
civile, Sez. Unite, n. 64262, 5 marzo 2005). The right of appeal has to be notified within sixty  
days at the Regional Administrative Court (T.A.R.) of Latium. Only the refusal of visas for 
family reunification, work, medical care and study needed to be justified before the Visa Code 
came into force, introducing the standard refusal form.   
Labour movement: quotas and flow decrees
As far as foreign workers are concerned, Italy has moved from the absence of any kind of 
planning to the adoption of a yearly decision on their prospects of entry, which is contingent  
upon the state of the labour market. According to the Martelli law (L. 39/1990), the Minister of 
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Foreign Affairs shall each year issue a decree concerning the number of foreign workers who are 
allowed to enter the country the subsequent year (decreti flussi).
The current  procedure  regarding  subordinate  employees  hired  for  a  fixed or  non-fixed 
period of time or non-EU foreigners residing abroad hired on a seasonal basis stipulates that 
the employer (Italian or foreigner legally residing in the country) - on the basis of quotas laid-
down by the “fows decree” - has the duty to present himself to the appropriate Single Desk for 
Immigration. In cases where the employer knows the employee he wants to hire, he must make 
a request by name for a work permit, and provide documentation showing that the worker has  
suitable housing accommodation (according to the criteria established by the norms of each 
region), as well as the relevant “proposal for a residence permit”. Once the information required 
by the legislation has been checked (in collaboration with the Provincial Police Headquarters  
and the Provincial Directorate of Labour) and the assessment is positive, the Single Desk issues  
the authorisation (nulla osta)  to work, and electronically transmits the documentation to the 
consular offices in the applicant’s country of residence. 
The latter then has up to six months to obtain the relevant visa and, once in Italy, he must  
present himself to the appropriate Single Desk within eight days after his arrival in order to get 
his fiscal code (codice fiscale), sign the residence permit contract and, since March 2012, the 
Integration Agreement (this  agreement will  be considered in detail  later  in this  document).  
Then the application form for the request of a residence permit for employment (form n. 209) is  
sent to Police Headquarters through one of the Post Offices, using the “Friendly Desk”. Finally, 
once  photos  and  fingerprints  have  been  taken,  the  Police  Headquarters  issues  a  residence 
permit for employment (EMN 2009).
But how are fow decrees decided? As stated in the Consolidated Act, every three years the 
Government  must  prepare a  program document on immigration,  in  which it  identifies the 
general criteria for the planning of entry fows and, on the basis of that document, an annual 
decree is issued for the following's years entries. The last three-year document (published in the 
Official Journal) covers the years 2004-200619. In the case where this decree is not published, the 
President of the Council of Ministers is able to provide an interim decree within the limits of 
the previous year’s quotas. The planning of quotas worked between 2002 and 2005, although, it 
was already “purely ritualistic”, as Sciortino (1999: 243) argues. In the most recent years, quotas 
for entries were 170,000 for 2007 and 150,000 for 2008, while none were programmed for 2009.  
Instead, there was a regularisation for domestic workers and care attendants (sanatoria colf e  
badanti)  being  limited  to  male  and  female  workers  in  the  domestic  field.  Recently,  the 
Consolidated Act was amended by law 25/2010, according to which transitional programming 
must  refer  to  the  last  issued  decree.  Therefore,  even  in  2010  there  was  a  transitional 
programming of entry quotas for seasonal and non-seasonal workers. Quotas were 80,000 for 
seasonal  employments  and  98,080  for  non-seasonal  workers,  among  which  52,080  were 
reserved for countries which had signed cooperation agreements on migration matters, 30,000 
for other countries (but these were restricted to the domestic field), 11,000 for the conversion of  
stay permits,  and 4,000 were assigned to workers who had completed training programmes 
abroad. Quotas for seasonal employments were lowered down to 60,000 in 2011 and to 35,000 
in 2012, when there were no quotas for subordinate work.20 
On one hand, the quota system of fow decrees has been structured in a selective manner, 
19 Documento programmatico relativo alla  politica  dell’immigrazione e degli  stranieri nel  territorio dello  Stato per il  
triennio 2004-2006, GU 169/2005: www.governo.it/Presidenza/DICA/immigrazione/DPPI_04052005_2.pdf
20 All fow decrees are available on the Ministry of the Interior's website.
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since a great many of the authorised slots are reserved for migrants from countries with which 
Italy has stipulated bilateral agreements. On the other hand, the system has increasingly come 
to be structured in a manner reminiscent of the old  Gastarbeiter  model, clearly encouraging 
entries for seasonal work rather than for permanent employment. Legal entry remains anchored 
to this system of annual entry quotas, which in the last few years have been improperly used as  
“mini-amnesties” to rectify situations of previous irregularity. 
Considering that  seven amnesties have been decreed to date  (the most recent  in  2012, 
ongoing  at  the  time  of  writing),  which  have  regularised  approximately  1.5  million  foreign 
nationals since now, it will be clear that Italian migration policies have, since the go, organically 
combined the structural submergence of undocumented migrant workers into the underground 
economy with their periodic emergence through the instrument of amnesties (Cillo 2007). 
In June 2011, the under-secretary of the Ministry of the Interior in charge of immigration, 
Sonia Viale, pointed out that “despite the absence of the three-year action plan (...) in June 2010  
the Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the Ministers of Interior, Labour and Social Policy, 
approved the Plan for Integration in Security, which identifies the main lines of action and tools 
to be adopted to promote an effective integration process, in compliance with the prerogatives 
and  responsibilities  of  the  various  institutional  actors  involved,  as  well  as  the  procedures 
foreseen in existing legislation”. Furthermore, the under-secretary explained that “over time the 
provision of article 3 of the Consolidated Act on immigration has lost much of its original  
value, due to the occurrence of new phenomena and situations. In fact, the planning of the fow 
of  foreign  workers  should  be  modulated  according  to  the  needs  of  the  economy,  and also 
requires a framework of macroeconomic stability, without which it is not possible to proportion 
the entry of foreign workers to the domestic demand for labor” (Italian Parliament, Chamber of 
Deputies, report on the session of the 8 June 2011: 297).
Family movement: a constitutional right
The  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  does  not  include  a  right  of  family 
reunification (Abdulaziz, Cabales, Balkandali v. United Kingdom) but the foreign national who 
legally resides in a State has the right to respect “family life” (art. 8 ECHR):
everyone  has  the  right  to  respect  for  his  private  and  family  life,  his  home  and  his  
correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of  
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the  
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
According to the ECHR, the notion of “family life” is not restricted to the family predicated  
on marriage. The Court considers “family life” to include every couple who are not necessarily 
married  but  are  living  together,  with  sons  (Gül  v.  Switzerland).  On  the  other  hand,  the 
polygamist family is not included (Rabia Bibi v. United Kingdom). However, as a matter of well-
established international law a State has the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its 
territory and where immigration is concerned, article 8 of the Convention cannot be considered 
to impose on a State a general obligation to authorise family reunion on its territory (see, for 
instance,  Gül  v.  Switzerland  and  Rodrigues  da  Silva  and  Hoogkamer  v.  the  Netherlands). 
Moreover,  the Court considers that,  in the context of  family reunification, it  rests  with the 
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persons alleging that there is a family relationship to provide reliable evidence thereof and to 
demonstrate  that  the  relationship constitutes  “family  life” as  understood in  article  8  of  the 
Convention (Taher v. Sweden).
In Italian law, the right of a family to live together enjoys explicit constitutional cover (art.  
29 and 30 of the Italian Constitution). Its nature as a fundamental right, which is therefore also 
recognised for the alien, has progressively found clear definition in a rich jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court and, in particular, in article 28 of the Consolidated Act which ratifies the 
right of family reunification. 
The foreign national can only make a request for the following family members: a spouse 
who is  adult  and  to  whom  he  is  still  married  (e.g.  not  legally  separated);  minors,  even if  
depending on the spouse and born out of wedlock (including adopted children), provided that  
the  other  parent  gives  his/her  consent;  adult,  dependent  children,  whenever  they  cannot 
provide  for  their  own  support  due  to  a  health  condition  that  causes  complete  invalidity 
according to Italian legislation; the parents of the requesting foreign national (but not of the 
spouse) provided that they are supported by the foreign national and if they do not have other 
children in the country of origin, or rather parents over the age of sixty-five whenever their  
other children cannot support them due to serious health problems (art. 28 Consolidated Act).21
At last, the Italian law does not recognize the status of family member to “de facto couples” 
and it forbids polygamy. As repeatedly stressed by the Constitutional Court, the Italian legal  
system does not  recognise the status of family members to  more uxorio cohabiting couples, 
widely referred as  “de facto couples”.  In several  judgments,  in  fact,  the Court specified  that 
article 19 of the Consolidated Act on Immigration is not unconstitutional insofar as it does not 
prohibit the expulsion of third-country nationals cohabiting more uxorio with an Italian citizen 
(Constitutional Court, ord. 313/2000 and ord. 481/2000).
Polygamy is considered a crime according to art. 556, Criminal Code. Therefore just one 
wife can benefit from the right of reunification (not necessarily the first one) and it does not 
allow the reunification of the other wives in polygamous marriages recognised in the country of 
origin. However, the reunification of spouses in a polygamous relationship is often allowed on 
the basis of their status as “parent of a minor” (biological or legal). This reunification is entitled 
to the best interests of the minor in application of the Convention of the Rights of the Child of  
1989, not for the right to family unity. 
 
The Integration agreement (2012)
In line with other European countries who had already enacted similar legislation, on 10 
March 2012 the agreement known as the Accordo di integrazione for foreigners came into force. 
This “integration agreement” takes after the French  Contrat d’Accueil et d’Integration and the 
British points-based system. As envisaged by article 4 (b) of Legislative Decree n. 286/1995 it is  
an agreement between the Italian State and a third-country national who enters Italy for the 
first time. 
The agreement foresees acceptance of a list of common basic principles as a precondition to 
being granted a stay permit that is renewable every two years. These conditions include the 
obligation to learn to some degree the Italian language, history, and Constitution, and to gain an 
21 For an in-depth analysis of the Italian law on family reunification, updated with the law decree 160/2008 and the 
law 94/2009, see: Cascelli (2010), “Recenti modifiche alla disciplina del ricongiungimento familiare di  cittadini  
extracomunitari”, Rivista dell'Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti, 00, 2 July 2010.
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understanding of how social services work and how to behave in conformity with Italian laws 
and civic customs. Italian authorities have to provide language and civic education, while the 
foreigner is committed to meet his/her civic obligations and to fulfill his/her duties under the  
Charter of values of citizenship and integration adopted by the Italian government in 2007. A 
credit-based approach is used to achieve integration. 
The Integration agreement is available to newcomers aged over 16 who will be required to  
sign the agreement  at  the Prefecture -  Single Desk for immigration or,  alternatively,  at  the 
provincial police headquarters, when submitting an application for a residence permit for no 
less than one year.  
Two original copies of the agreement are drawn up, the one for the foreigner being in the 
preferred language indicated by him/her. After signing the  agreement,  the foreigner will  be 
automatically awarded 16 credits and will be required to attend a free training and information 
session on civic education lasting from five to ten hours organised by the Prefecture. Initial  
points can be lost and new points acquired by demonstrating knowledge of the Italian language, 
taking  courses,  gaining  educational  qualifications,  enrolment with  social  and  health  care 
services, having a regular contract or mortgage to buy an apartment, etc. The loss of credits  
follows serious crimes.
After two years the Prefecture is responsible for verifying the achievement of 30 credits. The 
assessment may lead to three different outcomes: 
· settlement of the agreement if the foreigner has reached an appropriate level of integration 
(30 credits or more); 
· extension of the agreement for one year if the foreigner did not reach a sufficient number 
of credits to allow the settlement of the agreement (1 to 29 credits); 
· termination of the agreement when the foreigner has not reached an appropriate level of  
integration;  his/her  residence  permit  is  revoked  and  he/she  is  expelled  from  the  national 
territory (with 0 or less credits). Entry for family reunification does not require verification of a 
points score.
Schengen/Italy: some numbers
In 2010, Italy was the third Schengen country in terms of visa issuance, with a total of  
1,543,436,  after  France  and  Germany.  In  terms  of  category,  Schengen  (short-stay)  visas 
represented 82.6 % of the total number of visas delivered (MAE 2011: 149 and following).
Year Issued Visas Schengen Visas National Visas LTV
2005 1,076,664 810,996 213,984 51,684
2006 1,198,167 947,92 194,012 56,239
2007 1,519,816 1,130,265 363,277 26,274
2008 1,563,567 1,201,354 318,872 43,341
2009 1,401,704 1,051,883 301,561 48,260
2010 1,543,436 1,275,016 218,318 50,102
Table 5. Visas issued by Italian consulates per year (2005-2010) and category.
Produced using data published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE 2011)
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Looking at the continental area of request/issuance of visas by Italian Consulates in 2010, 
European non-Schengen countries are the first in the list while the Sub-Saharan Africa is the 
last of the five continental areas considered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Continental area 2010
Europe (no EU countries) 736,381
North and South America 87,919
Mediterranean and Middle East 194,510
Sub-Saharan Africa 73,697
Asia and Oceania 426,647
Total 1,543,408
Table 6. Entry visas: continental area of issuance.
Produced using data published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE 2011)
As regards countries of issuance, Russia, China, India, Turkey, Ukraine and Albania are in 
the top ten from 2008 to 2010. While for Russia, China and India the number of visas increases 
from 2008 to 2010, the number of visas issued in Ukraine and Albania has reduced to around 17 
thousand and 23 thousand respectively, probably as an effect of the facilitation agreements on 
visas signed with the EU22. This is also the case with Serbia, which is in the top ten for 2008 and 
2009 but with a decrease of 10 thousand visas occurring within this time.
2008 2009 2010
Russia    431,534 Russia    335,352 Russia    459,967
China    118,641 China    128,193 China    175,541
India    79,879 India    74,066 Turkey    95,159
Turkey    70,785 Turkey    70,128 India    80,798
Ukraine    67,959 Ukraine    56,605 Ukraine    50,367
Albania    64,025 Albania    54,497 Albania    40,993
Serbia    49,087 USA    41,291 USA    40,162
Morocco    47,610 Serbia    39,960 Belarus    38,585
Belarus    44,309 Belarus    38,331 Taiwan    33,105
USA    42,439 Morocco    32,914 Saudi Arabia    31,093
Table 7. Entry visas for Italy: countries' top 10 for visas issued.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE  2011: 154)








Historically  an  immigration  country  for  African  migrants,  Senegal  gradually  lost  its 
capacity to attract migrant workers, becoming a key transit country for, and source country of, 
unauthorised  and  officially  unwanted  migratory  fows  to  Europe  (Bruzzone  et  al.  2006).  
According to the  Ministère des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (the Ministry specifically dedicated to 
the Senegalese living abroad), in 2003-2004 the number of Senegalese living outside the country 
equaled 648,600 individuals, or 12 % of the total resident population in 2004. At that time, the 
same source estimated two unregistered for every registered emigrant. The majority lived in 
other African countries which, according to these figures, host 63% of the Senegalese abroad. 
Registered  migrants  were  more  likely  to  reside  in  Europe  (58.4%),  where  the  ratio 
unregistered/registered  migrants  equaled  0.5.  With  respect  to  regular  migrants,  the  Global 
Migration  Origin  Database  reports  that  around  the  year  2000,  the  number  of  Senegalese 
residing abroad equaled 479,515 individuals (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2010).
Since the mid-1970s, Senegal has evolved into an important emigration country. The main 
triggers  for  emigration  have  been  worsening  socio-economic  conditions  especially  in  rural 
areas and the success of former emigrants, which has acted as a strong pull factor. Initially, Cote 
d’Ivoire was the major Sub-Saharan migration destination until the late 1990s: a result of the 
outbreak of civil  war in 1999 and associated economic decline,  not to mention xenophobia. 
Then,  an  increasing  numbers  of  West  Africans  started  to  migrate  outside  the  region,  first 
towards South Africa, Gabon, Botswana and Libya, then also to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.  
Around 2000, the next fundamental shift in migration patterns occurred when Sub-Saharan 
migrants started to join Maghrebians in their attempts to enter the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla illegally or to cross the Strait of Gibraltar to Spain or from Tunisia to Italy. 
It is worth mentioning here that Italy and Spain introduced visa requirements for North 
African workers  in  the  early  1990s.  Following de  Haas,  “in  this  way sub-Saharan migrants 
forged  a  vital  connection  between  the  resurgent  trans-Saharan  and the  already established 
Euro-Mediterranean migration systems” (de Haas 2008).
In conclusion, Europe (France, then Italy and Spain23) as well as the US represent today the 
most important destinations for Senegalese emigrants. A result of free-circulation restrictions 
brought  in  by the  Schengen Agreements,  the  Senegalese  exodus towards  Italy  and Spain is 
inseparable  from  the  protectionist  drift  that  characterises  Northern  Europe,  in  particular 
France, with the introduction of visa in 1986. It is also the result of the progressive closing of 
African rich countries (Bruzzone et al. 2006). 
23 On Senegalese destinations, in particular France, Spain and Italy, see González-Ferrer, Baizán (2010).
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Historical overview of relations between Italy and Senegal
After  Gambia  (20%),  Italy  is  currently  the  third  country  of  destination  for  Senegalese  
emigrants,  the  second  in  the  EU  with  10%  against  18% of  France  (Some  2009:  53).   The 
increased patrolling of the Gibraltar Strait after the events of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 and the  
comparatively  higher risk  involved  in  its  crossing greatly  contributed to transforming West 
African  countries  into  the  main  embarkation  points  for  Western  Europe.  By  reason  of  its  
position, candidates for emigration mainly from West Africa transit through Senegal in their 
attempts to reach Maghreb countries and Europe (Fall 2008).
As Fall (1998) argues, Italy has been, for several years, a country of high migratory pressure, 
where it was possible to live without great risks, even without documents, and, the migrant’s 
own administrative position had been regulated it was possible to return enough frequently to 
the country of origin. 
The decisive factor  for  migrants  choosing Italy  is  the  periodic  possibility  of  amnesties. 
Indeed,  migrants  of  the  first  wave  have  been  able  to  regulate  their  situation  with  the  law 
943/1986: Senegal is in the second place according to the number of regulated. Those of the 
second phase have benefited from the Martelli Law, when Senegal is in third place. 
In spite of the official closing of borders that has followed these first measures, between 
1990 and 1994 the absence of systematic identity controls,  that leaves a relative freedom of  
movement to the undocumented migrant, perpetuates the migratory chain.  Therefore, many 
Senegalese  have  continued  to  enter  Italy  illegally.  The  economic  crisis  and  the  increasing 
attention of media and political authorities to the ties between irregular migration and crime, 
combined with European pushes towards an intensification of border controls as well as the 
identification and expulsion of irregular aliens, have radically modified the situation.
Among Sub-Saharan countries, the Senegalese diaspora is the largest in Italy. On 1 January 
2010, Senegalese regularly staying in Italy amounted to 71,000 (the sixteenth country in terms 
of resident population), against 53,941 in 2005 (Istat 2010). Always underestimated by official 
statistics, that do not take into account undocumented migrants, the Senegalese presence has a 
regular and, a not small, irregular component. 
Over  the  last  couple  of  decades,  Senegal  has  offered a  fertile  case  for the  study of  the 
Senegalese community in Italy (Campus, Mottura, Perrone 1993; Schmidt Di Friedberg 1994; 
Carter 1997;  Riccio 2008;  Lencioni 2008), as well as transnational migration trends and the 
development implications of migration in the sending country (Fall 1998; Riccio 2000; Perrone 
2001;  Grillo,  Riccio  2004;  Ceschi,  Stocchiero  2006;  Castagnone 2006;  Perrone 2010;  Sinatti 
2011; Ceschi 2012).  
Agreements 
Italy has no formal agreement on either migration nor repatriation with Senegal – unlike  
France24 and Spain25 – but it has expressed an interest in concluding one. Recently, according to 
a press release of March 2010 that came out of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
24 See the Accord de gestion concertés des flux migratoires of 23 September 2006 and the circular NOR IMIM0900083C 
of  15  January  2010  (accessed  24  September  2012):  http://www.immigration-professionnelle.gouv.fr/textes-de-
référence/accords-bilatéraux/accord-france-sénégal .
25 See the agreement of 9 November 2007 (prolonged early 2010) which granted an estimated 2,700 work permits for 
Senegalese workers seeking jobs in Spain. 
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the two Ministers [Italian and Senegalese] have convened to structure and to regulate the 
bilateral  consultations  and  have  shown  a  full  unity  of  views  on  the  difficulties  of 
clandestine  immigration,  favouring  regular  immigration  accompanied  by  focused 
programs of cooperation for development, also related to professional training, in order to 
favour  the  re-integration  of  return  immigrants  in  their  country  and  the  best  use  of  
monetary remittances coming from our country.26
The two countries nonetheless cooperate closely on matters pertaining to migration and 
Italy  punctually  returns  illegal  Senegalese  immigrants,  on an informal  basis,  with  Senegal’s 
agreement.  It should be pointed out that the Italian national average of readmission is about 
45%,  while  for  Senegalese  migrants  it  amounts  at  23.2%.  These  data  refect  the  lack  of 
readmission agreements between Senegal and Italy (Lencioni 2008).
A police cooperation agreement between Italy and Senegal was signed the 30 July 2010, in 
occasion of what the Italian Government  referred to as the “African tour”.  The Head of the 
Italian Police Antonio Manganelli, accompanied by the undersecretary of the Ministry of the 
Interior  (in  charge  for  immigration  in  Italy),  Nitto  Palma,  concluded  an  agreement  of 
cooperation between Italian and Senegalese police in order “to intensify the fight to clandestine 
immigration  and  every  kind  of  illicit  traffic”.27 The  agreement  is  not  public  yet,  but  it  is 
supposed to be similar to other police cooperation agreements. 
Generally, in this framework several initiatives of technical assistance can be undertaken. 
These can include the transfer of tools and equipment, as well as the organisation of training 
courses,  in  order  to  improve  the  institutional  and  operational  capacities  of  the  competent 
authorities of the country of origin/transit of migratory fows. Police officers can also be sent to 
diplomatic  and consular  representations,  to  act  as  experts  on  migration  issues  (Di  Pascale 
2010).
Other operational measures on migration issues in Senegal are Frontex operations.  The 
Agency has actively patrolled the West-African seas since 2006 within the framework of the 
Joint Operation Hera, up to 1,300 kilometres from the Southern-European coast to tackle illegal 
migration fows coming from West African countries heading towards the Canary Islands. In 
2010 Spain and Senegal renewed bilateral agreements permitting Frontex to operate from a base 
in Dakar for another year. The Frontex mission in Senegal currently consists of two Spanish 
Guardia Civil patrol boats, a Spanish National Police helicopter and a private airplane leased by 
the Spanish Defence Ministry.
26 My  translation.  Press  release,  Italian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Rome,  11  March  2010.  Available  at 
http://www.esteri.it  / .
27 An agreement “against clandestine immigration” was signed during the same Italian tour with Gambia. Migreurop, 




Vous, vous avez le droit et nous on n'a pas le droit...  
avec mes amis on discutait de ça. On se disait: pourquoi les  
Européennes quand ils vont venir en Afrique ils n'ont pas 
besoin  de  faire  la  demande  de  visa?  Il  leur  faut  tout 
simplement un passeport pour prendre l'avion et aller là où 
ils  veulent...  Les Africaines c'est  vraiment un  casino pour 
aller en Europe. Tu voit même les jeunes qui ont tout, tous 
les papiers, mais par erreur de communication, quand ils 
leur posent de questions ils ne répondent pas bien, de truc 
comme ça... alors qu'ils ont tout ce qu'il faut et ils ont les 
objectives qu'il faut pour aller en Europe, mais on leur rejet 
le visa. Par exemple moi, l'année passé, on m'a refusé un 
visa. C'était pour mission.
Djibi - November 2011, Dakar
The Italian Embassy in Dakar
The  Embassy  is  responsible  for  seven  countries  in  the  West-African  region:  Senegal, 
Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and Gambia. Whilst consular services are  
available to  all  the countries in this  group, Senegal  accounts  for the largest  number of visa 
applications, followed by Cape Verde and Guinea. 
It is worth mentioning representation agreements with other diplomatic posts and the use  
of honorary consuls for visa matters. In Cape Verde, Mali and Guinea Bissau Honorary Consuls 
receive  applications  and  partially  examine  them.  They  then  send  all  the  dossiers  to  the 
Consulate in Dakar (by diplomatic courier or DHL) for examination and the issuance of the 
visa. As far as I could understand, Honorary Consuls are chosen from among those Italians who 
have lived in the country for several years and who are well-known to the Embassy. They are 
usually used as a reference source for other co-nationals in those countries.
Moreover,  according to article 8 of the Visa Code, Italy has representation agreements28 
with France for Guinea and Mali, and with Spain in Mauritania. This means that France and 
Spain respectively receive and examine applications for Italy as the main destination, and they 
issue  Schengen  visas,  without  consulting  with  Italian  authorities.  Nevertheless,  the  Italian 
Consulate is the only authority with responsibility for the examination of national visas. 
28 Schengen States strongly rely on representation arrangements. On average, they have independent representation in  
51 third Countries, relies on their partners in 49, and do not have a consular presence at all in 67 States. There are,  
however, considerable differences between the Member States, and Italy is independently represented in over 102 
countries, has 35 cooperative agreements and no representation in 32 Countries (Hobolth 2012b: 97).
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A pilot  project  recently started in Cape Verde,  which is  trialling the use of  a  common 
application centre. However, Italy has not yet participated in this project. As stated by the Head 
of the Visa Office (interview. 1): 
[an authorisation] is requested from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Visa Centre, but  
we did not receive an answer yet, thus our honorary consul keeps on sending us visas. If we  
will be part of the project we would probably have no need to issue visas for Cape Verde 
here and it will maybe help applicants who at present pay for sending the application and 
for the withdrawal  of  the passport.  I  think it  will  be  a  long process  because  it  entails 
manifold changes for all of us. I do not know if we will really manage to do it.
Location and availability of information 
The Consulate of Italy in Dakar is in the same building as the Embassy, in the city centre 
(Plateau). Because of its geographical position, the Senegalese capital is difficult to reach from 
other regions, especially from the south of the country (the Casamance region). It is not easy to 
pass through the Gambia, by reason of border controls, and the alternatives are to reach Dakar 
by sea, which is expensive and uncertain, or by land, which is a very long trip. Moreover, the 
plateau is really far from popular neighbourhoods and the  car rapides, the cheapest common 
transports, do not go to this district. One way travel with a car rapide costs 50-200 CFA (0.10-
0.40 Euros), while taxis are really expensive (500-2,000 CFA), so they are usually shared. More 
frequently people walk, even for very long distances. The displacement very often entails a stop  
of few days in Dakar with some relatives.
The Visa Office is on the ground foor on the right just after the staff entrance. The door, 
fitted with dark glass, has an entry code lock. The list of the staff authorised to enter hangs on it, 
with both employees' and cleaners' names and surnames. The other staff of the Embassy can 
enter  through this  door only if  they are  accompanied by one of  the  authorised individuals 
included on the list, and this rule also applied to me when during my visit. 
As regards opening hours, the Visa Office receives applicants every morning from Monday 
to Friday between 9 and 12 a.m., except on Wednesday, when the front office is closed, and on  
this day the time is used for work on tasks that could not be managed in other days, or to carry 
out last minute duties. Monday and Friday are for Schengen visas' applications, while Tuesday 
and Thursday are set aside for applications related to family reunification. Moreover, every day 
from 2 to 3 p.m. a counter is open for the return of passports. 
There are two entrances in the building: one for visa applicants, with security guards, and, 
ten meters away, another one for civil servants, with a bell to request entry. As in most cases, in 
front of the Embassy there is a  telecentre (a copy bureau) ready to make last minute copies of 
documents  as  well  as  being  the  meeting  point  of  those  who  needs  help  dealing  with  the 
application.
As  regards  information,  on  the  website  of  the  Embassy  (ambdakar.esteri.it in 
French/Italian), there are the opening hours of the Visa Office, application forms, invitation 
letters and lists of required documents available for download. As the internet is not accessible 
to everybody, a first visit to the Consulate is necessary for the applicant to learn the full list of  
required documents. “C’est l’accès qui est difficile parce que nous n’avons pas d’interlocuteurs  
pour nous expliquer ces procédures”, was how an applicant for an Italian visa described to the 
Senegalese Press Agency (APS 2009). 
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The information board in front of the consular building and the guardians at the entrance 
of the Embassy are the only comprehensive sources of information, and there applicants can 
find the required forms in printed form. On the external wall of the building, near the entrance,  
the information board provides the following information: opening hours; services of the Anolf 
Senegal (the associazione nazionale oltre le frontiere, supported by the Italian trade union Cisl, 
offers services for migrants and their families in the field of translation of documents, Italian 
language  and  culture,  help  with  visa  applications,  health  assistance  and  study);  cultural 
advertisements  (announcements and scholarships);  notices from the Visa Office concerning 
new procedures; a list of translators suggested by the Embassy with phone and mail contacts. 
For many people these are the first indications as regards the procedure they will have to 
follow. In particular, it is here that most learn that access to the front office is possible only by  
appointment,  and that  there  is  no possibility  of  entering  in  order to  ask  information.  It  is  
recommended to call the Africatel service in order to fix an appointment to attend the Visa 
Office (see pictures in the Annexes). 
Local Consular Cooperation in Dakar
Formal reunions of the local Schengen cooperation take place every two-three months at 
the EU delegation in Dakar, and there are also informal exchanges of information on applicants 
between Member States’ Consulates. Reunions are coordinated by the EU political counsellor at  
the EU delegation in Dakar. Five reunions were held in 2010 as well as in 2011. The main issues 
discussed were: 
· diplomatic passports, as an exploited channel of mobility used even in instances where 
there was no requirement for them;
· the harmonisation of required documents among all Schengen Consulates, to avoid visa 
shopping;
· the outsourcing of appointment-taking;
· the harmonisation of statistics, for which the French Consulate proposes its model.
Furthermore, one of the aims of the last reunion (December 2011, at the time of writing) 
was to build up an analysis of frauds. As regards issues at stake, the Prime Chancellor argues 
(interview. 2):
first, to harmonise administrative practices, that means to make forms, information, list of  
required  documents  for  each  typology  of  visa  more  understandable  and  uniform;  to 
standardise,  as we did,  the procedure with the  same invitation form,  the same stamps 
“refused/accepted”...  all  this  was  achieved  in  Dakar.  Secondly,  to  harmonise  refusal 
procedures, that means to harmonise cases, to compare situations among us. Which are 
the  most  problematic  cases  we  deal  with?  Are  they  the  same for  all  of  us  [Schengen 
Consulates]?  Am I  the only one  [Consulate]  to  have a  problem with  birth  certificates 
released by certain municipalities... or are there any other cases? How did you deal with it?  
Which is  the best  strategy to defend ourselves, to damp, to verify?  Third:  information,  
which means to speak among us as far as possible. To exchange lists of refusals in order to  
avoid a new application the day after in another Embassy or the incomprehension of a 
refusal by another Embassy.
This interviewee also points out some difficulties in the harmonisation process (int. 2):
the  actual  implementation  is  not  perfect  here,  as  everywhere  I  think.  For  two  main 
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reasons: firstly, many countries are accustomed to their routines, it is difficult to change 
them or to adopt those of another Embassy. Moreover, it is not compulsory to do it and the 
change of practices needs organisational costs, time, re-education of staff, thus if they do 
not see a clear benefit they may not want to support the shift. Secondly, Embassies are 
often  overloaded.  Many  Embassies  here  have  small  offices,  often  burdened  with 
applications and perhaps not with full staff and not fully formed, and they are not able/do  
not have time to inform everyone [other Schengen embassies] and to put in an Excel file all  
visa denials, why they were denied... it is a cost in terms of labour and organisation that  
some Embassies can afford and others can not.
Although the issue of information exchange will be solved by the VIS system, the words of 
the diplomat give us an idea of how daily practices are deep-rooted in bureaucratic routines and 
thus  hard  to  change  in  a  “Schengen  dimension”.  The  harmonisation  of  lists  of  required 
documents, for example (int. 2):
is an ongoing effort and it is where we are less successful, I would say, because there are 
objective problems. There are many Embassies asking for documents to be examined but 
then, other Embassies ask for less. There are different types of visas, some countries have 
the “family visit” visa while Italy have not. And in this case certificates of residence, of  
family or relatives you are going to visit are required, but since we do not have this type of 
visa,  in my understanding [Italian Embassy]  that  application is  for tourism.  And for a 
tourism visa I do not ask all acts of family, residence, persons who you are going to visit. To  
make this distinction means a heavy workload for me which then must be verified, where  
there is  no obligation,  because in terms of the Italian law visiting an uncle or visiting 
Venice it always falls in a tourism visa. And the identity of the inviting person in Italy is 
not a requirement. If there is a familiar link it is fine, however if there is not I can not deny 
a person to go to Venice even if he does not know anyone in Venice. He is a tourist. This is  
a typical case, it happens frequently.
The arranging of the appointment: an outsourced service
From  2001,  the  appointments  service  has  been  outsourced  to  a  private  society.  The 
outsourcing to Africatel has led to a 25% increase of appointments at the Italian Embassy in  
Dakar. The society manages and organises a regular fow of people to the offices, the cost of the  
service falls entirely on the customer and the Consulate obtains a saving both in terms of staff 
and offices, which can be given over to other needs. 
Customers have to buy a prepaid telephone card at the bank windows of Ecobank, at the  
price of 5,200 Francs CFA (7.5 Euros) for 12 minutes of conversation with the call centre. This is 
a  premium price enormously  higher  than the price of  a  local  call  at  the standard rate:  for 
instance with Orange Senegal the price is 85 CFA/min, or one hour of conversation at the price 
of the Africatel phone card. However, often two or three appointments can be booked with one 
card.
Each  year  the  Consulate  gives  indications  to  Africatel  on  the  maximum  number  of 
appointments per typology of visa and communicating Senegalese and Italian national holidays, 
in order to avoid overbooking or the necessity for re-booking. Appointments are given a few 
weeks ahead (from 1 to 6) for family reunification and few days after the date of request for the  
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rest of visas. On average there are 800 appointments per month, 60 per day shared amongst  
three counters. Applicants are called to attend the office in the morning at 8, 9, 10 or 11.   
Nevertheless, according to the Visa Code, Member States shall maintain the possibility for 
all  applicants to lodge their applications directly  at their  Consulates  (art.  17 par.  5).  This is 
actually left as a last  resort  but the real  accessibility of  Consulates is  generally too difficult  
compared to services provided by external agencies in terms of geographical location, opening 
hours, and making of appointments, and therefore the applicant is dissuaded to address the 
request of appointment directly to the Consulate. According to the Embassy's website the Visa 
Office receives applicants only on appointment arranged by the Africatel call centre, which is  
available 7d/7 24h/24. There is the possibility of contacting the office through mail,  but this  
channel of access is intended for the use of international organisation (UN, ILO...), institutions 
or bona fide and well-known applicants. 
Applicants from this direct channel are listed in a red agenda of fuori lista (“out of the list”). 
Every morning, officials at the counter receive the list of  appointments of the day made by 
Africatel with name of the applicant, type of visa requested, mobile phone number and date of 
the call. At the bottom of the page there are fuori lista applicants, added by Consular officials.
Other consular representations in Dakar such as France, Belgium and China make use of  
the  Africatel  call  centre.  Since  August  2010  the  Embassy  of  Portugal  in  Dakar  has  even 
outsourced  the  leave  of  applications  and the  return  of  passports  to  AVA  -  Assistance  Visa  
Afrique29, which is  in  charge  of  the  planning of  appointments,  provision  of  information to 
applicants, leave-check-transmission of dossiers to the Consulate, payment of the visa fee and 
withdrawal of passports. This arrangement has meant that waiting times are now reduced from 
eight to three days. According to reports of the local Schengen cooperation, France does not  
agree  with  the  outsourcing,  stating:  “Even  with  Africatel  we  have  to  pay  attention”.  Other 
Schengen partners are also afraid of a loss of control over practices by the Consulate and the 
consequent increase in corruption margins. In the words of the Head of the Visa Office (int. 1): 
we are all a bit confused on this issue [outsourcing] and when we were told that Portugal 
adopted this procedure, everyone was a little bit... Portugal now says that all goes very well,  
they are satisfied. I think they do not even have a high number of visa applications and I  
also  believe  they  outsourced to obviate  problems they had in the past.  Or maybe  the  
difficulty in having not enough staff.
And following the interviewee as regards who decides about outsourcing (int. 1):
I  think  [the  decision]  is  taken  by  the  Embassy,  who  then  proposes  to  the  Ministry. 
Recently, the Ministry said it had fully supported the idea of outsourcing some services 
also with regard to visas and in many countries it worked like that. So, there are many 
countries where visa applications are lodged to these companies. I think that it is then the 
Embassy, the Visa Office, in charge of assessing if this is good or not. In the local context 
this  is  a  procedure  not  appreciated  by  Schengen members.  None  of  us  agrees  with  it  
because we would be faced with the impossibility of having the interview, a very important 
element for us. Thus, the simple examination of the documentation could possibly enable 
us  to  work  better,  work  harder,  but  it  could  not  guarantee  the  effectiveness  of  the 
assessment, analysis, decision on the application. 
29 The owner of the AVA society is the wife of the Portuguese Consul in Dakar.
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In the words of the Prime Chancellor (int. 2):
it is still open the possibility, that since now we have not used but we could do it in the 
future, to outsource even the appointment for legalisation of civil acts and the availability 
of forms and printed information papers at their centre. It is a matter of evaluating if it is  
useful or not, depending on where is this centre, how many centres they have. Since now 
we are not going further.
Furthermore, the Visa Code provides for a close monitoring of external service providers 
by Consulates and foresees spot checks on their activity (art. 43 par. 11, Visa Code). According 
to a report of the local consular cooperation and to the transcript of the Prime Chancellor's  
interview, the last visit without notice to Africatel was made in 2004, and no negative elements 
were reported (int.2):
what  we  found doing  the  inspections  concerns  mainly  how  they  [the  call  centre]  are 
organised,  see how employees  answer a call.  One more thing we did was to  call  them 
(using a  Senegalese from our  staff)  to  verify  ourselves  the timing,  because  one  of  the 
complaints was that the operator keeps you on the phone to make you pay more. We have  
not really found this,  indeed even being there at the call  centre,  we saw that there are 
surges of days or weeks in which a lot of people call and operators were overloaded. So it  
can happen, and it has happened in front of us,  that the operator had to take a pause  
because  he  did  not  know  the  answer.  On the  phone  we  were  generally  given correct 
answers in acceptable times.
Nevertheless (int. 2):
more than one person reported to us about a bribe to fix an appointment sooner, a bribe to  
be sure of the issuing of your visa... false. Because they [external service providers] only fix  
the appointment, then I will decide for the visa. Anyway, in these cases of bribing out of 
visa offices, they even ask money for something they can not really achieve, but the damage  
to image it is done.
Schengen insurance
All typologies of visas required the insurance, thus many societies offer special packages for 
this specific request of visa applicants30. The rate I consider in the estimation of the “price” of 
the visa (Figure 7) is among the cheapest ones. According to my informants with  Prevoyance 
assurance one month is 18,000 CFA and three months 30,000 CFA. Close to the Italian Embassy 
there is  Salama assurance, just around the corner. Here their prices: 13,000 CFA for 15 days; 
21,000 CFA for a month; 55,000 CFA for three months.  “Last minute insurances are always 
made there. You can ask to a  démarcheur to buy it for you. You give him for example 40,000 
CFA for a product that costs 30,000” told me an informant out of the Embassy. 
The Head of the Visa Office in an informal conversation while working argues (int. 1):
we were not able to push further the issue of Schengen insurance in the local cooperation. 
30 E.g. Mondassur, Package Schengen Europe Access: http://www.mondassur.com/devis/schengeurop_access.pdf.
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Brussels foresees black and white lists but here we do not have them. After legal arguments  
with the hospital of B. [name of a city in Italy] because the insurance did not want to pay, 
the hospital called the Embassy to put pressure on the insurance company. We gave notice  
of payment to them otherwise we would have not accepted their insurances within visa 
application anymore. Now we know almost all of them [insurance companies], they are all  
the same. Schengen regulations tell us to read all provisions but we do not do that... only if 
we are looking for faws in the dossier.
Supporting documents 
The Visa Code introduces detailed rules as to the documents which need to be submitted by 
the visa applicant (art.  10). The applicant must appear in person and the following must be 
presented: an application form, as set out in Annex I of the Visa Code; a valid travel document;  
a photo; “supporting documents” as set out in Consulates' forms; travel medical insurance. The 
Code clarifies what “supporting documents” means and sets out a non-exhaustive list in Annex 
II (art. 14). The Visa Code also provides for some fexibility. It established that Consulates may  
waive one or more of the document requirements in the case of applicants “known to them for 
their integrity and reliability” (art. 14 par. 6).
The  list  of  documents  is  very  general  and  each  Consulate  can  discretionally  require  
additional documents that, in some way, confirm the purpose and conditions of the planned 
trip and provide guarantees regarding return and any means of subsistence. Thus, three main 
conditions are to be verified through supporting documents:
(i) purpose of the trip;
(ii) means of subsistence (in general and to cover the trip);
(iii) intention to leave.
The Italian Consulate in Dakar demands a long list of documents, varying according to the 
required  visa,  in  order  to  assess  these  elements  and  their  truthfulness.  According  to  EU 
guidelines the third point (intention to leave) should be assessed with the fight booking and 
previously  issued  visas,  but  according  to  my  fieldwork  experience  I  acknowledged  the 
fundamental role of the interview in assessing the “migration risk” (this aspect will be examined 
in detail later in this document). 
Moreover,  the  long  list  of  supporting  documents  is  due  to  the  high  incidence  of  the 
production of false documents in countries of competence (Gambia and Guinea in particular).  
These  documents  are  called  “original  false”  by consular  officials  because  although  they  are 
authenticated by the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they are clearly false, with stamps 
half copied, not straight collages of pages and other mistakes like these. 
Thus, reminder forms are set out by the Consulate with lists of supporting documents per 
typology of visa and they are available on the Embassy website as well as directly delivered to 
applicants at the counter or at the entrance by security guards. More specifically, three forms 
were available at the time of my fieldwork, listing required documents for: tourism, business, 
and medical treatment (available in the Annexes). 
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Tourism
In order  to  receive  a  tourism visa  the  following are  required:  the  invitation (using the 
Embassy form) accompanied by a copy of the identity card of the inviting/confirmation of the 
hotel  booking  with  cost  per  night;  the  work  contract  of  the  applicant  in  Senegal  (duly 
authenticated  by  the  appropriate  office);  the  registration  certificate  of  the  employer  to  the 
Registry of Commerce; the last three pay-packets; the IPRES card (Institut de prévoyance retraite 
du Sénégal); a bank statement (the required sum of 270 Euros/5 days, plus the cost of the hotel)  
or  chèque voyage or “polizza fidejussoria”  (an Italian bank document for financial guarantee, 
provided by the inviting person in Italy); return fight booking with confirmed dates (receipts of  
the  travel  agency  are  not  accepted);  health  insurance  valid  for  the  Schengen  area,  with  a 
minimum coverage of 30,000 Euros. Each document must be supplied with copies. 
All the required documents concerning the job are essential in order to demonstrate the 
possession of means of subsistence as well as the disinterestedness in migrating to Italy. The 
requirements are very specific in order to assess the veracity of the purpose of the trip. The 
authentication of the work contract as well as the registration certificate of the employer are  
compulsory to avoid frauds, because contracts are frequently drawn up for friends or relatives 
to  facilitate the issuing of  a visa,  though the persons concerned are not  actually  employed. 
Moreover, official documents must be translated, authenticated by the Senegalese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and legalised by the Italian Embassy. Each of these steps has a cost charged to  
the applicant. 
“En général, si les documents à légaliser sont corrects et conformes, l’Ambassade les légalise 
sans problème. Seulement, ils prennent le temps nécessaire pour vérifier l’authenticité des pièces 
fournies.  C’est  pourquoi,  le  retrait  prend près  de  deux semaines”,  states  an applicant  to  the 
Senegalese Press Agency (APS 2009). A spelling mistake is enough to trigger a requirement to  
recompose the whole dossier. It is also worth noting that there are differences among Member 
States in the typologies of visas, and for example Italy does not have the “family visit” short-
term  visa  (like  France)  and  this  type  of  trip  is  considered  as  a  tourism  visa  (not  asking 
certifications of the link with the host).
Figure 7. Estimation of the mean price of a tourism visa.
To calculate the price of the visa all the costs for the dossier that the applicant has to meet  
have to be considered together (Fig. 7). Additionally there are the expenses for the journey (or  
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Call for appointment (Africatel) : 5,000 CFA  
Identity Card (prerequisite for the passport) : 1,000 CFA  
Passport : 20,000 CFA 
Photos : 2,000 CFA  
Schengen insurance : 30,000 CFA  
Visa : 39,360 CFA   
Total = 97,360 CFA
+ Flight : 300,000 – 450,000 CFA
+ Bank amount 
+ Cost of intermediaries
journeys) to the capital and eventual costs of intermediaries.  In Senegal,  the mean monthly 
income amounts to 1,080 US dollars (UNDP, Ministry of Economy and Finance of Senegal 
2010),  about  565,000  CFA.  This  cost  seems  relatively  high,  but  the  polarized  income 
distribution in a country where the human poverty index reaches 41,6% of the population has  
to be underlined (UNDP 2010).
In conclusion, next to economic costs there are also the human costs that applicants must 
face, both in terms of time (travel to Dakar, waiting times) and individually (the psychological 
pressure of being constantly under scrutiny through the process and in any further instance 
when a check takes place).
Business
As regards the business visa, all applicants have to provide for: the invitation of the Italian 
society with the specification of the purpose; return fight booking; confirmation of the hotel  
booking; any invoice from the Italian partner; copies of any Italian or Schengen visas; health 
insurance.
Furthermore, different documents are required for employees and employers. For the latter, 
three documents certifying the existence of the society and bank statements as well as evidence 
of a credit card for means of subsistence are required. Employees have to show documents from 
the employer, the mission order, the contract, the IPRES card, and the last three pay-packets as 
well as the last three bank statements of the employer.
Medical treatment
Embassies reserve a faster track for medical visa applications, assessing these practices as 
soon as possible. On the other hand, they are very strict as regards the documentation which 
must  be  very  clear and precise.  First  of  all,  no treatment  is  available  for free  through the  
National  Health  Care  Service  (Servizio  Sanitario  Nazionale),  so  Regions  or  individuals  are 
responsible for charges, and have to prove ability to pay.
The following items must be presented: medical certification issued by a health centre in the 
country  of  origin describing  the  pathology;  declaration  of  the  chosen Italian health  centre 
indicating the type of treatment, starting date, expected duration and estimated fee; certification 
of  the health centre of the 30% fee deposit.  Moreover the applicant  and the accompanying 
person have to prove their economic means for payment of the medical fee and for any other  
subsistence expenses. As argued by an official in an informal conversation:
in particular the accompanying person's documentation is assessed because of the use of 
this role as a migration channel. Often they are not parents of the patient, but other people.  
They  must  have  the  insurance  and  the  invitation,  then  associations  which  often  are 
intermediaries are in charge of the rest of it (...) There are a lot of children health patients, 
we always facilitate them.
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Timing the queue
After having put together the required dossier and having fixed the appointment, applicants 
have to lodge their form at the Visa Office. The majority of applicants arrive around 8 a.m.  
There is a lot of bustle in the streets around the Embassy at that time: street-sellers of coffee 
(cafè Touba) with their trolleys,  sellers of top-up cards, but above all  many people thronged 
around the télécentre. I will mention three actors which in my opinion characterise applicants' 
experience on entering the Consulate: démarcheurs, security guards and the carabiniere.
Démarcheurs 
During my observation at the Visa Office I acknowledged that manifold forms were filled 
with  the  same  calligraphy,  so  I  asked  applicants  who  had  filled  them out  on  their  behalf.  
Answers were all the same: “Quelqu'un dehors... J'étais pas sur(e) de le remplir correctement/Je 
sais pas écrire”.
Because of the lack of information, the complex procedure and the applicants' lack of skills  
in  facing the  bureaucracy,  “professional”  intermediaries  have  a  wide  margin  of  action.  The 
Embassy is a distant institution considered to be hostile and mediators are welcome helpers. In 
Senegal, they are called démarcheurs, those who find their job in helping applicants dealing with 
the dossier. Alpes (2011) call them “migration brokers”, in her fieldwork study of Cameroon.
Simple  information  and  some help  to  fill  in  the  forms  or  to  purchase  documents  are 
available outside the Embassy in Dakar. As an example, the price asked for filling out the form 
ranges  from 1,000  to  3,000  CFA.  “Nous venons ici  les  matins  pour  expliquer  aux  gens  les 
procédures  et,  parfois,  nous  les  aidons  à  rédiger  les  différentes  demandes  qui  doivent 
accompagner les dossiers, moyennant de l’argent. Mais, nous ne fixons pas de prix, cela dépend 
de la bonne volonté de nos clients”, an anonymous intermediary who works in front of the 
Italian Consulate told the APS (2009). And this is the same answer I got talking with one of  
them. An informant while going out of the Embassy pointed at them, les démarcheurs,  saying: 
“Leur bureau c'est ici. Tu le vois, lui il gagne sa vie comme ça”.
I., démarcheur, who has worked in front of the Italian Embassy for ten years, states:
if you know the steps it's easy, but if you don't it's difficult.  I have contacts with a lot of 
Senegalese in Italy, they call me for the nulla osta, they put me in contact with their wives 
and I explain to them what is required. I fix the appointment and I deal with all the steps. I  
help them even with nulla osta for work visas. I wrote them what they are supposed to have  
and I tell them to bring required documents to me. Often there are mistakes in these kind 
of documents and I do not want to be found guilty, to do everything again and to lose time.  
I do not go to the City Council to ask for documents.
The owner of a copy and translation centre close by the Embassy, underlines the central role 
of intermediaries in dealing with applicants:
the translation of a civil act, one page, costs around 3-5,000 CFA, but if démarcheurs bring 
them [the documents] you have to lowered down the price. They bring you most part of 
the work. My earnings is  due to them, but they gain more. You can take advantage of  
individuals, but not of  démarcheurs. However, the most expensive price is the one of the 
Embassy. A legalisation is around 15,000 CFA. And for diplomas is really expensive.
91
The Prime Chancellor (int. 2), answering my question on the informal market outside of 
the Embassy, argues:
this is normal, this is fine with us. This is clearly a freedom of the individual. We do not 
recognize these intermediaries, because it would be a serious mistake to tell applicants who  
is fine and who is not (...) We prefer to suggets in some cases, as the Italian translations of  
documents to be legalized, to do what they want,  and the important thing is  that they  
provide the translation, not us, because we do not have time, otherwise we have to charge 
them a cost, both in terms of time and money. The requirement is that the act is translated  
into a fuent Italian and it is the corresponding content, without lies. (...) Then, to help the 
public, we have a list in alphabetical order of translators we know, and if applicants ask us,  
we can suggest them to choose randomly among one of them. For us the important thing 
is that the individual has the freedom, if s/he feels better to pay another person to compose  
her/his practice. How much s/he wants to pay is an agreement between them and we do 
not want to interfere, we do not want to establish prices. (...) First of all, I have a relation  
with the person who brings me the act, not with the intermediary or interpreter. Secondly, 
it is to make clear that there are no privileged. We can not prevent anybody from setting up  
a shop in front of the Embassy, making copies and translations, it is clear that with an  
entrepreneurial spirit that is the perfect location, you are on the spot. It is not a crime. We 
can intervene only if those shops start to pass them off as the translation agencies of the  
Embassy or pretending any type of relation with us. 
On the list of translators drafted by the Embassy there is clearly written:
Ces traducteurs ne travaillent pas pour l'Ambassade d'Italie. Aucun responsabilité pour la 
qualité de leur travail et/ou pour les tarifs demandés pourra etre imputé à l'Ambassade 
d'Italie à Dakar.
Security guards
After having  waited  in  the  street,  where  there  is  no shade,  applicants  slowly  enter  the  
courtyard of the Embassy. There is a waiting area outside the Visa Office, under a tent which 
gives some shelter from the sun, a gift from the Anolf Senegal. The time of entries is managed 
by security guards from Sagam, a local security society. Two or three guards are always in the 
box at the entrance. They are actually a sort of front office, which has the list of appointments, 
and they call  applicants from the street and let them enter the courtyard. These tasks allow 
security  guards  to  have  a  wide  discretional  power  over  applicants  and  in  general  their 
involvement in the favours and rewards’ circuits is not unusual.
During a conversation, one of the Sagam guard states that:
the security has no statute, we do not have delegates. The fifteen we had have been fired.  
And if we complain they fire you without any problems, we can not say anything. We have 
very few contributions to the IPRES, we will not have pensions. We work many hours, I 
come at 5 in the morning and I get out at 7 p.m. and we earn a little. Just enough for  
transport and food. 90,000 CFA per month: I pay 30,000 for the rent of the room where I  
live with my girlfriend. In thirteen years of work I should be able to buy a house... but I can  
not even save anything. The problem is the outsourcing, if we were employed directly by 
the  Embassy  we  would  be  better  paid,  but  for  them  the  externalisation  to  Sagam  is 
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convenient. When I am back in the evening I am very tired. I move around all day long 
and I have to talk a lot. My colleague who is not here today is ill, he is too fatigued. When I 
get out I will visit him at home, I do not even know if he is at the hospital.
Finally, the Prime Chancellor on the Sagam and the rotation of guards (int. 2):
the contract is signed by the Embassy with the security company and it is usually a good 
practice to require a rotation. Whether this specific clause is required by the Embassy or 
the Sagam I do not know. (…) From our point of view, on the one hand it is good to have 
the rotation because it is less likely to leave margin for situations in which guards create 
their networks that we obviously do not like, for the external image [of the Embassy] as 
well as for the risk of meddling. On the other hand, at least from the side of security of the 
Embassy,  in  a  wide  sense,  it  is  useful  to  have  people  who  hand  down  knowledge  to  
newcomers, having people who are familiar with the environment, the threats... it is an  
advantage if you trust them and it is a shame to see them go away and have to start again to  
teach to the new ones. 
Carabiniere
An Italian carabiniere (a member of the militarised branch of the police force) is placed at 
the  entrance  of  the  Embassy  and  checks  on  the  regular  entries  and  also  on  any  suspect  
movement. As I observe, the carabiniere actually does front office activities, coming in the Visa 
Office  with  documents  and  passports,  asking  questions,  giving  information.  He  is  not 
competent in the field of Consular practices but his role is to keep order in the waiting area,  
thus he acts  as a sort of filter between applicants and the Visa Office.  “The Italian uniform 
makes Senegalese feel uncomfortable. Local guards can be bribed anyway”, argues the Prime 
Chancellor. 
The Prime Chancellor answering my question regarding Sagam guards,  démarcheurs and 
the carabiniere states that (int. 2):
they act as a front-front office. The carabiniere is in charge of the security of the post. The 
definition of security entails control on access as well as public order, in front of and inside  
the Embassy. Thus it is a practice to use the carabiniere to verify the ordered entrance of 
the queue, according to rules and without illegal traffics out of the Embassy. In order to do 
that there are Sagam guards as well (…) to verify that who enter has the right appointment,  
how it was fixed. (…) The carabiniere must control that neither Sagam employees nor  
anyone else is involved in illegal traffics.
Moreover,  it  is  the  carabiniere who distributes  numbers  for  queuing  at  the  legalisation 
office. Recently he started asking for identity cards while delivering numbers because the small  
pink slips were being collected by a few people and then sold for 8,000 CFA later on. 
To conclude, obstacles at the entry of the Visa Office allow for the development of filters as 
well as informality zones. During my fieldwork in the informal area outside of the Embassy I 





At the counter: interview and note-taking
Member States are responsible for organising the visa sections of their Consulates (art. 37 
Visa  Code)  and  thus  each  Embassy  decides  for  its  structure.  The  Consulate  can  also  be 
separated from the Embassy, as in Tunis, where it is located in a distant neighbourhood; or it 
can be in the same building of the Embassy, as in Dakar or Tripoli. 
The Visa Office at the Italian Embassy in Dakar has three front offices, two of them for all 
types of visas and the other one reserved for family reunification. It should be pointed out that  
the  Consulate  had  another  front  office,  reserved  for business  visas  and working  under  the 
authority of  the  Commercial  Office,  located next to  the  Embassy  building.  A fast  track for 
people well-known by the Embassy – mainly managers of companies trading between Senegal 
and Italy – was provided via this route. This was done so that these individuals do not mingle 
with other applicants and their procedure was progressed more rapidly. The appointments for 
those to be processed via this route were fixed by telephone directly with the official in charge of 
the Commercial Office. The interview, and even the assessment of the relevant documents and 
the purpose of the travel, was done at the desk, with the applicant being invited to sit down and  
generally  s/he  already  knew  the  official.  In  2011  the  official  in  charge  of  this  process  was 
relocated, so this counter has now been closed.
The applicant must be alone at the counter, and the presence of accompanying people is not 
usually accepted, unless the applicant is unable to deal with the interview. Dossier, passport and 
the fee of 39,360 CFA (60 Euros, not refundable in case of refusal) are delivered to the official on 
the other side of the counter. The language is usually French but if the person does not speak it, 
officials shift to Wolof (the main dialect in Senegal).  The Italian language is only used with 
applicants for a re-entry visa31, because they have held a stay permit in Italy and thus they are 
supposed to be able to speak the language.
First  of  all  the  official  checks  the  dossier,  in  order  to  verify  the  admissibility  of  the 
application (art. 19 Visa Code), and this entails a check for the presence of the items referred to 
in article 10 par.  3 from (a) to (c): application form, travel document,  photo. At the Italian 
Embassy in Dakar a “good practice” had been adopted in order to avoid unnecessary work on 
dossiers which would be later refused. This involves a quick check on the entire dossier by the 
official, which includes the supporting documents, and s/he can suggest to the applicants that  
they complete the dossier with other documents or that they do not lodge it at all. Anyway, the 
31 The visa for re-entry covers those cases of foreigners regularly staying in Italy who have an expired or lost stay  
permit. If the stay permit has expired less than 60 days previously, the Consulate can autonomously issue the visa.  
Otherwise, if the stay permit has been lost or expired for more than 60 days, an authorisation from the competent  
police headquarters (questura) is required. And these are the majority of cases: people trying to leave after months 
or years.
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applicant does have the right to lodge the dossier and the official cannot refuse to accept it for  
scrutiny.
An application file in the L-Vis is then created: basic data is entered at the counter, while the 
remainder will be added later in the back-office work. The applicant is then questioned in order 
to verify his/her “reliability” and to estimate the migration risk.  S/he is  required to explain 
exactly what s/he is going to do in Italy (this is to check for correspondence of the type of visa  
requested with the  purpose of  the trip),  previous  working experiences,  contacts  with those 
inviting them to Italy, their own family situation – marriage and sons are not certain to prevent 
migration, but they are a factor in “assessing the risk”. Even the age of applicants is assessed 
(“Young people are more of a risk”,  an official  told me) and also whether or not they have  
previously obtained Schengen visas is taken into account. Some extracts from my research notes 
as regards interviews for tourism visas32:
(M, 1984)
What is your job? Artist. That is? In which group? Since when? Have you travelled with the 
group? What do you have as professional documents? (He brings out fyers and a brochure 
of the group, pictures of concerts...) Have you a contract? No, I work on a fee basis. Where 
do you play in Dakar? And if you leave for 3 months how do you deal with the group? We 
are many people, no problem...
Did you get any other visas with us? Why do you want to go to Italy? Work or tourism?
But you are not going with the group? So is it for personal reason?
Have you got a personal bank account? No, fideiussione [“polizza fidejussoria” as financial 
guarantee].
He has the invitation of a friend. Who is she? What does she do? Swimming trainer. He has 
the wrong invitation letter, there is a new one, she has to fill it and to send it back. Leaving  
the 8th is not possible. You have to postpone the fight. The 7 th is holiday. It would be better 
to leave the 10th or the 11th. He has a refusal from France. Why? I don't know. We will ask to 
France.
(F, 1984)
What do you do? I study, I'm not working yet. I have an accounting diploma.
Why do you want to go to Italy? Why did you choose it?
Two months it's a long time. Have you any economic guarantees? Who is in charge of you? 
Are you married? Aren't you going there to seek a job? I'm going to refresh my ideas...
You do nothing here... who can tell me you are coming back? 
Did you read the list of required documents for a tourism visa? Yes.
I just wanted to be sure she read the list. Then I won't ask her anything more, it will be a  
32 In brackets the sex and the year of birth, then official's questions and remarks. Applicant's words are in italic. The  
original version as follows:
(M, 1984) Cosa fate come mestiere? Artista. E sarebbe? In quale gruppo? Da quanto? Avete viaggiato col gruppo? Come 
documentazione professionale cosa avete? (porta depliants e brochure del gruppo, foto di  concerti...) Avete  un 
contratto? No, pagato a cachet. Dove suonate a Dakar? E se partite 3 mesi come fate col gruppo? Siamo tanti, non c’è  
problema...  Con noi avete avuto altri visti? Perché volete andare in Italia? Lavoro o turismo? Ma non andate col 
gruppo? Quindi è per motivi personali?  Avete conto personale?  No, fideiussione.  Ha l'invito di un’amica. Chi è? 
Cosa fa? Insegnante di nuoto. Ha sbagliato formulario d’invito, c’è quello nuovo, se lo deve far compilare e rispedire 
via fax. Partire l’8 non è possibile. Spostate il volo. Il 7 è festa. 10-11 la partenza andrebbe meglio. Ha un VSU 
rifiutato dalla Francia. Perché? Non so. Semmai chiederemo alla Francia.
(F, 1984)  Cosa fate?  Studio, non lavoro ancora. Ho il diploma di contabilità. Perché vuoi andare in Italia? Perché l'hai 
scelta? Due mesi è un periodo lungo. Hai delle garanzie economiche? Chi ti finanzia? Sei sposata?  Non vai là a 
cercare  lavoro?  Vado a  rinfrescarmi  le  idee...  Non fai  niente  qui,  chi  mi  dice  che  torni?  Hai  letto  la  lista  dei 
documenti che servono per un visto di turismo? Sì. Volevo solo assicurarmi che avesse letto la lista. Allora non gli 
chiedo altro, tanto sarà un rifiuto. Non chiediamo più i complement, uno si deve informare prima.
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refusal.  We  are  not  asking  to  complete  the  dossier  anymore,  applicants  must  collect 
information before.
As far as I observed, suspicion is the default approach and economic guarantees are the 
most important criteria for the issuance of the visa. Officials are obsessively focused on “why do  
you want to go to Italy?” and a blurred answer is not accepted. Simply going on holiday or 
“refreshing ideas” is not possible if you do not have enough money according to the published 
table (see Table 4, Ch. 4).
For the business visa the interview is very specific on job details, to check the truthfulness 
of  the  applicant.  “How long  have  you been working  with the  company? How long is  your 
contract? How much do you earn? Who is your partner in Italy? Why are you going there? 
What kind of business is it?” are some examples of questions.
During or just after the interview, the official notes down, in the margin of the form, the 
assessments based on the answers of  the applicant.  Some extracts  from my fieldwork notes 
reporting officials' impressions written in the margin of the forms:
(F 1981, student, business visa) She declares she has completed her university studies and 
she is going to visit her cousin, she has a fideiussione. Risky. She does not give guarantees of  
return to the country of origin.
(M 1981, technician, tourism visa) He has a refusal by us 6 months ago. He cannot really  
explain his job and he declares an intention to go to a training session while asking for a 
tourism visa. Not coherent. Risky.
(F 1987, hairdresser, tourism visa) She got to know the person inviting her via the internet 
by, sending a picture. High migration risk. She can't explain who Madame G. is (payments 
on her account).
(F 1980, trader, tourism visa) She declares to have been invited by a friend of a friend... not 
reliable.33
“Risky”, “not reliable”, “not coherent” are the terms most used for unconvincing people who 
will probably get a refusal. Judgments on the person's intentions stem from the interview, which 
is why, according to both my interviewees, it has a central function (int.1):
[the interview at the counter] is a part of the evaluation which has a relevant weight as far  
as the documentation is correct but non-exhaustive or if it leaves a margin for doubts. The 
assessment  at  the  counter  adds  that  element  which  enables  [officials]  to  understand.  
Because the interview enables us to get to grips with some things, sometimes the applicant 
mentions elements  which make the difference.  For example:  the interviewee asks for a 
tourism visa  but  from the interview it  emerges  that  s/he  has  family  in Italy,  wife  and 
children or husband and children. Then it's clear s/he could have a different purpose for 
the  trip  from the  one  of  tourism required,  for  example.  Thus the  interviewer  tries  to  
understand the real purpose of the trip, which has to be coherent with the documentation 
in the application, and at the same time to understand if the person is reliable or not. 
33 In brackets the sex, the year of birth, the occupation and the type of visa requested, followed by annotations of the  
official. The original version as follows:
(F 1981,  étudiante,  visa  AFF) Dichiara  di  avere  finito  il  ciclo universitario  e  di  andare dal  cugino,  titolare  di  
fideiussione. A rischio. Non da garanzie di rientro in patria.
(M 1981, technicien, visa TUR)  Ha avuto un ns rifiuto 6 mesi fa. Non riesce a spiegare il suo lavoro e dichiara di  
andare a una formazione chiedendo un visto per turismo. Non è coerente. A rischio.
(F 1987, coiffeuse, visa TUR) Conosciuto invitante su internet inviando fotografia. Ad alto rischio migratorio. Non  
sa spiegare chi è madame g. (versamenti sul suo conto). 
(F 1980, commerçante, visa TUR) Dichiara di essere invitata dall'amico dell'amico... non affidabile.
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Someone who is not looking in your eyes sometimes has something to hide. Someone who 
does not even know the trip purpose has something to hide, someone who does not know  
his own bank account, how many money he has, etc... thus the interview is very important.
In the words of the Prime Chancellor, the counter allows for fexibility in the assessment, it  
enables officials not to rely strict in scheme criteria and document checks, but to assess each 
case individually (int. 2):
even if we always try to codify, in fact it is  often better lo leave it [the list of required  
documents] non exhaustive, both for the applicant and the official, so that you can adapt to  
the situation. If the person is able to produce evidences which according to us reduce the 
migration risk in a way which we might not have foreseen, it is a help for us and for the  
applicant. That is  why the counter is  fundamental,  because there we ask questions, the 
person can say something we did not even think to ask for, and at the end we will have a  
zero migration risk.
Investigating behind documents and statements in quest of the “truth” seems to be the aim 
of the interview, thus the fieldwork outcomes seem to fit in Dubois's politique du guichet (2010) 
where:
le guichet n'est donc pas seulement le point de contact nécessaire entre les politiques et les  
populations qu'elles visent (les politiques au guichet). Il constitue aussi le lieu sur lequel 
repose le mode opératoire d'une intervention publique visant à réguler ces populations (les  
politiques du guichet).
The operational intervention stems from the counter experience, where the requirements of 
law are adapted to the individual case and considered in the light of “practical  knowledge”.  
According to both my observations and interviewees there is an informal knowledge developed 
through experience and shared views among diplomats and officials, which is called upon in 
order to deal with the daily work in the local context (Triandafyllidou 2003). In the words of the 
Head of the Visa Office (int. 1):
after  two years  dealing specifically  with visas  I  am able to  say “this is  a  visa to reject,  
documentation is all false”... because by now it is clear, by now we know it.
Evaluation of the dossier - Issuance - Refusal
 
After the lodging of the dossier, the Italian Consulate in Dakar, as per common Schengen 
practice,  holds  the  passport  of  the  applicant  during  the  evaluation,  in  order  to  avoid 
applications in other Consulates. Such procedure is not codified by law, but it occurs in some 
African States. A receipt is issued and the applicant is called to an appointment after one or two 
weeks for the withdrawal of the passport. 
The evaluation of the dossier is at the discretion of the permanent staff (two officials at the  
Embassy in Dakar) who also consider any indications and comments noted down by officials at  
the front office. Moreover, the Head of the Visa Office is authorised to hold an additional in-
depth personal interview with applicants in case of doubts, but in practice this option is only  
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only exercised in extremely important cases. As an example, sometimes the Embassy is not sure 
about the reliability of family members of persons who are members of governments - since 
there have been frauds of applicants presenting them as members of Ministries travelling with 
their families or employees - so in this case the situation needs to be clear and the interview is  
required.
Assessing the migratory risk
In the afternoon, as part of the back office work, applications are assessed by the Head of  
the Visa Office. All documents and economic guarantees are checked, including salary amount 
and  retirement  contributions.  Bank  accounts  are  sometimes  verified  by  calling  the  bank 
directly. “Over the years we learned to understand Senegalese bureaucracy” - states the Head of 
the office while examining a dossier - “you act as a policeman, which is not my job, I am an 
administrative official”.
However,  the  main  issue  at  stake  in  the  decision  process  for  Schengen  visas  is  the 
assessment of the intention to leave the territory of the Member State and to go back to the 
country of origin at the expiration of the visa: the “migratory risk” mentioned in the Visa Code. 
In 2008, the EU Commission listed some factors that could be used to determine which  
travellers could be determined as “low risk”. A traveller was seen as bona fide when s/he travels 
frequently to the Schengen area for legitimate reasons (for instance travelling on business), has  
a reliable travel  history (the person respects the conditions for their length of stay on each 
occasion), has proof of sufficient means of subsistence, and holds a biometric passport (COM 
(2008) 69: 6). According to the Head of the Visa Office in Dakar (int. 1):
this is a country with a very high migration risk, we know it. We know it because there are  
a  lot  of  citizens  of  countries  of  our  competence  who  are  irregularly  staying  in  Italy, 
Senegalese in particular. We know it through our experience in the field of visas, because  
we see what kind of documentation is presented with visa applications, we see which and  
how  many people  do  not  show up if  they  are  asked  to  return as  part  of  our  control  
procedure (…) thus one of the main criteria of assessing the Schengen visa is that one [the  
migratory risk].
As an example of “migratory risk” (int. 1):
take the case of a wife with a baby who wants to go on holiday to visit her husband living  
in Italy. It is clear she is at risk. You can say “why is she not using the family reunification?” 
but it is sensible to assume that she and the baby are going to visit the husband abroad,  
why not? I would do the same, if I had a husband abroad, I would visit him for 15 or 20  
days during the summer. Legitimate, isn't it? Very legitimate. Then they did not come back.  
If this was another country, another world, you would do this visa extremely easily. Here 
you do it with thousands of perplexities. Your decision stems from the interview, you ask 
to your colleague “what do you think?”. You issue it. And then she does not come back. 
You maybe refused the visa to the one who would have come back. This is frustrating, the  
effort and the difficulty of really understanding, because you cannot enter into the heads of  
people, you have to make an evaluation sometimes with few elements, because you cannot  
even go into greater depth.
An instrument used by Embassies to predict the migratory risk is the lists of people to be  
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signalled because they travel with someone who did not come back, or have any other known 
reasons for being “risky”. In Chapter Four I called these the mala fide lists, while in the wording 
of the Prime Chancellor (int. 2):
they are called “black list”. On the other side, we include in a “white list” those people who 
from experience we believe to be reliable, those we can dedicate a treatment not of favor,  
but  at  least  they  have  demonstrated  to  be  reliable  people,  who  have  never  created 
problems, indeed perhaps they distinguished themselves. Those lists are for internal use. 
The basic principle is that it is a good practice to pass the knowledge, because it happens 
that the person knows he has been identified so he stays quiet for two or three years, here it  
happens often. Then they know that there is a new Chancellor, and they immediately come 
with the hope of having been forgotten. The other underlying principle, however, is that 
reporting on this black list does not automatically constitute a denial of a visa. Each new 
application will be considered exactly as if it was a new request, with any connection with  
what has happened in the past. Nevertheless, it is in fact good practice to share names and 
reasons of refusals with other Embassies, as well as it is a good practice to point out that  
the  person  in  question  was  either  suspected  or  identified  as  a  smuggler  or  as  an 
intermediary for requests for visas that have not had a happy ending. 
Thus,  at  the Embassy in  Dakar lists  of football  clubs,  marabouts,  and people  acting as  
passeurs  are  maintained  by  officials  and  the  Head  of  the  Visa  Office.  Athletes  and  artists, 
students  and  unemployed  people  are  categories  considered  as  “risky  fows”,  not-trusted 
travellers, those who will not come back. Using past experiences and idealised characteristics, a  
mechanism of profiling takes place to predict a person's likely behaviour (Gammeltoft-Hansen 
2006). As regards artists for example (int. 1):
here an event is enough for... any event. Think about Terramadre [a meeting taking place in 
Italy]  for  example.  Famous  event.  Every  two years  this  event  takes  place,  around two 
thousand people, we are asked for a lot of visas. Do you think they will come back? No, but  
everybody knows, everybody knows that these people do not come back. Last year I tried 
to track these returns, but it is impossible, amazing. As you try to get guarantees... people 
run away. These events are the best opportunities to join groups and run away. We have the 
problem of groups of artists... this is a beautiful attempt ever. Of course we hardly ever 
issue visas to these people, we try to be as strict as possible.. but how many people try. Now 
the Senegalese community in Italy is big, so contacts are not an issue.
During my fieldwork at the counter I came to acknowledge the “phenomena of footballers”. 
Managers of Italian sports clubs go to Senegal to look for young talents, and then they want  
them to go to Italy for a test. These footballers are obviously “suspected” since they are very 
young  (14-18  years  old)  and often without  economic  guarantees.  While  responding  to  my 
question on the topic, the Head of the office argues (int. 1):
we tried to put up resistance [against visas to young footballers]. The resistance, however,  
cannot be pursued beyond a certain limit. Sports clubs are powerful, they reach high levels 
and the resistance then becomes hard. I must say that for a guy to get an engagement with 
a club means to really change his life. The problem is that we are not always sure that they 
[football clubs] will take care of them. For this reason we try to do continuous monitoring,  
to understand which is the serious club, the one that made them come back, but to keep up 
with all this becomes an infinite work that we cannot do. By now, who has gone, has gone; 
who has not returned, has not returned. Then of course next year I will not give visas to 
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this or that club anymore because they did not bring the boys back, but in the meantime  
how many fown? This is our problem: we are here to curb something, but in fact we curb  
very little.
The same suspicion emerges towards other athletes, in particular I want to mention lutteurs  
(wrestlers). Senegalese wrestling (lutte Senegalaise) is a type of wrestling traditionally performed 
by the community of  Serer and it is a national sport in Senegal and parts of Gambia. Thus,  
Senegalese  wrestlers  -  young and usually  without  economic  guarantees,  as  footballers  -  are 
invited to participate in sport competition or festivals to perform this particular fight, and it is  
not so easy for the Embassy to refuse these visas.
The role of officials
The general  rule provides that employees  of the Visa Office must be Schengen citizens, 
assuming that this will limit any corruption. However, it is in fact, more practical for Consulates 
to have officials who speak local languages. Therefore, there are often exceptions to the rule,  
usually with the recruitment of staff with a good knowledge of Italian, people who have dual  
nationality or who have studied in Italy, as is the case with the Italian Consulate in Dakar.  
As regards the training, it is directly “on the job” (int. 2):
the experience of the official at the counter is fundamental, the knowledge of the country  
and  of  the  economic,  juridical  and  cultural  system.  His  mental  fexibility  is  also 
fundamental, in the sense of understanding if the person is lying or telling the truth from 
what s/he says, how s/he says it,  from counterchecks that only a person who knows the  
country  can  ask.  Annotations  during  and  after  the  interview  are  proof  of  this.  We 
encourage people to write down what they really think, there is no responsibility from 
their part for what they write, those are their impressions so they can be wrong. This will  
not entail any consequences, the important thing is to have them [annotations] because the  
person who will evaluate the application is not the same person who receives the dossier, 
so s/he must be helped, s/he has to know things s/he did not see, from someone who has 
ten  years  of  experience  in  the  country,  while  perhaps  the  person who  will  assess  the  
application being an official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is at that Embassy for  
one, two or three years... it's not the same thing. Then the official who is evaluating it can  
ask the colleague at the counter to clarify what s/he wrote, to understand why.
Thus, such an official is considered as a sort of insider in the local context, who can give  
useful  insights  on  applicants'  intentions.  The  decision-making  process  starts  with  their 
impressions at the counter (“they are a first filter” states the Prime Chancellor) and it ends with 
the decision of the Head of the office as regards the issuing of the visa or not (int. 1):
it is never a mechanical process. We cannot say “bring this document, it is fine”, “you have  
all the documents, you have the visa/you have not all the documents, you will not have the  
visa”, because sometimes documents are false, there a lot of them, so even if someone has 
every required document they are not  reliable, thus he will  not have the visa.  Perhaps  
someone does not have a document but the dossier and the interview are convincing so the  
visa is issued, thus it is really an evaluation, linked to the discretion of whoever is in charge  
of it.
In concrete terms, officials draw up their evaluation according to their impression at the 
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counter as well  as applicant's answers, and the Head of the office in charge for the decision 
usually recognises the aforementioned “suggestion”, hardly questioning them. This process of  
bottom-up policy-making recalls the notion of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) where the 
implementation of policy in the end comes down to the people who actually implement it.  
Holding a relatively high degree of discretion enables street-level bureaucrats to make  ad hoc 
decisions and policy changes. Lipsky asserts that discretion is a relative concept accorded to 
street-level bureaucrats, since their work often demands a human dimension and self-direction 
(int. 2):
it's up to the evaluator of second instance to know whose are the impressions, and for that  
we sign annotations, because if you know the person you know s/he is stricter or... it is a 
personal work between the evaluator and the official at the counter. I personally do not  
often level out on the evaluation of the official at the counter, I consider it. Because it has to  
put me on the track of things that I do not see by looking at the paper. It must put me on  
the right track, but then I have to assess - me or the person who evaluates and then signs -  
because there is  the responsibility of signing.  That is  why it  is  also important that the 
responsibility lies with those who sign, not with the person who took part in the exchange 
at the counter. Obviously there is an element of subjectivity in these assessments, there is 
no other way. There is  an element of subjectivity in trying to find out documentary or  
concrete evidence on suspects that may originate at the counter. So, risk of subjectivity? 
Yes, there is.
According to Lipsky, the value of discretion is in the ability to have disparity in perceptions 
of one situation and subsequently interpret policies as is deemed fit, and I do think this is the 
case  for  officials  in  Consulates.  The separation  of  reception and evaluation  duties  to  avoid 
corruption  and  bargaining  actually  leaves  spaces  for  strong  and  adverse  feelings  towards 
applicants to grow. 
“There is an element of subjectivity in these assessments, there is no other way”, argues the 
Prime Chancellor in Dakar. It is the process itself which is based on assessments and subjective 
impressions, relying on blurred profiles to classify who is reliable/who is risky. Thus, there is a 
risk of bias and discrimination based on social extraction, gender, age, origin (both in terms of 
country and milieu, i.e. urban/rural) and all the other elements which come into play in the 
very precise moment of the interview.
Control on return
After the evaluation, if the visa is issued, a sticker is printed and pasted on the passport, on 
the page where the Consulate put the stamp at the lodging of the application. Then an embossed 
stamp, an inked stamp and the signature of the official responsible for that visa are all needed to  
confirm its validity. 
In a case where the visa is issued but there are doubts about the applicant's reliability, the 
Visa Office can impose the “control at return”. It is basically a request to invite the applicant to 
present himself  at  the Embassy at return from the trip.  This mechanism is  not foreseen by 
Schengen law, and is a bureaucratic response to a message distributed by the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign  Affairs  in  2005  and is  actually  used  by  manifold  Consulates  in  African  countries. 
France also uses the control au retour in countries presenting a “migratory risk” and according 
to the last report of the French Cour des Comptes (2013: 53):
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faute du module intégré RMV 2, pourtant prévu par l’arrêté du 22 août 2001, les contrôles 
sont  effectués  à  partir  de  fichiers  manuels  ou  d’applications  bureautiques  ad  hoc 
nécessitant une double saisie. 
Nevertheless, in the RMV as well as in the L-Vis there is a space to fill in with an ambiguous 
“date  of  presentation”,  which  is  probably  the  evidence  of  the  intention  of  regulating  this 
bureaucratic step. When the control at return is required by the Italian Embassy in Dakar, three  
copies of a letter are to be signed by the applicant:
Madame / Monsieur,
à la suite de la délivrance d’un visa Schengen à votre nom, vous êtes prié/e de bien vouloir 
vous présenter personnellement à cette Ambassade dans les dix jours suivants votre retour  
(au plus tard le dd.mm.yyyy). Nous vous informons que, dans le cas échéant, l’Ambassade 
d’Italie est tenue, sur la base des dispositions en vigueur, à signaler votre non retour aux 
autorités Italiennes compétentes.
Salutations distinguées. Le Fonctionnaire Délégué 
Moreover, a small piece of paper with the stamp of the Embassy bearing the text “Present 
yourself  at  the  Embassy  in  the  ten  days  after  your  return”  is  pinned on the  passport.  The 
“appropriate Italian authorities” the embassy has to report to concerning the (supposed) non 
return are the police headquarters (questure) of the province of destination of the traveller.
At the end of the month, the Embassy prints the list of people who were signalled to be 
controlled at return and, in theory, officials should call mobile phones to check if these people 
are actually back or not, asking them to show up at the Embassy as requested. In fact, officials  
often have no time to verify returns, so this work is usually done after a period of two or three  
months after the fixed date of presentation has elapsed. After a few attempts, if the mobile is 
always closed, then the following letter is sent to the questura:
Si segnala, per gli opportuni seguiti del caso, che il cittadino senegalese ..., nato il … a … 
(Senegal), titolare di visto di ingresso in Italia per ..., rilasciato da questa Ambasciata il ...  
per la durata di ... giorni (sticker n. ... apposto su passaporto senegalese n. ...) non si è qui 
presentato  per il  controllo al  rientro come richiestogli  da questa  Ambasciata.  Predetto 
doveva recarsi da ..., residente in via ... a ..., … . Ambasciata d'Italia Dakar34
Examples of officials' annotations on the visa form in cases of request of control at return 
show us the typologies of suspicion directed towards various type of people:
· (F 1980, Guinea C, secretary) She declares to go to Italy for the time when her nephew's  
wife is due to give birth. She declares to be a secretary, married, with a daughter. She has 
no intention of staying in Italy. Obligation to present herself.
· (F 1982, Mauritania, tour operator) Tour operator in a camping facility. Girlfriend of a 
seasonal worker (the host). She is going on holiday since the camping facility is closed 
during the summer. 1st usv [uniform Schengen visa], with obligation to present herself.
· (F 1982, trader) Wife of Mr. S. She is going to Italy for her wedding trip.
· (M 1993, footballer) He is going to Vicenza for some tests. He already had a visa from us.
34 “We report, for the appropriate following up of the case, that the Senegalese citizen ..., born the … in … (Senegal),  
holding an entry visa for Italy for ..., issued by this Embassy the ... for the duration of ... days (sticker n. ... affixed on  
Senegalese passport n. ...) has not presented himself for the control at return as requested by this embassy. S/he was  
supposed to be hosted by ..., resident in ... a ..., [information on the host]. Embassy of Italy in Dakar”.
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· (M 1987, trader) Trader who would like to visit his brother in Bologna. Invited by his 
sister-in-law. The purpose of the trip is not very clear.
· (M 1987) young disciple who will go with the teacher, a religious leader. Very young. At  
risk!! 1st usv. → If he does not come back, the marabout35 is on the black list.
· (M 1995) Young footballer going to Italy for a second test. However still control at return.
· (M 1968) Music player working with a famous singer. Charged to the singer. Obligation to  
present himself.
· (M 1995) Young footballer going to Italy for a one month test → let's try.
· (F 1982, tailor) Invited by a friend met here in Senegal. Sufficient requirements. Control 
at return.
· (M 1990) He plays in the club … since 3 years. To be assessed → ok because the host  
seems to have understood.
· (M 1994) Young footballer in a club in Thiès. Going to Italy for a test. His father is sick,  
the mother did present herself here → the society has already behaved in a serious way.  
Control at return.
· (F 1979, hairdresser) 1st usv. She declares herself to be the cousin of the host's husband. 
Hairdresser with a low revenue. Profile at risk. The host assures the return, declaring she 
has already invited her mother-in-law who came back and also another sister-in-law. To be 
assessed with control at return → She shows up at the counter with the host, we trust her –  
with verification.36
My annotations of applicants' details for the examples above (male/female; year of birth; 
job) are included in the brackets,  and are followed by the annotations  of the official  at  the  
counter. The comments of the Head of the Visa Office who decides for the visa are included 
after the  arrow symbol.  As  far  as  I  could perceive,  the  Consulate places  stress  upon a few 
elements  such  as  age  and  marital  status  of  the  applicant;  employment  and  economic 
requirements; previous Schengen visas obtained, and the reliability of the host. Anyway, the 
most important issue is the economic requirement, without which it is impossible to get a visa.
Furthermore,  the  migratory  risk  should  not  be  assessed  in  cases  of  applicants  for  a 
Schengen visa who could have applied for the family reunification or who are relatives up to the 
second degree with the host (it was the fourth degree until the Security Package came into force 
35 The marabout is a Muslim religious teacher and leader.
36 Original version (fieldwork's notes): 
· F 1980, Guinea C, sécretaire: Dichiara di recarsi per il parto della moglie del nipote. Dichiara di essere segretaria,  
sposata con figlia. Non ha intenzione di rimanere in Italia. Obbligo di ripresentarsi.
· F 1982, Mauritania, operatrice turistica: Operatrice turistica presso camping. Fidanzata a impiegato stagionale  
(invitante). Si reca in vacanza visto che camping non operativo in estate. 1° vsu, con obbligo di ripresentarsi.
· F 1982, commerçante: moglie del signor S. Si reca in Italia in viaggio di nozze.
· M 1993, footballeur. Deve recarsi a Vicenza per provini. Ha già avuto un visto ns.
· M 1987, commerçant: commerciante che vorrebbe recarsi a Bologna dal fratello. Invitato dalla cognata. Scopo del  
viaggio poco chiaro.
· M 1987: piccolo discepolo che accompagna il maestro capo religioso. Molto giovane. A rischio!! 1° vsu. → Se non  
torna, il marabout è nella lista nera.
· M 1995: giovane calciatore si reca in Italia per secondo provino. Comunque sempre controllo al ritorno.
· M 1968: musicista di nota cantante. Presa in carico della cantante. Obbligo di ripresentarsi.
· M 1995: giovane calciatore si reca in Italia per provino di 1 mese → proviamo.
· F 1982 couturière: invitata dall'amica conosciuta qui in Senegal. Requisiti sufficienti. Controllo al rientro.
· M 1990 gioca nel club ... da 3 anni. Da valutare → ok perché invitante sembra aver capito.
· M 1994: giovane calciatore in un club di Thiès. Si reca in Italia per provino. Padre è ammalato. La madre si è  
presentata → la società si è già comportata seriamente (GP). Verifica al rientro.
·  F 1979 coiffeuse. 1° vsu. Dichiara di  essere  cugina del  marito dell'invitante. Parrucchiera con scarso reddito.  
Profilo a rischio. L'invitante garantisce il ritorno. Dichiara di aver già invitato la suocera che è tornata e anche una  
cognata. Da valutare con obbligo di ripr. → si è presentata allo sportello con invitante, ci fidiamo-con verifica (GP)
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in 2010). In the following examples of annotations, the applicant is a relative (up to second 
degree) of the host, and so the visa is almost always issued but as there is still mistrust and the  
need for control, the presentation at return is requested:
· She declares to be a tailor, invited by her brother. Lack of economic requirements. Control  
at return.
· Student in informatics. Lack of economic requirements. She brings all the documents of 
her husband. All seems false [literally: produced] 1 st usv. Control at return.
· (M 1994) Going to his brother, married to an Italian citizen. Migratory risk. He is a young  
boy.
· (F 1965) Housewife who is going to Italy to visit her husband for 3 months. The husband 
has been in Italy since 2 years. Obligation to present herself at return.
· (F 1996, student) Minor. His mother lives in Italy. The father has died. He is going on  
holiday.
· (M 1997) Student who would like to spend holidays with his mother. Good impression at  
the counter. We trust him.
· (M 1992, student) He is going to visit his uncle, employee at the Senegalese Embassy at  
the Holy See.
·  (F  1938)  Mother  who  has  some  sons  in  Italy.  She  already  got  a  refusal  for  family 
reunification. Now she is asking for a tourism visa for a vacation.37
Refusals
Until  April  2010 Italy did not produce justifications for the majority of Schengen visas'  
refusals,  although according to Italian law there  was  a  right  to  appeal  within sixty  days  of  
notification, at the Regional Administrative Court (T.A.R.) of Latium. Only the refusal of visas 
for family reunification, work, medical care and study needed to be justified. According to the 
Consolidated Act article 4 par. 2 “it is not obligatory to specify the grounds for denial of entry  
visas, except with regard to visa applications covered by articles 22, 24, 26-29, 36 e 39” (referring 
to applications regarding visas for work, joining family members, medical treatment or study).
Since 2010, the Visa Code has required the justification and notification of the refusal for all 
visas with the “standard form for notifying and motivating the refusal, annulment or revocation 
of a visa” (annex VI), according to the “entry conditions” provided by article 5 of the Schengen 
Borders Code. 
In the Schengen form at the Italian Embassy in Dakar (available in the Annexes), the first 
lines (number of protocol, visa application number, date...) stem from local cooperation, and 
the final part concerns the appeal according to Italian law. Three copies of the form are inside 
the  passport,  and  when  the  applicant  comes  to  the  counter  the  official  does  not  explain 
37 Original version (fieldwork's notes):
· Dichiara di essere una sarta, invitata dal fratello. Mancanza dei requisiti economici. Controllo al ritorno.
· Studentessa in informatica. Mancanza dei requisiti economici. Porta tutti i documenti del marito. Sembra tutto 
fabbricato. 1° vsu. Controllo al ritorno.
· M 1994: si reca dal fratello sposato a cittadina italiana. Rischio migratorio. E' un ragazzino.
· F 1965 menagère: casalinga si reca in Italia dal marito per 3 mesi. Marito in Italia da 2 anni. Obbligo ripresentarsi  
al rientro.
· F 1996, éleve: minore. Madre vive in Italia. Padre deceduto. Si reca per vacanza.
· M 1997, allievo che vorrebbe passare le ferie con la madre. Buona impressione allo sportello. Ci fidiamo.
· M 1992, étudiant: Si reca dallo zio, impiegato presso l'ambasciata senegalese alla Santa Sede.
· F 1938 madre di alcuni figli residenti in Italia. Ha già avuto un rifiuto per RF. Adesso vuole visto per TUR per  
ferie.
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anything; usually s/he just informs the person of the refusal and makes him sign the forms. 
Applicants usually try to ask for explanations, but officials answer by reading the refusal letter,  
which actually does not explain so much.
In the form, a list of multiple choice boxes states that a visa is refused if the applicant: 
presents a false travel document (1); gives no justification for the purpose and conditions of the 
intended stay (2); provides no proof of sufficient means of subsistence for the duration of the 
stay nor for the return to his/her country of origin/residence (3); has already exhausted the 
three months of the current six-month period (4); has been issued an alert in the Schengen 
Information System for the purpose of refusing entry (5); is considered to be a threat to the 
public policy, internal security or public health of one of the Member States (6); provides no 
proof  of  travel  medical  insurance,  if  applicable  (7);  presents  supporting  documents  or 
statements whose authenticity or reliability is doubtful (8). 
The text associated with the last box (9) corresponds exactly to the normative transposition 
of the notion of migratory risk:  “your intention to leave the territory of the Member States 
before the expiry of the visa could not be ascertained”. Thus, a refusal is always possible, even 
though the application is complete. Next to some evident and objective motivations (1, 4, 7), the 
refusal  could  also  be  founded  on  manifold  vague  and  porous  reasoning,  subjected  to  the 
discretional interpretation of the consular staff. According to my fieldwork observation, cases 8 
and 9 are the most used, often combined. In the words of the Head of the Visa Office (int. 1):
four of them [the boxes] are the most used, these are: unreliability of the documentation, 
box 8; migratory risk therefore the impossibility to establish the wish of the return that is 
box 9; box 2, according to which the purpose of the travel has not been justified; and box 3 
that it is the lack of economic means. Sometimes we also use box 7 that it is the lack of the  
Schengen insurance… but it is  difficult, everybody knows about that.  Now there is the  
possibility to modulate the refusal but also these [motivations] are rather vague therefore 
people do not really understand the reasons for which the visa is denied and they often ask 
us explanations, especially if it is an Italian citizen inviting them. There is not enough time 
to give them explanations at the counter and we actually do not even want to... because 
here, in this country, the fact of giving explanations is sometimes... I mean... as to fill the  
gap and to allow them to prepare ad hoc documentation, which sometimes is a fake. I say  
it above all because when we give a refusal we give it to people that have brought unreliable 
documentation  and  those  people  who  insist  it  is  sometimes  for  trying  to  find  the 
possibility  to  add  that  document,  even  fake,  that  could  allow  them  to  have  the  visa.  
Because of that we try to avoid this close approach... because refusals are often caused by 
that.
In the following paragraphs are some examples of annotations on application forms, all for 
tourism  visas,  which  were  then  refused.  The figure  in  brackets  is  the  number  of  the  box  
indicating the reason for refusal:
· F 1987 housewife (9)
Housewife invited by her husband who does not want to do the family reunification. The 
applicant does not convince. A “wife” who is not reunificated by a husband who does not 
want her by his side. Reasons do not seem good.
· F 1985 student (8, 9)
She declares to be invited by a friend since courses of accountability will start in February 
(she  is  attending the second year).  1st usv.  The date of  the fight  reservation does  not 
coincide with the date of the health insurance. And there is no return fight!
· F 1953 retired (2, 3)
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She declares to be invited by the son-in-law. She is informed of documents required. Lack  
of economic guarantees and documentation of the family relationship. 
· M 1987 economic operator (8)
The bank account is false! See verifications.
· M 1970 driver (2, 7)
He declares to be invited by a friend and a cousin. He has already been in Europe (see 
passport). Insufficient requirements. Lack of the insurance and fight reservation.
· F 1987 director assistant (3)
Secretary invited by the brother-in-law for holidays. Insufficient requirements.
· M 1987 student (9)
Student going to Italy for Christmas holidays. Invited by C., met here. The women “invites” 
frequently  but her previous “friend” brought non complying documentations.  Even the 
present does not convince!
· M 1995 student Arabic, Gambia (3)
Going to Italy with the invitation of the Italian wife of his father. 38
 
Furthermore, one of the reasons for refusal can be the presence of an alert in the Schengen 
Information System,  and in  these cases  the  applicant receives the following letter  from the 
Embassy:
J'ai le regret de vous informer que la demande de visa que vous avez présentée auprès de 
cette Ambassade n’a pu être accueillie par nos services. En effet, vu l’article 4, paragraphe 2 
du d.lgs. 286/98, modifié par la Loi 30.07.2002 n. 189, ainsi que l’article 6-bis du D.P.R.  
18.10.2004, n. 334, régissant le refus de visa, nous vous communiquons que votre demande 
de visa pour “..........” a été refusée sur la base de l’article 5, paragraphe 1, lettre d), de la 
Réglementation (CE) n. 562/2006 (Code Frontières Schengen) et sur la base de l’article 4, 
paragraphe 6 du T.U. 286/98, modifié par la dite Loi 189/2002 – en considération du fait 
que vous résultez signalé dans le Système Informatif Schengen comme inadmissible dans 
l’Espace Schengen.
As regards an appeal against this decision, according to Italian law it is the same procedure 
as for other visa refusals, but for SIS data in particular the authority to address is the Ministry of 
the Interior, Department of Public Security, or, if the answer is not satisfying, even the Data 
Protection Authority:
(…) vous pourrez éventuellement présenter recours, dans les 60 jours suivants la date de 
38 Original version (fieldwork's notes):
· F 1987 ménagère (9) Casalinga invitata dal marito che non vuole fare il ricongiungimento familiare. L'intervenuta 
non convince. Una “moglie” che non viene ricongiunta da un marito che non la vuole accanto. Le ragioni non ci  
sembrano buone.
· F 1985  élève  (8, 9)  Dichiara di essere invitata dall'amico per 3 mesi perché i corsi di contabilità inizieranno a 
febbraio (frequenta il 2° anno). 1° vsu. Data prenotazione aerea non coincide con data assicurazione. E poi niente  
ritorno!
· F 1953  retraitée (2, 3)  Dichiara di essere invitata dal genero. Di essere a conoscenza della documentazione da 
presentare. Mancanza garanzie economiche e documentazione provante il legame di paretela.
· M 1987 operateur économique (8) Il c/c è davvero falso! Vedi verifiche.
· M 1970 chauffeur (2, 7) Dichiara di essere invitato dall'amico e cugino. Già stato in Europa (si veda passaporto).  
Requisiti insufficienti. Mancano assicurazione e prenotazione aerea.
· F 1987 assistente de direction (3) Segretaria invitata dal cognato per le ferie. Requisiti insufficienti.
· M 1987 étudiant (9) Studente si reca in Italia per vacanze natalizie. Invitato da C. conosciuta qui. La signora  
“invita” frequentemente ma il  suo precedente “amico” aveva prodotto documentazione non conforme. Anche il 
presente non convince!
· M 1995 student arabic, Gambia (3) Si reca in Italia su invito della moglie italiana del padre.
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réception de la présente communication, auprès du Tribunal Administratif de la Région 
Lazio par l’intérmédiaire d’un avocat.  Le recours devra être notifié, sous peine de nullité  
(ex art. 144 c.p.c. et art. 11 R.D. n. 1611 du 1933), auprès des bureaux de l’ “Avvocatura  
dello Stato” compétente, qui - conformément à la règlementation italienne - représente 
l'Administration de l'Etat. Le droit d’accès, de rectification ou d’annulation des données 
insérées  dans  le  Système  Informatique  Schengen  pourra  être  exercé  en  s’adressant 
directement au “Ministero dell’Interno – Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza – Ufficio 
Coordinamento e Pianificazione delle forze di Polizia – Divisione N.S.I.S., Polo Anagnina 
Palazzina B, via di Torre di Mezzavia, 9 – 00173 Roma”. Au cas où la réponse est estimée 
insatisfaisante,  vous  pourrez  vous  adresser  au  “Garante  per  la  protezione  dei  dati 
personali”,  Piazza  Montecitorio  n.  115/121  –  Roma”,  en  déposant  une  plainte  afin  de 
vérifier les données personnelles faisant l’objet du signalement dans le S.I.S.
The official in charge at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that the number of 
appeals does not exceed 1,000 in a year. “People need to have money to pursue the appeal”,  
concluded the official.
According to Italian law, procedures are free of charge as regards the right of the family unit 
(ex art. 20 law decree 150/2011), but there is a fee to be payed in case of appeals of Schengen  
visa  denials.  Moreover,  in  case  of  Schengen visas'  applicants  there  is  no  legal  aid  (gratuito 
patrocinio) available, because the provision of this is applicable to the foreigner only if regularly 
resident in Italy (Giovagnoli 2012: 37).
Therefore, appeals against visa denials mainly concern family reunification visas and very 
few are concerned with Schengen visas. According to the data of the MFA official in charge, 
there were 406 appeals in 2011 and 486 in 2012, of which approximately 60 were for Schengen 
visas in 2011, and 66 in 2012. The official also states that “in appeals for Schengen visas for 
tourism we win. It is easy to demonstrate the migration risk from the economic condition of the 
applicant”. It means not only that the appeal route is hardly accessible from abroad (both in 
financial and practical terms) but also that it is even very difficult to demonstrate legitimate 
interest in the issuance of the tourism visa.
Statistics
Statistics on visas that will be taken into account here include applicants from all countries 
of competence of the Italian Embassy in Senegal. Visas delivered by the representation partners 
are not in the statistics while the ones collected by honorary consuls are included. 
First of all, we consider the percentage of uniform Schengen visas (USV) and national visas  
(NV). In 2010, out of the total of 7,109 delivered visas, 4,954 are national visas (69.7 %); in 2009, 
the figures are 4,617 out of 6,576 (70.2 %). Of the total of national visas issued for Senegal, 83.3 
%  in  2010  and  71.6  %  in  2009  are  visas  for  family  reunification,  followed  by  those  for 
subordinate work (around 10 % in 2010; 20 % in 2009). In a general framework, in 2009, Italian  
Consulates delivered 21.5 % of NV and 75.1 % of USV. The trend in Senegal seems therefore to  
be in the opposite direction of the Italian national trend, but on the same trend as that of other 
emigration countries, where there is a wide use of  ex post entry channels (as amnesties and 
quotas) as well as of family reunification, and at the same time there are not relevant data on 
work visas. It is also interesting to note that Senegal is at eighth place in the table for numbers of 
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applications for regularisation in 2009, and it is the only one of the first ten countries present in 
this classification which does not also fit in the top 10 for the release of NV for work (Caritas 
2011: 117).  Thus, the family reunification visa is the most numerous category of visas being 
issued, clearly showing the sedentarisation process of work migration and/or the effectiveness 
of the migration network.
As regards Schengen visas, the main motivation for visas being issued is tourism, with a 
percentage of 42.2 % in 2010 and 38.72 % in 2009, followed by business visas, invitation, and 
mission. Tourism visas, together with business visas, also have the highest percentage for refusal 
rate.
Now we consider internal statistical data from the Italian Embassy in Dakar covering the 
six  years  2005 to 2010,  taken from the L-Vis of  the Consulate (see Table 8).  At first,  if  we  
consider all  visas  issued,  we notice a  progressive  increase  from 2005 to  2008,  with  a slight 
downward trend in 2009. From 2006 to 2007 the number of visas issued increased by 3,413, and  
compared to 2005 the total for 2007 has more than doubled. The last decrease must be read in 
the light of scandals which took place at the Italian Embassy during 2008. Schengen visas were 
sold by a high official of the Embassy for about five or six thousand euros. 39 Visas were limited 
in 2009, implying even fewer visas approved than in 2007, but in 2010 there was slight increase  
in numbers issued.
Considering data by motivation of the visa, the first relevant change occurs in 2007, when 
there was an exponential increase in work and tourism visas, respectively growing by more than 
ten and four-fold. 2007 is the first year of reserved quotas for Senegal under the legal decree on  
migration fows (1,000 per year) and the same quota applies for 2008. The effects of quotas can 
also be seen in the following years, but for 2007 the visa numbers have also to be considered in  
the light of the second decree of 2006 (decreto flussi bis, 21 July 2006), which added 350,000 
entries for all who have lodged their application by the 21 July 2006. The first decree provided  
170,000 entries and applications received were about 520,000.
After several years of quotas set at 170,000, the 2008 quota was limited to 150,000 home 
care workers (from those who applied under the 2007 quota). Lower quotas led to a reduction  
in  infows  for  employment  in  2008,  although  these  are  visa  issuance  figures  and  include 
seasonal workers. The number of entries for employment fell further in 2009, when, due to the  
economic crisis, Italy did not enact a fow decree, but only an amnesty for the regularisation of 
domestic  and  care  workers  for  anyone  employed  since  April  2009.  Employers  had  to 
demonstrate adequate income or justify their inability to do so, as well as paying a 500 euro fine. 
The government received about 295,000 applications, fewer than originally predicted. 180,000 
were for domestic workers (maids and nannies) and the remainder were for care workers. By 
mid-March 2010,  about  85,000 permits  had been issued;  the  rejection rate was about 6.3% 
(OECD 2010). Those of Senegalese nationality are in eighth place for applications, accounting 
for 13,646 or 4.63% of the total (Ministry of the Interior 2009).
39 Sold visas  were  estimated  at  about  2,000.  The only  agency who spread the news  was  Il Messaggero:  'Senegal, 
inchiesta su visti falsi per 6.000 euro. Rimosso un funzionario dell'Ambasciata Italiana', 11 October 2008. See also:  
'Traffico irregolari. Da Dakar a Roma con visti falsi: indagato diplomatico italiano', MeltingPot.org, 15 October  
2008.
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* See note 31.
**  Rome, World Swimming Championship 2009.
Table 8. Visas issued by the Italian Consulate in Dakar by types and year (2005-2010). 
Produced using data published by the Embassy of Italy in Dakar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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A number of legislative changes were made in 2008-2009. In 2008, stiffer penalties were 
applied for illegal migration and family reunification requirements were also made stricter.  In 
July 2009 the Security Package included reform of immigration law, further raising the penalties 
for illegal immigration, placing restrictions on access to public services for those with permits, 
and increasing the maximum detention period for undocumented foreigners from 60 to 180 
days. Fees were raised, renewal of residence permits was made to be conditional on integration, 
and a language test would now be required to obtain the long-term residence permit.
From 2007 to 2008, reunification visas almost doubled and the decrease seen in 2009 is only 
very slight. According to Caritas, Africa is the continent with the highest family-reunification 
visa rate: 43,227, 33.5% of the total are for “family reasons”, which means family reunification 
and visa to accompany a family member (Caritas 2010).
Moreover, the existence of derogatory visas, granted by representatives of Member States 
abroad in order to maintain good relations with local government, should be noted. It is not  
possible to quantify them in our case-study, but, as an example, in a French consulate in an 
African country, the derogatory dossiers represented, in July 2007, a quarter of the 80,000 visas  
issued in that year (Spire 2008: 26).
A further interesting piece of data is the number of refusals, and in order to obtain this 
information it is necessary to estimate the gap between applications and issuances. The data 
clearly shows a decrease from 2005 to 2007 in the percentage of refusal in terms of the total 
number of visas issued. In subsequent years there is a small but constant upward trend until  
2010. It is worth mentioning here that the refusal of visas appears in the statistics only if the  
application is lodged and the Visa Office rejects it, as a result of its assessment. If the application 
is considered incomplete, as in manifold cases, officials can suggest that the applicant should 
supplement it with supporting documents. Civil employees can not directly deny a visa, nor can 
they refuse to accept the application, but they can suggest that it should be supplemented. The 
Italian Consulate in Dakar tries to do this, giving detailed information to the applicant at the 
front office or afterwards, to avoid refusals. Other Embassies accept all applications and then 
reject the unsatisfactory ones. Anyway, it is an extremely variable approach because it is up to  
the Head of the office to give directions in this matter, and Consuls as well Heads of Visa Offices 
change every four years in accordance with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' system.
Finally, as we saw in Chapter Four, limited territorial validity (LTV) visas are issued only for 
humanitarian reasons or in the national interest. But the Consulate can issue this type of visa 
even if the applicant does not meet the requirements to enter into the Schengen area (i.e. due to  
SIS  alert  or  prior  consultation)  but  nevertheless  the  Consulate  does  want  to  issue  the  visa 
anyway.
In 2010 there was an example of this at the Italian Embassy in Dakar. A LTV visa for health 
care was issued to an applicant with a SIS alert for expulsion. He was the fiancé of an Italian  
citizen and he had serious health problems. Although the Embassy informed the Ministry of the 
Interior and border authorities about the entry a week before, there were problems and he was  
not allowed to enter into Italian territory. Finally, he entered only because he had a liver crisis  
and he was hospitalised40. 
This serves to show that after the issuing of the visa, checks are anything but over, because 
the visa does not automatically provide a right of entry to the visa holder and it does happen 
that people are pushed back at the border because of the lack of some documents, for example 
the invitation letter or economic requirements (in cash).
40 At the time of my fieldwork he was in Italy, he has got married and he has a baby. I saw the pictures at the Embassy.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
(Right of) Family Reunification
Unlike type C visas, national visas for long stays (type D) are subject to national law. EU 
law, however, includes a provision stating that national visas also entitle their holders to short  
stays in other Schengen countries. The family reunification visas are type D, and in Italy the 
granting of them is governed by Italian immigration law (Consolidate Act on Immigration, 
Title IV).
In the first part of this chapter, I will go through administrative practices for the issuance of  
the nihil obstat (literally “no impediment to” pursuing the reunification procedure; nulla osta in 
Italian) merging the direct  experience of observations  with more general  refections on the 
process itself. 
The second part is focused on the control practices aimed at discerning the truthfulness of 
an  applicant's  documents  and  declarations,  possible  misuse  of  the  law  on  reunification, 
prevention measures and the right of appeal against denial of a nulla osta/visa/stay permit.
The Family Reunification route: Nulla Osta - Visa - Stay Permit
The right to seek the reunification with Third-Country family members is recognized to 
nationals and EU nationals, and it also applies to nationals of third countries holding an EC 
long-term residence permit in Italy or holding a residence permit valid for a period of not less  
than one year issued for subordinate employment or self employment, or for asylum, study, on 
religious grounds or family reasons.
According to the regulations on family reunification between third-country nationals, the 
term “family” only refers to the so-called nuclear family, consisting of the spouse and minor 
children, i.e. those younger than 18 years of age (art. 29 par. 1 (a) and (b), Consolidated Act). 
The law also provides for family reunification in cases of “dependent” children over 18 and 
“dependent” parents over 65 only in particular situations of disability or lack of financial means 
of support.
The status of spouse derives from the institution of marriage, the only legal instrument 
recognized by the Italian legal system for the relationship of a couple formed by a man and a 
woman,  which  is  considered by  the  Italian  Constitution  (art.  29)  to  be  a  requirement  for 
legitimate filiation. 
The procedure of family reunification consists of two phases. The first of these takes place in 
Italy, and it concerns the verification of objective requirements for the issue of the nulla osta by 
the Single Desk for Immigration in the province of residence of the family member. The second 
phase begins in Senegal only after the release of the nulla osta,  and this is concerned with the 
issuance of the entry visa (verifying family relationship and other features of the persons that  
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are involved in the reunification). This task falls to the Italian Consular posts abroad, and it 
demands the verification of the subjective requirements for the family member. Therefore, in 
order to explore the implementation of law within the reunification process it is necessary to 
study  both  phases,  the  first  taking  place  in  Italy  and  the  second  in  Senegal,  through 
consideration of field cases: at the Single Desk for Immigration of the Prefecture of Pisa (Italy) 
and at the Italian Consulate in Dakar (Senegal). 
Italy: house, income and the nulla osta
 
Three visits to the Prefecture of Pisa are usually needed: a first one for the lodging of the 
dossier, then one for the withdrawal of the  nulla osta and lastly on the arrival of the rejoined 
family members.
The  first  step  is  the  request  for  the  nulla  osta,  with  an  on-line  application  for  the 
appointment on the Ministry of the Interior's website. At the counter of the Single Desk for 
Immigration the necessary requirements are to be lodged (art. 29 par. 3 Consolidated Act). The 
application must be supplied with two fiscal stamps of 14.62 euros (one for the application and 
the other for the nulla osta) and two copies of the stay permit/card, declaring the availability of 
accommodation and the satisfaction of the income requirements.
Accommodation  requirements  are  very  strict  and  in  addition  to  the  copy  of  the  lease 
contract/property act/lease free of charge, it is necessary to prove that the housing complies 
with  hygienic  and sanitary  as  well  as  dwelling  suitability  requirements,  as  certified  by  the 
relevant Technical Office of the Municipality. Before the implementation of law 94/2009, which 
modifies  article  29,  housing  requirements  were  supposed  to  meet  standards  provided  by 
regional  law for public  residential  housing. With the introduction of  the  role  of  Municipal 
Offices, it is worth mentioning the risk of differences among procedures according to different 
understandings of municipalities (Cascelli 2010: 6). In the province of Pisa, the municipality of 
Cascina for example, does not release the certificate attesting minimum standards of the house,  
and the person who is the applicant is obliged to address a request for a suitable document to a 
building surveyor, paying 500 euros for this.
As regards the availability of adequate income, the Third-Country national  applying for 
reunification needs to provide evidence of a minimum annual income deriving from legitimate 
sources and not lower than the annual social allowance. This sum is increased by half for each  
family member to be reunified. For the reunification of two or more children younger than 
fourteen,  or  with  two  or  more  family  members  who  were  granted  social  protection,  it  is 
necessary to give evidence of an income not lower than twice the annual social allowance. The 
total income of cohabiting family members is considered. The applicant has to show their last  
income  declaration,  in  the  case  of  subordinate  work,  or  certificates  which  demonstrate 
autonomous work (registration certificate to the Commerce Office and a copy of their VAT 
number). 
According to my observations at the Prefecture of Pisa, few people compose the application 
on their own, the majority of people resort to patronages or to the “migration service centres” 
founded in recent  years,  which generally offer their  services free of charge.  It  is also worth  
mentioning the phenomena of people “helping” the applicant with the dossier, and asking them 
for money for this. 
During my fieldwork I had occasion to ask an applicant “did you do it [the application] 
yourself?” and the answer was “No, Mrs. …. helped me”. As for visa applicants at Consulates, 
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the  fear  of  mistakes  and  the  perceived  distance  of  the  institution,  as  well  as  the  lack  of 
information offices, leave spaces for formal and informal support. The very fact that the dossier  
is composed by an Italian citizen or an institution makes the applicant feel more confident,  
which  is  actually  justified  in  the  case  of  patronages  for  example,  because  of  the  direct 
relationship and mutual trust among officials of the Single Desk and the patronage's employees.  
“Dossiers received from the Acli [patronage] are perfect, we do not even check them” states an 
official at the Prefecture of Pisa. 
When the required documentation has been lodged, the Single Desk issues the nulla osta, 
which has to be sent to the interested relative and to the Embassy of reference. The issuance of 
the nulla osta is subject to the new maximum term of 180 days, introduced by law 94/2009 (new 
art. 29 par. 8 Consolidated Act) which has removed the provision of tacit consent on the part of 
the administration. This 180 days term was previously associated with the obtaining of an entry 
visa, and introduces the risk that the time elapsing before the conclusion of the procedure might 
become  excessive.  This  also  raises  doubts  about  contrasts  with  EU  law  that,  whilst  being 
permissive, stipulates that “as soon as possible and however within nine months from the date 
of  presentation  of  the  request,  the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States  shall  have 
written down their decision for the applicant”.41 The consequence of this development can be 
particularly severe bearing in mind that long waits for decisions entail consequences above all 
in relation to the inclusion of those minors to be reunited in the destination society.
When the nulla osta is ready, the Prefecture of Pisa calls the applicant for the withdrawal. 
Usually the practice takes a month if everything is correct, but often it can take as little as two  
weeks. In the case of lack of documents, the applicant must be called to complement the dossier 
within ten days according to the law, but the Prefecture of Pisa gives as much time as possible.  
“The Ministry did not say anything, they do not know how things work here, practically” argues 
an official.
Senegal, a galaxy of certificates
Together with the  nulla osta,  the relative who is  to  rejoin their  family members  has to 
present documentation certifying kinship,  marriage, age (in the case of a minor), and every 
other  relevant  certificate.  The Prefecture  has  to  assess  the  veracity  of  identity  and  of  any 
documents proving kinship. In Senegal the retrieval of certificates is a serious problem: births 
are  often  recorded  late,  archives  are  lost  in  foods  or  other  catastrophes  and  certificates  
themselves  are  not  easily  legible  because  they  are  handwritten.  Moreover,  falsifications  are 
common, and for applicants it is not unusual to find a stamp from a Minister obtained through 
friendship  networks.  In  the  Italian  Consulate  “original  false”  is  the  term  used  to  indicate 
certificates for which the distinction between fraud and truth is tenuous, in as much as the 
document is not really falsified but it is still not thought to be legitimate, with no possibilities 
open for further verifications.
The  reminder  list  of  necessary  documents  for  the  visa  application  distributed  by  the 
Consulate in Dakar is divided into three parts,  for parent, spouse and children respectively 
(available in the Annexes). For each category, the required certificates are listed. The common 
documents for the three categories are the form with an identity photo,  the  nulla  osta,  the 
passport, the birth certificate of the applicant and the family certificate. For the spouse, the 
certificate of marriage and, where appropriate, the certificate of recent divorce (less than six  
41 Art. 5 par. 4, directive 2003/86/CE (Cascelli 2010).
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months) are required. For the child, required documents are the certificate of marriage of the 
parents, the recent parental authorisation (less than three months) with the copy of the identity 
card of the parent and the pronouncement on the authorisation of the transcript of the birth42. 
The largest group of documents is made up of those which concern the parent: marriage  
certificate or death/divorce certificate of the spouse;  birth certificate of the child resident in 
Italy;  certificate  of  dependency  and  economic  guarantee  for  the  rejoined;  a  certificate  of 
“collective life” (which attests that minor children are living and dependants); copies of deposit 
slips paid by the child resident in Italy in the last year. The IPRES card and paying-in slips are  
also required in the case of retirement.
“Every act of civil status must be duly translated and legalized by a representative certified 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, concludes the reminder. However, from the 1 March 2010 it 
is no longer necessary to pay for the legalisation of the documents for a family reunification 
visa, and it is interesting to remember that before this date there were some very high costs 
associated with this  process.  A birth certificate or a marriage act  cost  10,515 CFA; a police 
record, a family record book or a parental permission cost 15,600 CFA.
Regarding costs for obtaining acts from the Senegalese Ministry of the Interior, these range  
between  200  CFA  and  500  CFA  for  towns  and  between  75  CFA  and  150  CFA  for  rural  
communities,  for  each  document43. The  price  of  an  entry  visa  for  family  reunification  is 
currently 49,200 CFA (75 Euros).
As regards waiting times for the issuing of the entry visa, the Prime Chancellor argues that 
(interview. 2):
three years ago the queue for family reunification was a problem, it was over six months 
waiting, now it has lowered down to two months-one month and a half, which is perfect 
actually because people ask immediately for an appointment, before having documents.  
Sometimes it has occurred that people arrive the day of the appointment and they did not 
have the documents ready. They came with the idea “I lodge the dossier, then when I will 
have everything I will come back”. We have to say no, because if I accept that application 
and it is incomplete I will refuse it and the person has to come and pay again. So now we  
told Africatel  to inform people when they give an appointment for family reunification 
that if the day of the appointment you do not have all required documents your application  
will be rejected at the counter, but the fee will be paid anyway because Embassy's resources  
were employed. You lost even the money of the appointment reservation because you have  
to fix another one and pay again.
After the lodging of the dossier, the applicant is called to an appointment after two weeks 
but usually integrations are needed. In most cases applicants have to go to the Embassy several  
times to complete the dossier and they can leave supplementary documents with the guardians 
at  the  entrance.  So  actually  the  application can  be  lodged  even  if  it  lacks  all  the  required  
documents, but the essential condition is to have the nulla osta.
Sometimes  at  the  lodging  of  the  dossier  the  official  finds  transcription  mistakes 
(discrepanza) in the nulla osta  (i.e. incorrect transcription of the name or the birth date), and 
thus the process has to be stopped and the error corrected by the Single Desk in Italy. This 
procedure takes time according to the workload of the Single Desk and usually it is not fast (a 
few weeks).
42 The sentence on the authorisation of the transcription of the birth is a judicial decision which authorises the official  
to register in the State Register of the place of birth, a birth up to a year after the event.
43 Source: http://www.demarches.gouv.sn/.
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The  interview  is  focused  on  documents,  checking  the  presence  of  all  the  required 
certificates, and the questions are mainly pro forma. Nevertheless, as regards the reunification 
procedure of sons, there is more attention and control: officials usually look at the height as well 
as the physical appearance of children, trying to assess if they are minors. Questions concerning 
the  father/mother  in  Italy  are  asked,  and  when  there  are  doubts  on  the  truthfulness  of  
declarations,  more  invasive  practices  of  control  can  be  put  in  place  (these  will  be  detailed 
further in this Chapter). Even on pregnant wives there is particular control because “we try not 
to let them go to give birth in Italy. As you know minors are less deportable...”, argues an official 
in Dakar.
Stay permit
If  the  visa  is  issued,  when  the  rejoined  family  member  arrives,  the  applicant  shall 
communicate it to the Prefecture. Every office decides its own best working practices, and the 
Prefecture of Pisa requires a fax within eight days from the arrival of the rejoined member. 
Often people  go directly  to  the  Single  Desk with  all  the  family  members,  which is  useless  
because they have to wait for their appointment.
With the coming into force of the Integration agreement, the rejoined family member has 
to sign this at the Prefecture, whereas before there was only a need for the communication of  
the arrival and the explanations for the issuing of the stay permit. “Previously, it [the procedure] 
took ten minutes, now it takes one hour” states an official of the Prefecture of Pisa. The eleven 
pages of the agreement must be printed in two copies, but the Head of the office at the Single 
Desk in Pisa imposes a requirement for four copies, being afraid of  ex post legal argument. 
Moreover, the rejoined family member is given a letter of appointment for the civic education  
course, credentials to check the status of the stay permit, and a certification of understanding of  
the agreement with the copy of the identity card of the accompany/translating person attached.  
This last document is specific to the Prefecture of Pisa to be sure of the comprehension of the  
person making the application.
According to my observations in Pisa, officials explain the agreement using an informal 
language, stressing on the fact that there is no exam after the course and no verification of  
points after two years. Finally, the rejoined family member has to pay a fee in order to get (and 
subsequently to renew) the stay permit for family reasons. The applicant is given an envelope 
for the request of the stay permit to be lodged at the Post Office, which must contain two copies  
of the visa and of the nulla osta, a fiscal stamp of 14.62 euro, a payment slip of 27.50 euro (for 
those under 18) or 127.50 euro. The fee to send the envelope is 30 euro. The person has then to 
attend an appointment at the police headquarters for fingerprints and photo, and the request for 
residence has to be lodged at the town hall.
Checking the “real”
While for Schengen visas the risk to be assessed is the potential for migration (overstaying), 
in  case  of  reunification  the  “risk”  is  the  misuse  of  the  law  through  false  declaration  of 
parenthood, marriages of convenience, or a false statement of age of the child (EMN 2012b). In 
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this section, I consider the measures taken to prevent misuse of the system, and the right of the  
applicant to appeal against a visa denial.
Misuse of the law on reunification
Although specific rules aimed at preventing abuses of the law on family reunification (as  
called for by the directives 86/2003/EC and 38/2004/EC) have not been issued in Italy, there are 
however some preventive measures. In particular, art.  29 par.  9 of the Consolidated Act on 
Immigration requires that  the request for family reunification has to  be rejected when it  is 
established that the sole purpose of the marriage or the adoption was to allow the person to 
enter and reside in the territory of the State. Moreover, par. 1 bis of art. 30 of the Legislative  
Decree  n.  286/1998  provides  for  the  immediate  revocation  of  the  residence  permit  if  it  is  
ascertained that there is no “actual cohabitation” after marriage. In order to discourage the so-
called  “marriages  of  convenience”,  law  94/2009  introduced  stricter  requirements  for  the 
acquisition of Italian citizenship by marriage with an Italian citizen. Article 11 of the above  
mentioned law amended art. 5 of law 91/1992, as follows: 
Italian citizenship can be granted following marriage, provided the following conditions 
are met: the foreign or stateless applicant must be married to an Italian citizen for at least 
two years,  and he/she  must  have  his/her  legal  residence  in the  territory  of  the Italian 
Republic; if the spouses reside abroad, the application can be submitted three years after 
the date of the marriage. Until the adoption of the decree granting citizenship, the spouses 
must not be legally separated and there must not be dissolution or nullity of the marriage  
or cessation of its civilian effects. 
Paragraph 2 of the same law also specifies that the above mentioned periods “are reduced 
by half if the spouses have natural or adopted children”. The same law 94/2009 amended also 
art. 116 par. 1 of the Italian Civil Code, as follows: “a foreign national who wants to contract a 
marriage in Italy must show to the Registrar”, apart  from the authorisation, “a valid Italian 
residence permit”. This provision, however, has been declared unconstitutional by the Italian 
Constitutional Court (decision n. 245 of 25 July 2011). According to the Constitutional Court,  
in fact, the right to marry is an inviolable fundamental one which cannot be restricted in a 
general, unreasonable and disproportionate way. The judgment of the Constitutional Court, in 
particular, has criticised the fact that the alien is treated differently as regards the protection of 
inalienable rights, that the restrictions introduced by law 94/2009 may give rise to unacceptable 
restrictions of the rights of the Italian citizen who wants to marry a foreigner who is staying 
irregularly.  The judgment has also criticized the violation of art.  12 (right  to  marry) of  the 
European Convention of Human Rights, as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court judgment of 14  
December 2010 (O'Donoghue and Others v. The United Kingdom).
A second type of misuse of the system could involve the false declaration of parenthood. 
When paternity/maternity cannot be precisely determined or in case of false documents, art. 29 
par.  1  b  of  the  Consolidated  Act  provides  for  the  option  that  the  Italian  Embassies  and 
Consulates may decide, at the expense of the interested parties, to issue certificates based on 
DNA tests, according to art. 49 of the Presidential Decree n. 200/1967. According to art. 2 par. 7 
of  the  Legislative  Decree  n.  5/2007,  implementing  the  Directive  86/2003/EC,  once  the 
authorisation for reunification is granted, the Italian consular authorities may issue the entry 
visa  only  after  verifying  the  authenticity  of  the  documents  proving  family  relationship, 
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marriage, minor age, and health conditions. These documents, therefore, when released by a 
foreign Country have to have been previously verified. It is worth underlining that only the  
authenticity of documents is contestable, not the truthfulness of them. Italy cannot interfere in 
the bureaucracy of another State.
Although there is no specific law punishing, the false declaration of parenthood, article 495  
par. 1 of the Italian Penal Code punishes anyone who provides false identity, statehood or other 
qualities applying to himself or others before a public officer with imprisonment from one to six 
years. In the case of false declarations to the Registrar, the term of imprisonment is at least two 
years.
Moreover, law 94/2009 introduced the penalty of imprisonment from one to six years for all 
who counterfeit or alter documents in order to illegally obtain a visa or a residence permit. If 
the fraud relates to an act or part of an act considered valid until there is a complaint of forgery,  
the period of imprisonment is extended from three to ten years.
Another form of possible misuse in the context of family reunification may be the false  
statement of the age of the child, considering the fact that the law recognizes a special discipline  
for the benefit of the minor child rather than for the adult child, who instead is entitled to claim 
reunification only  if  s/he  is  “dependent”  upon the  applicant.  In  the  case of  documentation 
issued by a foreign State, since such documents have to be previously verified, the Italian Court  
of  Cassation  has  stated  that  Italian  consular  representatives  may  undertake  all  necessary 
investigations to determine the age of those who require an entry visa in Italy, including the use 
of a bone densitometry examination (Court of Cassation, Civ., n. 1656, 25 January 2007). The 
next circular of the Ministry of the Interior (n. 17272, 9 July 2007) clarifies that if the report of  
the investigation has a margin of error, to protect the child, the minor age will be assumed as 
valid.
Finally,  to avoid “chain reunification” and discourage forced marriages between or with 
minors  intended  to  contravene  the  rules  for  entry  of  nationals  of  third  countries,  the 
Consolidated Act provides that the spouse is allowed to the reunification only if s/he is at least 
18 years old and the minor child enjoys reunification with the parent only if unmarried (art. 29 
par. 2 (a) and (b)).
Preventing misuse #1: certificates and police cooperation
To prevent misuse when applying for a residence permit on the ground of marriage of 
convenience  or  false  declaration  of  parenthood,  Italian  law requires  that  if  the  marriage  is  
celebrated  abroad,  a  certificate  translated  and legalized  by  the  Italian  authorities  abroad  is 
always requested, except in cases of exemption under international conventions. In cases where 
the marriage was celebrated in Italy, the Third-Country national must make a statement. The 
Police Office that receives the declaration is required to request the certificate directly from the 
civil registrar. In addition to the control of the certificate of marriage, before issuing a residence 
permit for family reasons, the Police Office carries out checks at the applicant’s home to ensure  
the existence of an effective cohabitation and marriage relationship.44
To check family relationships in cases where, in the stage of application for an entry visa, 
family ties cannot be documented with certainty by means of certificates or certifications issued 
by competent foreign authorities, Italian consular representatives request the examination of  
44 For a comparative study on family reunifications procedures in nine EU Member States, as well as provisions for  
preventing the misuse, see Pascouau (2011).
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DNA, at the expense of the parties concerned. To prevent misuse of the permit required for  
reunification  with  family  members  already  residing  in  Italy,  the  application  shall  be 
accompanied by foreign certification translated and legalized, and if the events giving rise to the  
family ties occurred in Italy (marriage, birth) both a copy of the passport and the document  
issued by the Office of Civil Status are required. In particular, in case of an application for a  
residence permit  in  favour of the child  born in Italy,  it  is  generally required that the birth 
certificate has a photo of the child affixed to it.
In Italy the problem of marriages of convenience and false declarations of parenthood is  
challenged  not  only  by  legislative  means,  but  also  by  State  Police  operations  aimed at  the 
identification and prosecution of such situations. In this type of operation, cooperation with 
other EU Member States and Third Countries involved represents a strategic priority.
At  international  level,  this  cooperation  takes  place  within  the  Interpol  network,  which 
draws together not only the results of collaboration with EU countries,  but also with those 
Third Countries that are mostly affected by the phenomenon. In this context, there is a constant  
attention from Italy to the transnational cooperation initiatives with countries associated with 
strong migratory pressure. 
In this regard, the recent “African campaign” led by the Chief of Police Antonio Manganelli  
is noteworthy. In recent years, Manganelli has visited several African Countries, as well as other  
Countries from the Middle East and the Balkan area, signing independent police cooperation 
agreements or other understandings under the auspices of Interpol. As a continuation of this 
national  strategy,  dictated by the commitments formulated in the Stockholm  Programme, a 
meeting initiative was launched, to encourage meetings between the Member States and the 
main countries of origin of migrants from Africa, with these meetings being chaired by Italy.  
Transnational cooperation was the focus of the Euro-African Conference held in Naples on 9 
February 2011, an event which saw the participation of many representatives of police forces 
from different African and European Countries, who have defined common elements in the 
analysis of criminal activities related to migration fows. Cases of coordination on future cross-
border investigations  and exchange of  information have emerged from this  initiative (EMN 
2012b).
Preventing the misuse #2: DNA and BMD tests
Since the documentation related to the family and parental relationships is not held to be 
reliable, the Consular Posts can use DNA testing, in order to verify “real” kinship, or the Bone 
Mineral Density (BMD) test, which mainly used to diagnose cases of osteoporosis but which 
allows – at least theoretically – an estimate of age within six months and thus the true age of  
applicants. The DNA technology is the only non-documentary method accepted for proof of  
biological kinship.45
The law  decree  160/2008 introduces  into  Italian  law the  possibility  for  Consular  Posts 
abroad to impose a DNA test requirement for the release of kinship certificates (as regards both  
children, be they minors or majors, and parents of the applicant in Italy), with testing to be 
done at the expense of the interested parties (new paragraph 1 b, art. 29, Consolidated Act). 46 In 
45 For a comparative overview on DNA testing in nine EU countries see Pascouau (2011: 41 and followings).
46 In 2008 in Italy there was also the Bertolini proposal (supported by Partito delle Liberta’, the right-wing party): it 
was aimed at allowing the use of the DNA test to obtain a family reunification visa, in order to avoid “the increasing  
irregular  migration fows which determine a  serious situation of  insecurity  and illegality,  not tolerable  in our 
country”. The proposal consisted of only one article which provides for the alien the compulsory requirement of the 
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particular, the test can be required when the kinship “cannot be proved with certainty through 
certificates or acts issued by competent foreign authorities, by reason of lack of an established  
authority,  or  however,  when  this  exists,  justified  doubts  on  veracity  of  aforementioned 
documents”. 
On this subject, article 2 of the Decree of the President of the Republic (D.P.R. 334/2004) 
should be mentioned, as this had already provided that “by reason of lack of an established  
authority or presumed unreliability of documents released by the local authority, [...] diplomatic 
and consular posts provide for the issuance of certifications [...] on the strength of verifications 
considered necessary, carried out at the expenses of interested parties”. 
Furthermore,  local  missions  of  the  International  Organisation for Migration (IOM) are 
already offering voluntary DNA tests to applicants for family reunification.  Such an opportunity 
had expressly been introduced by the decree 5/2007 but in the exclusive interest of refugees, for  
the  purpose  of  releasing  of  substitutive  certifications  from  Italian  Consular  Posts,  if  the 
interested parties could not prove their own family ties because of their status (new paragraph 
art. 29 bis, Consolidated Act: Cascelli 2010). 
The Italian collaboration with IOM began in 2001 in the Embassies of Nairobi and Addis 
Ababa; in 2003 it was extended to diplomatic posts in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Syria and Sudan, 
then to other Embassies where identification has been a serious problem. In April  2005, the 
Director  of  the  Regional  Office  for  Mediterranean  area  and  IOM  Mission  Chief  in  Italy 
proposed to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs greater use of DNA tests for citizens of other  
Countries  where documentation  is  unreliable  or non-existent  (IOM 2002).  In this  way,  the 
possibility of proof was established for applicants who, for various reasons cannot produce valid 
documentation as proof of their kinship. They can now require the DNA test to be carried out 
on a “voluntary” basis by IOM offices, where the necessary test kits are distributed.
The IOM office in Dakar works together with the Italian Consulate for DNA tests.  The 
medical kit is provided by IOM and the sample is then sent to Italy to be analysed. Applicants  
have to pay a fee both in Senegal and in Italy. Apparently, in Senegal there are no laboratories 
able to carry out this type of analysis. According to an Embassy official in Dakar “it is kind of  
forbidden to have a DNA test  here...  I  tried to look for a hospital  able to do it,  but it was  
impossible. And I think it is because here men do not want to prove they could be sterile”. 
As regards BMD tests, the Italian Embassy in Dakar relies on a radiologist in a hospital 
called “La Clinique” close by, and the fee of the test is 30,000 CFA. The test aims at ascertaining 
the  bone  age  according  to  the  cartilage  growth.  An example  of  the  test  result  is:  “selon la 
disposition des cartillages de croissance l'age osseux est compris entre 14 et 15 ans”. 
The Consular official in charge of family reunification argues that “often children are clearly 
older than they declare and may be over 18. It happened that they send their little brothers to 
make the BMD test in their place, so for five-six months I went to the hospital and I assisted at  
the test. Then everything was fine and the real age came out”.
Regarding this second tool of biological control, a sentence of the Italian Supreme Court 
has declared the activity legitimate as it was carried out by the Italian Embassy in Accra, which 
used the BMD test to deny a young Ghanaian an entry visa in Italy to rejoin her mother, who 
was regularly resident in Italy. The X-ray of the skeletal apparatus had ascertained the age of 
twenty-five  years  old,  against  the  minor  age  declared  and  certified  by  the  applicant. 
DNA test for the reunification with a blood-relation. In France, the Mariani proposal of 2007 introduced the DNA 
test  in an experimental way,  but only for motherhood, and was facultative  until  2010. The use  of the test  was  
forbidden before this proposal.
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“Understood  that  the  certifications  released  by  the  foreign  State  are  valuable  only  in  that 
Country, the Italian consular posts can proceed to all the necessary administrative checks with 
the purpose to establish the real age of those people that asks for the visa for entering Italy,  
among which is the BMD examination”.47 
Officials  at  the Italian Consulate in Dakar apply an ample threshold of tolerance to the 
results of the examination, considering a margin of error of two or three years of age. However,  
it is worth stressing the obsession with fraud, which leads to the use of numerical results in the  
achievement of a real  technologie du soupçon  (Cette France-là 2010).  The  distinction among 
“true” and “false” minor or among “true” and “false” parents shows the systematic mistrust that 
rules in the good management of visa applications and the transformation of data with medical  
authenticity into a judgement which has juridical integrity is worrisome.
The negative outcomes of the test are obviously a reason for the refusal of the visa, as well as 
the lack of documentation of familiar linkages or the refusal to do a DNA test, which can also  
lead to a denial. Other reasons for refusal are the marriage ex post the request of the nulla osta 
because  it  had  been  celebrated  only  at  the  mosque  and  was  registered  later  with  the  civil  
authorities,  as  well  as  the expiration of the  nulla osta,  although for ministerial  dispositions, 
timing is stopped at the first contact with the Embassy (according to provisions the nulla osta is 
valid for six months). 
In the case of a SIS alert, the standard letter of refusal is issued but the applicant has the 
right to appeal and the alert can be removed in favour of the family reunification.
Right to appeal
Article 30 par.  6 of the Consolidated Act provides that the applicant may appeal  to the 
monocratic judge against the refusal of the visa, the  nulla osta,  or the stay permit for family 
reasons, and against other measures of the Administrative Law on the right to family unity (and 
therefore  also  in  principle  against  the  alleged  withdrawal  of  the  stay  permit,  in  case  of  
investigation subsequent to fraud). 
Unlike  other  types  of  residence  permits,  which  are  raised  on  mere  legitimate  interests 
(administrative law judge’s jurisdiction), the residence permit for family reasons is a necessary 
deed when applicable, and integrates the object of a subjective right. This is the reason why the 
jurisdiction of all disputes regarding residence permits for family reasons is ordinary (see Court 
of Cassation, Civ., Sec. United, n. 383, 12 January 2005). 
The special local jurisdiction is exclusive of the monocratic judge of the place in which the  
interested party resides (art. 30 par. 6 Consolidated Act, notwithstanding the rules on the court  
of claims  ex art. 25 Code of Civil  Procedure). The Court deliberates in closed session, after 
hearing the person concerned (pursuant to art. 737 ss. Code of the Civil Procedure). Since this  
is a contentious process, it is necessary to form an adversarial procedure with the Ministry of 
the Interior. 
Against the decree issued by the Court it is then possible to submit a complaint pursuant to 
art.  739  of  the  Code  of  the  Civil  Procedure  at  the  Court  of  Appeal  (within  ten  days  of  
notification of the decree by either party), and to appeal in Cassation under art. 111 of the 
Constitution. Recently the law decree 150/2011 ex article 20 introduced a summary procedure 
(rito sommario di cognizione) unless otherwise specified (Giovagnoli 2012: 38).
Moreover, the same paragraph 6 of article 30 provides that the decree that grants the appeal 
47 Supreme Court, Section I Civil, Sent. n. 1656, 25 January 2007.
120
may  order  the  issuance  of  visas  in  the  absence  of  nihil  obstat for  family  reunification.  In 
conclusion,  the  article  provides  that  the  proceeding shall  be  exempt  from stamp duty  and 




In this dissertation I have aimed to contribute to what I stated in the Introduction was for 
me the most  relevant  research stream regarding human mobility:  the obstacles to access to 
movement, and in particular the visa device. In so doing, and in concentrating on practices 
associated  with  the  Schengen  area,  I  hope  I  have  made  it  possible  to  see  the  day-to-day 
implementation of these practices as a clear manifestation of a process of partition between 
those for whom the path to mobility is smoothed and speeded up, and those condemned to  
immobility. 
In the following paragraphs, I will review the issues that have been addressed within the 
various  sections  of  this  dissertation:  the  implementation  of  Schengen  visa  policies,  the 
development of a “local knowledge” and practices of discretion in operation at the Consular 
level, the “war on frauds”, the blurred notion of “risk”, and the filtering processes experienced by 
people  who  can  or  cannot  move.  After suggesting  further  questions  for  study,  I  will  then 
conclude this work.
Implementation, shifting out and down
My experience at “the other side of the counter”, and in queues with visa applicants, has  
provided the major component of this  work,  which explores the daily consular practices of 
bordering.  I  am  going  to  summarise  here  the  most  important  findings  of  my  fieldwork 
concerning the act of translating or reformulating the law on Schengen visas at the micro level. 
Following  up  Guiraudon's  idea  of  “venue  shopping”  (a  term  she  used  to  describe  the 
activity of finding the setting,  or venue, which offers the best prospect of achieving desired 
policy goals), there does seem to be a growing removal of visa procedures from the visible realm 
of public debate and the policy-making of the administration in charge.
As I said in Chapter Five, the lack (or sometimes the complexity) of information about visa 
application  steps,  coupled  with  the  sparse  presence  of  Embassies  and  Consulates  on  the 
territories of states, led to the development of large informality zones and the use of official 
intermediaries (“shifting out” of the foreseen implementation setting). As regards the informal 
market,  services  offered  by  démarcheurs or  other  intermediaries  (translators,  copy  centres, 
security guards, carabiniere, etc...) actually fill the gap left by the Embassies. As described by one 
of my interviewees,  they act as a “front-front office”, and on the one hand they constitute a  
source of support for applicants in dealing with visa application practices, but on the other 
hand, there is a human and economic cost for users, increasing time for collecting information 
and increasing the ultimate cost of the visa application. 
Additionally,  I  highlight  the  growing  trend  of  Embassies  to  outsource  the  actual 
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implementation  of  services  to  external  providers,  which  deal  not  only  with  the  fixing  of 
appointments (as Africatel does for the Italian Embassy in Senegal), but also with the lodging  
and the delivery of dossiers and passports (as done by AVA for the Embassy of Portugal in 
Senegal, and as also carried out by several private agencies for Italian consular posts48). 
The resources in Consulates are limited, and therefore the response from the Member States 
is to outsource in order to save costs, both in terms of human resources and physical spaces. On 
one hand, it is acknowledged that the EU imposition of visas on 135 countries entails a huge  
number of applications to be processed; on the other hand, there is doubt over whether the  
increase in the price of the visa from 35 to 60 euro from 1 January 200749 has resolved the 
budget tension (Beaudu 2007). Moreover, the limit of half the price of the visa for the service fee 
(30 euro) does not take into account either the local context and the cost of living in different 
countries, or the exemptions from visa fees as set out in article 16 of the Visa Code, with the  
perverse  effects  of  the  price  increasing  in  countries  where  the  service  fee  was  lower,  and 
potentially worrying consequences as regards the dubious situation of family members of EU 
citizens (Beaudu 2009: 123). 
Although the privatisation of portions of these public services seems to occur mainly for 
financial reasons, it is still worth underlining the growing trend of outsourcing and its spread 
among the majority of Embassies of EU countries. Nevertheless, when outsourcing is not the 
main solution (as in the case study presented), the role of consular officials in implementing 
procedures via “street-level bureaucracy” is fundamental. 
Beyond  EU  regulations,  Schengen  policies  are  first  of  all  operationalised  by  national 
ministerial circulars, but when they are implemented at “street level”, the practical knowledge 
stemming from the  local  context  is  the main instrument at  play  (“shifting down” from the 
foreseen  implementation  setting).  The  knowledge  of  the  country,  of  the  administration 
apparatus and of people's behaviour is collectively shared by locally-situated officials, and is 
hierarchically approved by the Head of the office. Although officials do not decide in concrete  
terms on applications, they have enough decision-making room to enable them to act as street-
level bureaucrats, directly interacting with recipients, developing coping strategies and routines 
to simplify the nature of their job. 
The use of  profiling and categorisation to classify  applicants is  a significant  part  of the 
decision-making  process,  and  at  the  time of  the  interview or  the  note-taking,  officials  will 
categorise applicants on one side or the other of the line of trustworthy/untrustworthy. 
Application  forms,  supporting  documents,  interviewing  and  the  storing  of  photos  and 
fingerprints are presented as straightforward instruments in what is described by those who 
operate it as a transparent process. However, the granting of a visa is actually contingent and 
dependent on a wide range of factors which may or may not work in the applicant's favour.  
When analysing  the  visa  application  process  at  the  Italian Consulate,  I  have  witnessed the 
important  role  of  discretion  within  the  decision-making  processes.  Consulate  staff 
acknowledged  the  use  of  discretion,  but  framed  it  as  a  margin  of  fexibility  within  the  
interpretation  and  application  of  the  law.  Applicants,  by  contrast,  were  aware  that  the 
convincing presentation of certain papers could enhance their chances of being granted the 
desired visa, and they underestimate factors of uncertainty and volatility that they experienced 
within the interpretation of legal and regulatory frameworks.
By studying  rather than presupposing  the  place  of  law and discretion  in  conditions  of 
48 Some examples of these private agencies working with Italian Embassies: Ivao in the FYROM  http://www.ivao-
mk.com/ - Vfs in Morocco http://www.vfs-it-ma.com/ - Idata in Turkey http://www.idata.com.tr/  . 
49 Council Decision 2006/440/CE, 1 June 2006.
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departure, I suggest we will be able to come to understand how access to mobility is associated  
with  high  costs  for  some  and  not  for  others,  and  how  this  constitutes  a  very  filter  of 
discrimination which is present in the Schengen regime.
To  conclude,  the  EU's  aims  of  harmonisation,  bureaucratisation,  and  user-friendly 
Consulates are unachievable because of the very nature of the visa regime, where the approach 
is  neither  statistical  nor  standardised,  but  au  cas  par  cas (Infantino  2010).  Even  the 
operationalisation through the Local Schengen Cooperation cannot really harmonise practices, 
because of the way in which elements of discretion and the personal understandings of consular  
officials are constantly coming into play.
Frauds, Migratory Risk, and the “Past Future”
Supporting documents are the only criteria fixed by the EU legislation as evidence with 
which  to  assess  applicants'  intentions,  and  Local  Schengen  Cooperations  are  in  charge  of  
sharing  knowledge  and  developing  tools  to  assist  in  assessment  of  this  information.  As  a 
consequence, these documents become the field of investigation par excellence in order to avoid 
frauds, making officials act like police officers. 
The problem of “original false” does not concern only Senegal and the fight against false  
declarations is not new. There were “false tourists” in the 70s, “false refugees” in the 80s, and 
now there is the generalised suspicion of false partners, false marriages, false paternity, false age, 
false artists, false  whatever,  in the offices of Social Services as in Consulates,  due to blurred 
notions which define the line of inclusion or exclusion. In his study of the administration of  
migration in France, Spire (2008: 119) describes the operation of this guerre à la fraude:
dans chacun des domaines, l'infation de mesures législatives laisse aux agents subalternes 
le  soin d'interpréter des notions particulièrement  foues,  comme la “bonne intégration” 
pour les étrangers, les “actes positifs de la recherche de l'emploi” pour les  chômeurs ou 
encore l' “isolement” pour les mères seules ayant la charge d'un enfant. (…) Inquiets quant 
à leur avenir ceux-ci [les agents des services] se sont réapproprié  cette croisade morale 
contre la fraude qui leur est présentée comme une condition de survie de l' état social.
As I said previously, in the case of Consulates the notion of “migratory risk” is not at all 
clearly defined, and from fieldwork (Chapter Six) I observed that individual consular officials 
feel that they are assigned to the mission of tracking down misuses of applications. It is worth 
noting that there is a diverse understanding of the term “misuse”, which includes interpretations 
which are not limited to the assessment of the “migratory risk” and to fighting the possibility of 
overstaying  (since  illegal),  but  also  extend  to  assessment  of  the  “risk”  of  potential legal 
settlement of the applicant (e.g. pregnant women). 
In contrast to  the legal  texts  that refer  to  “migratory risk” and “irregular  immigration”, 
investigating local practices followed by the consular staff underlines another side of the risk 
issue,  which  for  the  staff  concerned  warrants  significantly  more  attention  (an  aspect  also 
observed by Infantino, Rea 2012). Although legal, this way of settlement is considered illegal by 
Consulates, with a prevention approach also applying towards “chain migration”, which means 
the possibility of going to stay in the country of destination and gaining a legal status through 
124
family networks (this is widely referred to as  immigration subie  in the French debate: Fassin 
2009).  I  agree  with  Infantino  and  Rea  in  classifying  these  practices  as  the  tricks  of 
implementation (ruse de la mise en  œuvre: Dubois 2010), rather than attempts to fill gaps in 
implementation procedures. 
Furthermore, the effect of the fuidity of the concept of risk goes far beyond the matter of  
not having requirements, leaving a wide margin for discretion, approximation, discrimination, 
and uncertainty. It is in particular worth noting the thin line of separation between C and D 
visas. The legal differentiation between the two is transgressed by the practical examination of  
applications,  which  are  treated  separately,  but  with  the  same  investigation  approach  and 
practices of control employed. The focus of officials is on the vrais motifs of the application in 
the case of C visas, and on vrais liens for family reunification. 
As  I  described  in  Chapter  Seven,  the  required  steps  for  completion  of  the  family 
reunification procedure  are  not  easy  in  terms  of  bureaucracy,  and  the  obstacles  interposed 
between the right to reunification and its concrete exercise have become so numerous as to act 
as deterrents in following a legal pathway to achieve family reunification. It seems that as the 
control of entries prevails on guarantees connected with the exercise of a subjective right and 
the  use  of  a  tourism  visa  to  enter  the  country,  then  the  strategy  of  overstaying  and  the 
subsequent  application for  the  stay  permit,  seem to many  applicants  to  be  a  more feasible  
solution.
The last consideration on the application of the notion of risk concerns its  “prediction” 
implications.  Since the  Visa Office has  to  assess the  intention of  the applicant  to  leave the  
Schengen territory, it  is clear that it is a  prediction of possible scenarios, within the limit of 
possible knowledge. Bigo (2002) uses the effective expression of futur antérieur, which literally 
means  a  grammar  of  the  “past  future”.  In  this  perspective,  visa  officers  are  supposed  to 
anticipate the future of a visa applicant from her/his identity and supporting documents, and 
thus  judge  whether  the  applicant’s  stated  purpose  for  travelling  is  genuine  or  not.  But  the 
genuineness of border-crossing purposes is not something that could be conveyed accurately by 
any storytelling documents and it is not even something that is knowable with any degree of 
certainty,  since  it  pertains  to  the  sphere  of  intentionality.  Here  the  biggest  issue  of  visa 
procedures arises. 
Prospective travellers are produced, selected and sorted out according to criteria which are 
most often unknown or ambiguous to them, using assumptions based on what they have not yet 
done, and may never do, but which nevertheless are held in the mind of the controller.  
As a conclusion,  the present  research is  an attempt to highlight the micro level  of  visa 
operations,  often seen as “non political” or “low-political” (Wang 2004), and to re-policitised 
the  experience  of  individuals  involved  in  visa  practices.  As  far  as  I  could  investigate  in  
Consulates,  it  is  rather  naive  to  consider  the  visa  only  as  an administrative  step,  and  it  is  
fundamental to acknowledge its political use, the political experience of every visa applicant,  
going  through  an  assessment  of  his/her  personal  situation,  and  of  his/her  economic 
possibilities, and in particular of the “intention to leave the country”.
To move or not to move
In order to grasp an understanding of visa issuing procedures and the operation of selection 
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filtering for people on the move from a certain country, we also have to look at the general  
discourse on migration from that country. In the case of this work, this concerns Senegalese 
migration into Italy (from interview 2, Prime Chancellor):
..the impact for Italy, in the case of Senegal, is minimal, I think. All the reports of the  
Ministry of the Interior argue that the Senegalese community is one among the fews not 
having an organised criminality. Senegalese do not cause damages, they work as well, even 
those irregulars, they send remittances and sustain the economy. We have to take it into  
account. The Schengen tool has maybe more efficacy where it is more needed, in countries 
with massive migration infuxes and a type of migration socially costlier. I am thinking 
about Albania of the 90s, Maghreb countries in the last years... Unfortunately, and I am 
sorry to say that, percentages of apprehensions and criminality prove that Balkan countries  
and North Africa are far more worrisome than Sub-Saharan Africa for us.
According to my fieldwork, the filters of selection deployed in Senegal are more focused 
towards the economic factor rather than the “security” one. The migratory risk is coupled with 
the  notion  of  reliability,  which  is  mainly  understood  as  being  economically  reliable.  As  a 
consequence, the access to mobility becomes harder for artists, students, young and unmarried 
people... but also for the poorer tourists, since this logic of good (economic) reasoning to move 
has the effect of excluding the possibility to travel, unless the would-be tourist is rich enough to  
satisfy the criteria.
Thus, I conclude by stressing the erroneous confusion of the terms movement (in the sense 
of accessing foreign spaces) and migration (in the sense of settlement abroad). EU Consulates 
actually limit the movement of people, restricting their potential mobility, because they can be 
categorised as at risk of migration. Thus, imposing visa restrictions to deter illegal staying - 
because of a presumption of risk - limits the very accessibility of movement. People who move 
get  a  visa,  people  who  would  migrate don't,  and  this  exclusionary  process  is  based  on 
bureaucracy, discretion, profiles, and the grammar of the “past future”.
According to the Prime Chancellor in Dakar (interview. 2), whilst talking about the visa 
system:
..the aim was not to limit the freedom of movement, indeed, the visa system has been 
created  to  give  the  freedom  of  movement  to  whom  show  to  have  simple  reasons  for 
exercising it: I want to go to Italy for tourism, so tourism visa. While at the same time  
restricting the possibility of migration, for which a stay permit is needed. If then the visa is  
used as overstaying channel, it is an illegal use of this device, it is a cop-out. But what 
would be the answer then, to remove the visa? It would penalise anyone who wants just to  
go to Italy and come back.
And discussing the efficacy of the visa regime itself in the attempt to differentiate among 
mobilities (interview. 2):
What is then the alternative? What is the best way? Honestly, I do not know. Because if  
immigration is an issue, if we consider immigration in Europe excessive, if we consider  
immigration a damage, a negative phenomena, if we believe we have to fight it, then the 
visa device is currently the only legal tool, agreed with emigration countries, which give  
the possibility to bona fide applicants not to be discriminated only because coming from a 
certain country. This is often overlooked, but in the absence of a system like Schengen the 
person who has what it takes would have big difficulties [to travel]. How can s/he ask to go  
to Italy? How would be the control carried out? At the border? But in this way, against an  
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administrative cost and a loss of time, who has what it takes, does not gain the right - 
because we know that the visa does not grant the full right to access - but an effective 
guarantee of enjoying the right to go into the Schengen area.
The perspective of the diplomat reverses the issue, underlining the freedom for which the 
Schengen regime seeks.  Other than taking for granted the need of border control,  which is 
obviously the state perspective in a world of nation states, it also lacks an awareness of the other 
side of the coin:  the non-reciprocity of visa requirements. There is  no visa  requirement  for 
Europeans in Senegal, but I did not face any difficulty in travelling. There is no visa required to  
travel to Gambia, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Guinea and Mali. And the list goes on.
For  centuries,  Europeans  have  taken  for  granted  that  it  is  their  right  to  visit  foreign 
territories, without asking permission. This situation continues until the present day. Do we find 
it normal that Africans need visas to enter Europe although we Europeans think it is our natural 
right to travel abroad? The irony is that while Europeans talk in belligerent terms of “combating 
illegal migration” from Africa, these Europeans can move to and settle in Africa with relative  
ease and nobody asks them the reasoning and intentions for their stay.
By way of conclusion, we cannot actually know what kind of travellers we are, we cannot be 
placed  in  fixed  performed  and  performative  categories,  we  cannot  decide  about  others' 
intentions.  I suggest that a critical approach should aims to reduce the (theoretical) distance 
among people on the move, linking my easy travel to Senegal with Pape's visa application for 
France or the boat of Tunisians heading towards Lampedusa, investigating the construction of 
obstacles  and  the  consequences  of  different  access  to  mobility  on  the  perpetuation  of  
inequalities among people. 
In this sense, to share knowledge on Embassies and visas is a contribution to make “visible” 
those  practices  that  are usually  hidden behind walls  of  bureaucracy,  in order to  reduce  the  
distance between those who require a visa to travel and those who do not require it. Because 
while in countries subject to visa requirements, the knowledge around it is “popular culture” 
(Sabry 2002, Alpes 2011), in countries enjoying a visa-free regime there is in the main a total 
ignorance of the somewhat Kafkaesque visa issuing procedures which are in operation.
For further research I think it could be interesting to explore how people respond to the 
discrimination which is in play in this  area of human life,  if  and what are the connections 
between a visa refusal (or the deterrence effect of applying for it) and the decision to use other  
channels of movement without documents. The “future perfect” is certainly not a perfect future, 
but I  hope  critical  research  will  attempt  to  contest  and  disrupt  the  partition  of  the 
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Snapshots from the Embassy of Italy in Senegal
Out/side
Cofee and Cigarettes    
Telecentre-Traduction in front of the Embassy
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Embassy's wall with information board  -  Out/Waiting for #1 -  Out/Waiting for #2 - Out/Waiting for #3
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  In/Security  -  In/the shadow  -  Service Visa
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ABSTRACT 
Who moves? Schengen Visa Policy and Implementation in Consulates. 
A fieldwork study from the Embassy of Italy in Senegal
The theoretical problem the research deals with is the unequal access to spaces, which I choose to  
explore through the visa device, the main instrument used by nation-states to control the access to their  
territories.  The  study  of  visas  can  give  us  interesting  insights  on  borders,  in  a  wider  meaning  than  
geographical national borders, which continue to represent a form of inequality imposed on people.
Virtually nothing is known about the practices that “people on the move” have to face to travel with  
proper  documents toward the countries  of  Europe  or United States,  and all  the consular bureaucracy  
which is deployed abroad passes largely unnoticed. The thesis is focused on the visa policy, exploring its  
implementation in Consulates.  The locations appropriate  for  the operational  case  study  are Schengen 
Consulates abroad, in countries subjected to the visa requirement, where these Consulates act as borders 
through the visa device, having the power to issue it or not, on the basis of an alleged “migratory risk” (the 
assessment of the intention of the person to leave the Schengen territory within the period of the visa).  
Here, decisions which lead to both mobility and immobility are made.
Thanks to a fieldwork experience at the Italian Consulate in Senegal, I could investigate what goes on 
in Consulates, how law is implemented, practices developed by the administration, how recipients and 
officials behave at the counter, and similar activities.  I will look at the implementation of visa policies at 
the  micro  level  of  Consulates  in  the  attempt  to  unpack  discourses  and  policies  around  migration, 
exploring selective filters and the construction of the category of (potential) “migrant” itself.  
In  the  First  Chapter,  I  illustrate  the  concepts  which  frame  my  understanding,  by  reviewing  the 
literature on the state control of movement through processes of categorisation and selection, the concept 
of border,  the implementation process of public policies  and the  micro level of  practices of discretion 
operated by Administrations. 
Subsequently, in Chapter Two, I will present the methodology of the work, describing methods I used 
to develop my research questions as well as difficulties faced in the fieldwork. The ethnographic approach I 
choose to study the Italian Embassy in Senegal includes the use of qualitative research techniques (direct  
observations, informal conversations, interviews), coupled with the collection and analysis of quantitative 
data.
The rest of this dissertation is organised in two parts, where the first has a contextualisation function 
relating to the second. In the first I describe the institutional framework (both European and Italian) of 
migration  administrations  and  policies,  while  in  the  second  part  I  will  dig  into  the  detail  of 
implementation of visa policies in Consulates, which I consider to be the actual “substance” of my present  
study. More specifically, in Chapter Three, I will trace the interrelated structure of Italian administrations 
in charge of migration management, in particular looking at the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, also including other (state or non-state) 
bureaucracies involved in the issue of migration (Municipalities, Post Office, Patronages). 
Chapter Four explores, on the one hand, the most recent regulations and tools of the Schengen visa 
policy, and on the other hand, Italian laws and the mechanisms for legal entry. 
In the second part of the thesis (Chapters Five to Seven) I will look at the micro level of policies, its 
implementation  and  the  working  practices  developed  at  the  Consular  level  in  the  country  under  
consideration.  It is  that aspect of the institutions which is  relevant to the people's  experience, not the 
people themselves, that constitutes the object of inquiry.  The aim of the study is not to account for the 
success  or  failures  of  the  Schengen  visa  policy,  but  rather  to  achieve  a  better  understanding  of  the  
institutional and routine bureaucratic mechanisms that lie behind it. I will show how the implementation 
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of the visa device entails procedures which are both long and unclear, and are in operation both on the  
side of the Consulate and the applicant. This issue will  be developed in three steps. First of all,  I will  
outline  the  visa  application  process  (Chapter  Five),  considering  the  access  to  information  and  the 
collection of required documents. Secondly, in Chapter Six, I will describe the visa examination phase,  
with particular attention to the very moment of the interview at the counter and the official's assessment, 
as well as the decision-making roles. Both these chapters based on fieldwork are focused on the direct  
experience  of  key  actors  interviewed  (diplomats,  officials,  employees,  démarcheurs,..)  and  on  my 
fieldwork's notes, in order to contribute to a concrete knowledge on Embassies and visas, making “visible” 
those practices usually hidden behind walls of bureaucracy.
Then,  in Chapter  Seven,  I  will  look at  the family  reunification procedure.  I  will  investigate  both  
phases, taking place in the country of origin (Senegal), and in the destination country (Italy – through the 
case study of the Prefecture of Pisa, Italy), in order to show the persistence of those practices of control on 
“the truthfulness of mobility” which may be present even in the case of a recognised right.
To conclude, I will recapitulate my findings in the light of my initial research questions, connecting 
them back with some theoretical considerations, and I will draw some final conclusions.
ABSTRACT
Chi si muove? La politica Schengen dei visti e l'implementazione consolare. 
Una ricerca sul campo all'Ambasciata Italiana in Senegal
Il problema teorico dal quale sono partita nel mio lavoro di tesi è l'acceso ineguale agli spazi esteri,  
che ho scelto di indagare attraverso il dispositivo del visto, il principale strumento utilizzato dagli stati  
nazione  per  controllare  l'accesso  al  proprio  territorio.  Lo  studio  dei  visti  può  fornire  prospettive 
interessanti sui confini contemporanei, intesi non solo come confini geografici nazionali, che continuano a 
rappresentare una forma di diseguaglianza imposta alle persone. 
Il percorso che le “persone in movimento” devono affrontare per viaggiare in Europa o Stati Uniti con 
documenti  regolari  è pressoché sconosciuto e  la burocrazia consolare all'estero ignorata.  La  tesi  parte  
dunque dalla politica dei visti e ne indaga l'implementazione a livello consolare. Il caso studio considerato 
sono i  Consolati  Schengen, che agiscono come confini attraverso il  dispositivo del visto,  detenendo il 
potere  di  concederlo  o  meno,  sulla  base  della  nozione  di  “rischio  migratorio”,  ovvero  la  valutazione 
dell'intenzione della persona a lasciare il territorio Schengen entri i tempi concessi dal visto. 
Attraverso un lavoro di  ricerca sul campo presso il  Consolato Italiano  in Senegal  ho indagato le 
pratiche degli  Uffici Visti,  le  prassi  messe in atto dall'amministrazione,  i  passi  che il  richiedente deve 
compiere  per  comporre  il  dossier  di  richiesta  del  visto,  il  comportamento  di  impiegati  e  utenti  allo  
sportello. Focalizzandomi sul livello  micro delle pratiche consolari, il lavoro di tesi mira a scomporre il 
discorso e le politiche migratorie, esplorando i filtri di selezione alla mobilità e la costruzione della stessa 
categoria di (potenziale) “migrante”.
Il  primo Capitolo del  lavoro presenta  i  concetti  chiave  che  definiscono il  mio quadro teorico di 
riferimento, ripercorrendo una revisione della letteratura sul controllo statale della mobilità attraverso la 
categorizzazione  e  la  selezione,  il  concetto  di  confine,  i  processi  di  implementazione  delle  politiche 
pubbliche e il livello micro delle pratiche burocratiche quotidiane dell'amministrazione. 
Nel  Capitolo  Due  viene  presentata  la  metodologia  di  ricerca,  illustrando  i  metodi  utilizzati  per 
sviluppare le  domande di  ricerca,  nonché  le  difficoltà  incontrate  nella ricerca  sul  campo.  L'approccio 
etnografico per indagare il caso studio dell'Ambasciata Italiana in Senegal ha visto l'uso di tecniche di  
ricerca  qualitativa  (osservazione  partecipante,  conversazioni  informali,  interviste),  oltre  alla  raccolta  e 
analisi di dati quantitativi. 
La tesi si suddivide poi in due parti, dove la prima ha la funzione di contestualizzare la seconda. Nella  
prima  parte  viene  presentato  il  quadro  istituzionale  (europeo  e  italiano)  dell'amministrazione 
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dell'immigrazione e le politiche in merito, mentre la seconda parte, che considero la vera “sostanza” del  
lavoro, è dedicata all'implementazione della politica dei visti a livello consolare.
In particolare, nel Capitolo Tre traccio un quadro dell'amministrazione italiana in carico del controllo 
delle  migrazioni,  ricostruendo in particolare  le  funzioni  dei  Ministeri  dell'Interno,  degli  Esteri,  e  del  
Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, includendo anche le altre burocrazie (statali e non) coinvolte in materia 
(Comuni, Poste, Patronati). Il Capitolo Quattro espone invece, da un lato, la normativa e gli strumenti  
della  politica  Schengen  dei  visti,  in  particolare  le  introduzioni  normative  più  recenti,  e  dall'altro,  la 
legislazione italiana e i meccanismi di ingresso legale.
La seconda parte del lavoro (Capitoli da Cinque a Sette) si concentra sul livello micro delle politiche, 
la loro implementazione e le pratiche sviluppate a livello consolare nel caso studio considerato. Oggetto 
d'interesse dello studio è il ruolo giocato dall'istituzione consolare nell'esperienza dei richiedenti un visto, 
e non i richiedenti stessi, dove l'obiettivo non è valutare il successo o il fallimento della politica Schengen 
dei visti,  ma piuttosto arrivare a una migliore comprensione dei meccanismi burocratici istituzionali  e 
delle pratiche quotidiane che vi stanno dietro. Mostrerò come il visto comporti procedure lunghe e poco 
chiare, sia da parte del Consolato che del richiedente. In primo luogo, lo studio ripercorre il processo di  
richiesta del visto (Capitolo Cinque), considerando l'accesso all'informazione, la raccolta dei documenti 
necessari, la consegna della pratica. Nel Capitolo Sei viene descritta la successiva fase di valutazione della 
domanda  di  visto  da  parte  del  Consolato,  con  particolare  attenzione  al  momento  dell'intervista  allo 
sportello e la valutazione da parte dell'impiegato consolare, nonché i ruoli decisionali sulle pratiche. 
In entrambi i capitoli di ricerca sul campo ho dato particolare rilevanza alla voce degli attori chiave  
intervistati  (diplomatici,  funzionari,  impiegati,  intermediari,..) così come alle annotazioni del  diario di 
ricerca, per contribuire a una conoscenza viva sulle Ambasciate e i visti, al fine di rendere “visibili” le 
pratiche solitamente nascoste dietro i muri della burocrazia.
Infine,  il  Capitolo  Sette  è  dedicato  alla  procedura  di  ricongiungimento  familiare,  dove  investigo 
entrambe le fasi, nel paese di origine (Senegal) e di destinazione (Italia - attraverso il caso studio della 
Prefettura di  Pisa),  al  fine di  mostrare la  persistenza delle  pratiche di  controllo  della  “veridicità  della 
mobilità” anche nel caso di un diritto riconosciuto.  Concludo con una rilettura degli esiti del lavoro di 
ricerca sul  campo alla luce delle mie domande di  ricerca iniziali,  in relazione anche a considerazioni  
teoriche, e traccio alcune conclusioni finali.
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